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Overview of Findings and Reflections 
Introduction 
Louise Sperling 
Tom Renilngton 
J on M. Ha u gen 
This volume contains eight case studies managed by CIA T, CRS, and CARE Notway in a project 
entitled, Assisting disaster-affected and chronically stressed communities in East, Central and Southern 
Africa: Focus on small farmer systems. The case studies were undertaken to evaluate various forms of 
emergency seed aid in the field and to couple these with analyses ofthe broader seed and crop systems. 
The objectives were to understand if and how vulnerable farmers are being helped by the kinds of 
assistance they receive-and how to move fotward on improving practice. 
The work was undertaken over a two-year period, in seven countries in A frica. In all cases, the seed aid 
practitioners were also engaged in the evaluations and reflections, so that "lessons leamed" could 
immediately influence the "next steps of practice." It is to the credit of the participating national 
agricultura! research systems and nongovemmental organizations (NGOs) that they were willing to take 
a hard look at the effectiveness oftheir interventions. Equally, the donors, both USAID/OFDA and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Notway, are to be lauded for promoting substantive follow-up on 
emergency assistance because such follow-up is rare. 
Table 1 gives the broad overview of the major features of the case studies: the countries in which they 
were undertaken, the stresses that originally triggered a decision to supply seed-related assistance, and 
the types of interventions that eventually unrolled. Note that the analyses ofthe real stresses changed as 
the work progressed. 
Table 2 hones in on the salient (defining) questions ofeach field program. Five ofthe cases address key 
features of specific interventions (such as introductions of new varieties), while three present overviews 
of the practice and evolution of seed aid on a country-wide basis. 
In the volume that follows, case study abstracts provide findings specific to the intervention and context. 
In this introduction, we step back-and reflect on the broader findings that emerge from this rare 
opportunity to examine seed aid across countries, across stresses, across interventions, and across 
different types of seed systems. 
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Uven•iew oJ Findings and Rejlections 
Tahle l. CIAT/CRS/CARE-Norway Project: Major Descriptors 
Case study descriptors 
Countries 
Content 
Burundi , Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
Drought, civil strife, flood , plant disease (and crop breakdown), 
distorted political economy 
Trigger Stresses 
lnterventions 
Crop foci 
• Direct seed distribution 
• Seed vouchers and fairs 
• Starter packs and targeted input distribution 
• Community-based seed production 
Maize, beans, cassava, sorghum, rice, millet, cowpeas, bananas, 
sweet potatoes 
also: wheat, barley, vanilla , cocoa, moringa 
Tahle 2. CIAT/CRS/CARE-Norway Projecl: Defming Questions 
Specific site Defining question 
Analysis of Specific lnterventions 
Eastern Kenya 
Northern Burundi 
Western Uganda 
Western Kenya 
Northern 
Mozambique 
Direct seed distribution and seed vouchers and fairs: what is their relative 
cost -effectiveness? 
Seed vouchers and fairs and the role of traders: who benefits? 
Seed vouchers and fairs: real agro-biodiversity gains? 
+-----
lntroductions of new (self-pollinated) varieties in period of crop breakdown: do 
informal farmer producer groups move quality seed, and quickly? 
lntroductions of new varieties in a period of crop breakdown: are there special 
concerns with vegetatively propagated material? 
Overview of Seed Relief and Evolution of Practice 
Malawi 
Ethiopia 
Zimbabwe 
Direct seed distributions 
Seed vouchers and fairs 
Starter packs/targeted input programs 
Community-based seed production 
Direct seed distributions/local procurement 
Direct seed distributions 
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General fmdings: See d system s under stress 
Acute response implem ented in chronic stress contexts 
Emergency seed system assistance was delivered in six out of the eight cases in response to what was 
characterized asan acute stress. That is, acute seed insecurity was presumed to have been brought on by 
distinct, short-duration events that affected a significan! portian of the population. However, more 
in-depth analysis, in all six cases, showed the problems to be of a more chronic, systemic nature: e.g., 
declining productivity, water-related stress, ongoing civi l unrest, and/or misplaced political policies . 
The other two cases, both of crop breakdowns (one in westem Kenya with beans and the other in 
northem Mozambique with cassava), were the only ones in which prior assessments (or diagnoses) 
actually took place. These revealed that the "acute manifestation" was due to more systemic biotic, 
abiotic, and economic pressures: build-up ofplant disease, lack ofcrop rotations, declining farm sizes. 
The result of an "acute" response in a more chronically stressed context means that the problem is not 
al leviated and that seed system assistance is then needed~again and again. However, the effects of 
giving "acute" aid in chronic stress contexts are not just neutral (and may have a negative impact). 
During the second and third rounds of a id, one is not just starting from the same ( compromised) baseline. 
lncreasing evidence, within and beyond these case studies, demonstrates that aid given again and again 
distorts farmers' own seed procurement strategies (see Malawi case herein and Kenya case, Sperling, 
2002), undermines local seed/grain market functioning (Burundi case herein), and even compromises 
the development of more commercial seed suppl y systems (Zimbabwe case herein and Tripp and 
Rohrbach, 200 1 ). 
So, there are negative effects of giving acute seed aid on a repeated bas is, particularly for vulnerable 
fanners, for local and regional traders, and for the developers ofprivate enterprise. 
Chronic seed distribution promotes the em ergence 
of a re lief seed system 
Seed aid distribution is taking place in a large number of countries: onc season, two seasons, three 
seasons, and beyond. The giving ofseed aid is itselfbecoming a "chronic" acti vity. Table 3 summarizes 
the number of years seed a id has been given in severa( of the countries under study. Figures ha ve been 
amassed from actual govemment records, from NGO reports, and from the accounts of implementers 
working on the ground. There seem to be few checks for stopping such assistance (simply when funds 
dry up?) and deliberate exit strategies have not bccn planned. 
Table 3. Chronic Seed Aid Distribution 
Country 
Burundi 
Eastern Kenya 
Ethiopia 
Malawi 
Zimbabwe 
Seed Aid Distributions 
22 seasons since 1995 
1992/93, 1995/97' 2000/02, 2004 
Food aid 22 years since 1983/84 
Seed aid on and off during the same period 
9 seasons or more since 1992 
Near continuous since 1991 (food aid, seed aid, or both) 
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Overvieu· ofFindings and Rejlections 
The rise of a chronic seed aid system has been identified as a profítablc business opportunity for the 
entrepreneurial, who specialize in quick deli very ofa small range ofcrops. lt has also led to the rise ofa 
separate seed system based on relief, i.e., a "relief seed system" (see the Eth iopia and Zimbabwe cases). 
Relief seed systems are created to assist farm communities in post-disaster contexts and are based on the 
assumption that other seed channels (in both the formal and farmcr seed systems) are simply 
nonfunctional. 
Relief seed systems have evolved dramatically and differentially in di fferent countries in A frica, but 
their rise has been quick and steady. They seem to be of two basic types: in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and 
Malawi, there are commercially based reliefseed systems. This is because of the importance ofmaize as 
a commerc ial crop and the dominance of commercial maize in the seed market. In countries without a 
significant maize-based commercial seed sector (like Burundi ) or those with a niche market (Ethiopia), 
donors and relief agencies have always relied on the farmer seed system to source their seed for 
emergency redistribution. The functioning of such systems involves a straightforward set of steps: a 
disaster is declared, seed need is assumed, and then a well-establi shed chain of suppliers moves into 
action. 
No diagnosis and an assumption of lack of seed trigger 
seed-related disaster responses 
The lack of any diagnosis related to the seed system has now beco me a commonplace observation within 
the disaster literature (Sperling and Cooper, 2003). In practice, one of four strategies is employed for 
"assessing" seed security and none is sufficiently accurate or timely for assessing seed security among 
vulnerable farming populations: 
• No assessment is done at all-and seed need is assumed. 
• Food security assessments are effected-and seed need is assumed. 
• A crop production fall (decline) is measured- and seed need is assumed. 
• Lengthy surveys of fam1ing and rural production systems are completed- and the results are 
analyzed and written up-after emergency seed has been delivered. 
Within the cases documented here, only two instances of diagnosis or problem assessment were noted. 
Both were research-driven and related to an analysis of progressive crop fai lure--due to plant 
di sease/farming system pressures. 
In the absence ofseed-related needs assessment, the default option has been to assume that there is a lack 
of available seed. This has been done in a wide range of disaster contexts since the start of seed aid 
practice. 
Two sources of concrete information, from very different perspectives, indicate how incorrect this 
automatic assessment of lack of availabil ity often is. 
l . A growing number of studies have actually traced where farmers in "disaster" si tuations sourced 
the seed they planted- in areas where seed aid distribution had taken place. Table 4 indicates that in 
contexts where precise data were examined (and with larger sample s izes), relatively little of the 
seed sown came from emergency aid (with the importance of the assistance varying by crop and 
context) . This means that, as farmers were lining up to become beneficiaries of free seed aid, they 
were s imu ltaneously sourcing non-a id channels to access most of their needed seed supplies. 
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Tahle 4. lmportance of Relief Seed in Farmers' Overall Seed Supply during Disaster 
Periods 
% of seed planted 
Context Crop sourced through relief So urce 
Zimbabwe/drought/political Pearl millet 12* Bramel and Remington 
instability/2003 (this volume) 
Rwanda/war/1995 Beans 28** Sperl ing, 1997 
Kenya/drought/1997 Maize 11 Sperl ing, 2002 
Somalia/drought/2000 Sorghum 10-17* Longley et al. , 2001 
Somalia/drought//2003 Maize 3 Longley et al., 2001 
* 
** 
2. 
This figure includes seed delivered by NGOs and the govemrnent during the stress period, sorne ofwhich 
rnay ha ve been labeled " relief." During '"normal"' times, fanners access 5% oftheir pearl rnillet seed frorn 
these channels. 
The figure of28% carne from the first seed distribution, two rnonths after intensive fighting ceased. Relief 
seed was then distribution again, the next rnajor planting, and in January 1996, and onl y 6% ofthe bean seed 
shown carne via relief channels. 
This project also set out to assess seed availability via local seed/grain traders, who may supply 
seed in crisis periods. In Burundi, where secd a id has bcen given since 1995, 4 1 trad ers recounted 
the ir experience with seed sourcing over the last 1 O years of drought and war. Seventy-eight percent 
indicated that there had never been a problem with availabil ity. The other 22% nuanced their 
answers, w ith only one (item a below) suggesting an absolute lack at one point in time (see Burundi 
case, this volume). 
a. only once-during the 1993/94 war- when everyone was fl eeing (n= l); 
b. in 1993, when all seed had been bought up by the emergency NGOs; 
c. during the "events," seed was available in Rwanda (30 km away) but "my bicycle broke 
down"; 
d. the problem was price. 
Trader remarks highlight how re lative the term "availability" is and how directly linked it is toa trader's 
means. Those who source seed using bicycles. and with slim price margins, ha ve different parameters of 
ava ilability than those with large trucks (and who also eas ily cross borders). As this overview is being 
written, a large-scale commodity trader has been hired by the project to assess seed availabil ity in eastem 
Kenya- where government and NGOs have been distributing free seed on an impressive scale (for the 
second season in 2004). The Kenya analysis is drawing results comparable to the Burundian one: seed is 
widely available in local seed/grain channels. Via the Kenya case, this project has commissioned the 
commodity trader to construct a practica! checklist for assessing market func tioning (including seed 
availabili ty) from an expert point ofview. 
In sum, in tenns of assessment, the fi eld-based studies show that in multiple contexts ( e.g. , drought, civil 
strife, or both), farmers ha ve been able to access the large majority of their seed from local channels. 
Severa! trader assessments have further confim1ed the availabi lity of seed on a large scale-during 
periods ofoutside aid. Again, availability is a re lative term, and much depends on the means oftraders 
serving a region: their price margins, transport facilities, and seed sourcing networks. 
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Overvie1c of Findings and Rejlertions 
To date, only two types of cases have been identified that show when availability of seed in a disaster 
context may be a fundamental constraint.. The first case is where local seed on offer is no longer adapted 
to local growing contexts, often due to biotic and abiotic pressures (e.g., cases herein are in eastem 
Kenya, due to bean root rots, and northem Mozambique, due to cassava brown streak). Purists might 
label this problemas a seed quality constraint, rather than one ofavailability. However, the fact remains 
that fam1ers did not have anything to plant that would actually grow. 
The second case invol ves contexts where there have been substantial production shortfalls and local 
markets ha ve never sufficiently developed to deliver routine seed or planting supplies. In addressing this 
latter issue of availability and market failure, it might be useful to distinguish between spatial and 
temporal issues of availabi lity, or the lack thereof. Delving into the root causes for these lacks should 
encourage practitioners to move from a focus on seed aid to one on strengthening the seed system. 
Identijication of local seed/grain markets as a core e lementfor 
seed system stability 
The more one looks at seed systems in detail , the more the role o f local seed/grain markets appears as a 
central element in promoting seed security. Varied market-related find ings are emerging from direct 
field analysis: 
l . Market-sourced seed (especially for self-pollinated crops and cereals, in general, with the 
exception of maize) provides a core for fanner seed security, especially among the more vulnerable, 
e.g., in this volume, Burundi , Zimbabwe, and westem Kenya; scc also Rwanda (Sperling, 1997) 
and eastem Kenya (Sperling, 2002). 
2. Local grain markets, from which secd is obtained, have been shown to be more durable than 
expected in stress periods, with analysis showing their functioning in periods of civil strife (e.g .. 
Burundi) as we ll as in periods of drought and tloods. 
3. The genetic quality of seed sourced in markets is most oftcn acceptable to fam1ers, as it is generally 
grown in surrounding agroecological contexts . 
4. Surpri singly, the physiological and phyto-sanitary quality of seed purchased in local markets can 
also be partially regulated (through purchase from known contacts and rigorous farmer sorting). 
Laboratory analyses (for purity, health, and gennination) demonstrate acceptable quality 
parameters for the market seed examined. Such data do not mean that all market seed is of high 
quality. They do, however, firml y show that the reverse is not universally true. Market seed, a 
priori, should not be equated with low-quality seed. 
5. For the non-hybrids, local seed/grain markets are proving an important channel for moving new 
varieties, that is, new genetic materials developed by formal research systems. In fact, for some 
crop types, loca l markets seem to move new varieties more effectively than formal seed channel s. 
6. Markets ha ve provento be a useful so urce for re-accessing seed of desired types and quantities that 
has been lost or temporarily abandoned in stress periods. 
Given their pivota/ role in seed system stability- and resi/ience-one of the majar conclusions of our 
case studies is that local grainlseed markets must be strategically supported. not undermined. in 
post-stress periods. They provide a central core ofseed security. particular/y for the vulnerable . 
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Seed systems during crisis are generally resilient-except in cases 
of crop/variety breakdown 
Evidence shows that seed system resilience. of the local, farmer system, is the norm, rather than the 
exception during periods of stress. " Resi li ence" in this context means that seed channels continue to 
provide varieties and seed that farmers find of acceptable quality, and which wi ll grow w hen sown. 
Further, those analyses that focused on varietal di versity have generally found that major varieties are 
not lost- not during drought, war, nor even select cases of flood (viz. Ferguson, 2003) 
There are important exceptions to this observation on seed system resi lience. In areas of crop 
breakdown, when existing varieties no longer perform dueto fom1idable pressures ( usually plant d i seas e 
or declining fert ili ty), the local systems may not ha ve the capacity themselves to bring in new materials. 
Particu larly in cases where vegetatively propagated crops (e.g., cassava, sweet potatoes) provide the 
base offood security, outsidc assistance may become key. The problem o f cassava mosaic virus in East 
and Central Africa since the late 1980s demonstrates such need. 
Misplaced seed-quality parameters in emergency response result 
in overemphasis on "health" to the detriment of gene tic quality 
Issues of seed quali ty very much shape the types of seed assistance (and asset transfers) that can unfold. 
In emergency seed procurement, quality issues most often focus on whether the seed is certified or not 
(as many donors require fom1al verification as a prcrequisite for seed procurement.). Quality stereotypes 
ha ve equated certi fied and formal sector seed as bei ng of high germination and good seed health, with 
poor assessments applied to farmer seed (home-produced and procured from the market), which is 
stereotyped as generally poor. Case study analyses have shown that such labels can be deceptive. The 
quality of fom1al -sector seed may not be as advertised (this volume, see western Kenya case) and 
emergency-grade seed overa ll is of highly variable health and genetic quality (eastern Kenya case). 
Farn1er seed and market seed has also proven to be "objectively" of good qua lity, as assessed in 
laboratory analyses (western Kenya case). 
Some of the existing emergency interventions build in special measures to examine quality on a 
site-by-site basis, such as the catalyzing of regulating committees during seed vouchers and fairs 
(SV &F). Undoubtedly, additional mechanisms can be put in place to reinforcc acceptable quality 
standards. Minimally, seed on offer via emergency assistance should be as least as good as that which 
farmcrs routine ly sow. 
The focus on the seed health parameter of "quality" has di verted attention away from w hat is probably 
the more importan! quality issue for seed: the seed on offer, at the very least, must be adapted to the stress 
conditions at hand, and have generally acceptable crop characteristics. It is puzzling that genetic 
(variety) quality, in practice, has been g iven second priority in emergency responses. Varieties emerging 
from formal research sectors or on offer from commercial companies are assumed "good enough," 
whether or not they have been selected for use in the regions of stress or for growing under the 
management conditions practiced by beneficiary farmers. 
Optimally, the genetic quality on offer should anticípate on-s ite stresscs; e.g., they should be early 
maturing for those facing a hungry gap or resistan! to speci fi c disease prcssures in areas with marked 
pathogen build-up. 
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Overview o[ Findings and Rejlections 
lntervention-specific findings 
Moving from the overview of seed system insights, the section below summarizes findings tied to 
specific types of support interventions aimed at seed systems. 
Broad pattern of default: DSD to CBM 
At present, a narrow range ofresponses are employed to bolster seed systems in stress. Diagnoses being 
mínima! or perfunctory at best, the evolution of a seed-related assistance pattern is well established (see 
Malawi , Zimbabwe, Ethiopia cases, this volume) During emergencies, institutions jump to direct seed 
distribution (DSD) by default. During recovery, institutions move to community-based multiplication 
(CBM) schemes by default. So seed system assistance is characterized by "option by default." 
Practitioners supply interventions they feel competent to implement, but not necessarily the 
interventions that are needed for a given context. 
DSD versus SV&F: Misplaced comparisonquestion 
The capability to conduct a range of interventions has created a divide in practitioner circles. Seed 
vouchers and fairs are being implemented by those who sense the need to go beyond seeds and tools 
(S&T), while S&T (re-baptized as direct seed distribution) remains the baseline response. 
OSO is about seed~nothing more and nothing less. It assumes that seed is not available-and 
orchestrates a seed transfer. If done well , a range of varieties and crops can be delivered to a large 
number ofbeneficiaries~and in time for sowing. The DSD approach is neither inherently good nor bad. 
SV&F at first glance, focuses on seed, and also involves a seed asset transfer. The baseline assumption 
for implementing SV&F revolves around a problem of"access," and, more explicitly, that there is nota 
problem of availability in the disaster-affected zones. 
As one looks more deeply, however, into the two asset-related transfers, it is clear that an "apple and 
orange" comparison has been put forward. While both use seed as their most visible vehicle, SV &F are 
implemented to achieve a much broader, and substantially different, set of goals (see eastern Kenya, 
Burundi, western Uganda case studies, this volume). They are designed to build and stimulate local seed 
systems under stress, as well as to give a boost to local trading economies in potentially unstable times. 
In supporting local li velihood systems, SV&F, defacto, lay the immediate ground for moving away 
from outside or externa! assistance and link reliefand development aims from the early stages ofa crisis. 
Fine-tuning SVFS-only through follow-up 
Three aspects of SV &F were al so subject to greater scrutiny in the case studies, and unanticipated 
insights emerged only because of follow-up: 
• Agro-biodiversity not necessarily supported by SV &F 
Contrary to expectations, crop and variety divers ity is not enhanced, a priori, by the SV &F approach, 
but neither are the systems defacto undermined. The diversity present ata fa ir cannot reflect the range of 
diversity in the farming system (sorne crops do not cometo market and less sought-after varieties are not 
put on offer by traders). The diversity actually put on offer is also not necessarily accessed by farmers: 
sorne seek fírst to fill their vital needs- before their optional wants. More diversity-related transactions 
could be promoted if, from the supply side, traders and seed sellers were given incentives to put more on 
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offer (prizes? or modest subsidies for offering diverse and new varieties?). Demand might a lso be 
stimulated, iffanners were given more knowledge about the products on offer, as well as the opportunity 
to purchase " tria!" size samples. Ultimately, the demand side will have to be more strategically 
stimulated if and when SV &F are reshaped to become innovation and li velihood fairs per se. SY &F 
could serve as important venues for putting new varieties, management ideas, or agro-enterpri se 
products on offer. They are already being used to move non-seed inputs (as done at the trade input fairs 
in Mozambique). 
• Trade rs are intportant bene ficiaries in SV &F, but not at farme rs' exp e nse 
Oespite the small scale of transactions, traders at SV &F are often drawn from surrounding locales, and 
prove key for injecting immediate cash into the stressed economy. 
Traders emerge as a clear beneficiary group in SV &F, in addition to, but not at the expense of, 
beneficiary buyers. In the Burundi case, those sell ing at fairs tended to emerge from a specialized trading 
class, with an evident female bias (women cannot easily own land). In westem Uganda, traders were 
generally seed sellers, as likely to be fu ll -time fanners as not. 
Traders particular! y benefit from fairs in tenns of (a) receiving direct cash payments (versus having to 
extend credit), (b) having a high volume of daily sales, and (e) obtaining prices slightly higher than on 
the open market. 
As traders are generally local, investment in their business translates into investment into the local 
economy, with the SV &F trader revenues in Burundi, for instance, being reinvested particular! y in 
commercial activit ies ( including the extension of credi t). 
The coupling offanner beneficiary and trader beneficiary seems to be a "win-win" situation. However, 
as the scale ofSV&F widens, the relative client benefits should be examined more closely. 
• Analyse s of c o st-effective ness not conclusive 
Severa! cost-effectiveness analyses have been done comparing OSO and SV &F, and their resu lts are not 
conclusive. Much depends on the scale on which activities ha ve been implemented and how these have 
evolved through time (the capacity-building costs become lower as the relatively "unknown 
approaches" become more fami liar). The major d ifference in cost-benefits are not the direct effects so 
muchas the ancillary effects on surrounding seed, cconomic, and livel ihood systems. In tenns ofseed, 
per se, greater diversity is available through SY &F, as well as the important fact that they all ow fanners 
to select among that diversity in response to their own particular stress si tuation. 
Variety introductions are potentially key in a crisis but seed 
dif.fusion channels need to be focus of equal concern 
New varietal introductions can make a key di fference to production and stabi lity in cnsts times. 
However, the cases indicate severa! pivota! decisions that need to be made concomitantly with an 
assessment that new varietal material may be warranted. 
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• Varie ty basket should be on offe r 
A choice o f varieties shou ld be on offer- part icularly as the context is one of stress. ln both westem 
Kenya and northem Mozambique, the basket of options helped to ant ic ipate probable future breakdowns 
of disease resistance. 
• N ot ever·ything new is good 
Not everything new is good. Maize hybrids, in particular, are often promoted as new items on offer in 
stress contexts. However, their perfonnance is very uneven as an emergency input (see Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Malawi cases). This underl ines the need for a strategy for ncw introductions to be 
careful ly weighed- particularly ifthe recipicnt herself is not the one selecting the precise emergency aid 
option. 
• The choice of specific diffusion cha1mels is critical for new varie ty impact 
The choice ofdiffusion channels for moving new vari eties (formal, infonnal, market, groups offanners, 
etc .) is potentially as important for achieving impact as the quality of the product being diffused. 1t 
makes stra tegic sense to build on channels that move products fast, widely, at low cost. The case 
analyses showed unimpressive results for working through in fonnal farmer seed mu ltiplier groups, but 
remarkable d iffus ion results via local grain/ eed traders. Parallel to a foc us on diffusion channels, the 
varied seed production mode ls being promoted throughout A frica ( ofwhich farmer multiplier groups are 
one) need to be designed from the start with an explicit impact-oriented outreach focus- ifthey are to 
reach the vulnerable. 
Severa! of th e case studies showed that new varieties in themselves can have an important impact in 
speci fi c kinds of stressed contexts. However, research needs to speed up its product- development 
response if it is to become a reliable partner in a lleviat ing disaster scenarios. 
Seed security: 
Moving forward the frontie rs of disaster response 
The steps for improving the effectiveness of seed aid practice seem fa irly straightforward, and 
implementable over the next fi ve years. They involve a combination ofpositive strategies: (a) promoting 
real leaming evaluations that can fine-tune current implementation modes, (b) broadeni ng the basket of 
potential response options-through low-risk case scenario tests and capacity build ing, (e) supporting 
assessments of seed system sccurity prior to intervention (which w ill also encourage methods/tools to 
become further refined), and (d) developing strategies for "emergencies" that factor in chronic stress. A 
fundamental step for moving forward also involves acknowledging that "more of the same"- repeated 
OSO or SV &F-may not be achieving the expected humanitarian aims. Most of the recommendations 
below encourage a mov ing away from knee-jerk emergency responses- towards interventions where 
implementers better understand what they are implementing and w hy. 
Evalua tion of assistance 
The scale of seed aid has escalated since it was introduced as a complement to food aid about 15 years 
ago. Given (a) its impressive scale, (b) the observat ion that seed a id has become repetitive, and (e) 
evidence that aid can have negativc as wcll as positive effects, evaluation should be promoted for a range 
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of contexts. Perfunctory evaluations (such as tallying the quantity of seed distributed to x number of 
farmers) serve as little more than self-confirming checklists that implementers have "done a good job." 
Instead, evaluations should minimally have two salient characteristics: 
• First, they should be situated within a brief analysis ofthe functioning of on-going seed systems-and 
frankly assess how important the aid was versus other seed-related sources and support. Taking a 
sample of farmers and finding out w hat they actually sowed and why is quick, easy todo, and gives a 
reality check on the importance of the intervention. 
• Second, each evaluation should program a critica! question follow-up so as not to repeat the same 
mistakes: e.g., did the poorest get seed? (why or why not?) Was the crop profile on offer appropriate? 
(why or why not?) Did farmers re-sow the new varieties deli vered? (why or why not?) 
The money required for such follow-ups is modest in relation to the funds employcd in the intervention 
itself. The time required for such punctual questions involves but a matter of weeks. If such modest 
time/money commitments prove obstacles for implementing organizations, they should not be 
intervening at the heart of vulnerable farming systems. ldeally, evaluations of seed system support 
should also be framed within assessments of the larger regional economy and livelihoods, but it is 
unrealistic to expect the quick-response teams to conduct in-depth analyses. So for moving evaluation in 
seed aid forward, we suggest the practica! and do-able, and consigo the " ideal" (more in-depth) to 
specialists. 1 
Broadening the base of response options: 
Focus on capacity building 
The repertoire of seed system responses in emergencies has already been broadening, particular! y in the 
last four years, with seed fairs , vouchers, direct cash payments, input and livelihood fairs, etc., Further 
follow-ups analyzing and comparing these options are underway in a number of countries and are sup-
ported by severa! agencies (e.g., in Ethiopia: OFDAIUSAID and ODI). Unfortunatcly, implcmentation 
of response alternatives is frequently de- l inked from an analysis of the problem at hand (see next point 
on needs assessment), and pro-linked to the current speci fic capacity ofthe implementing organization. 
There is an urgent need to build the capacity of implementers to engage in a range of response options. 
Without an explic it donar focus on practitioner capacity building, we will get more ofthe same. 
Refinement and promotion of seed system security assessments 
(SSSA) 
The methodology for doing seed system securi ty assessments is quickly being honed, and key e lements 
can be applied immediately. Work during the last few years has shown which seed channels to focus on 
during acute crisis (90% of the time, own production and local seed/grain markets) and how to assess 
whether such channels are functioning, at what level, and for whom. 
For instance, one of the tenets of the SSSA Guide (CIAT/CRS/CN, forthcoming) is that "production 
shortfall is not necessarily equal to seed shortfa/1. " Modeled after actual Eastcrn African farming 
parameters, the example illustrated in table 5 clearly shows that one can lose most of the harvest (88% 
for beans and even 99% for sorghum) and stil l have enough sced to sow-assuming that all the crop 
harvested can be saved for actual planting. 
l. At the time of this writing, CRS has conducted ex post evaluations of seed vouchers & fa irs in Gambia, Ethiopia, and 
Zimbabwe, and has recently completed a meta-analysis ofthc SV&F approach (Bramel and Remington, forthcoming). 
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Our understanding now of the importance of local grain/seed markets is also contributing to the SSSA 
guides and shifting the focus of methods beyond assessing what farmers actually have in their hands 
(own production and home stocks) to what they can access. Two key parameters shape market analysis 
in the SSSA in particular. Differences between the seed and grain on offer need to be factored in across 
crops, and a spatial overlap must be la id o ver market zones and zones of agroecological adaptation .. In 
all cases, elements of a comprehensive SSSA thinking guide are in place- and such seed security 
assessments- as distinct from food-need calcu lations- should be encouraged in the coming years. Only 
with more focused seed security assessments can we hope to more toward more tailored support 
responses. 
Tahle 5. The Relation between Harvest (Home Production) and Seed Needed for 
Sowing (Theoretical Example, Eastern Mrica) 
Crop 
Surface area per household 
Seeding rates per hectare 
Sowing needs per surface sown (1,1.¡ ha) 
Multiplication rates of seed 
Harvest per surface sown (1,1.¡ ha) 
% of harvest needed to meet basic sowing needs 
Source: SSSA Guide (CIAT/CRS/CN, forthcoming). 
Factoring in chronic stress needs from 
the beginning of an emergency response 
Beans Sorghum 
1,1.¡ ha Y. ha 
100 10 
25 kg 2.5 
8 100 
200 250 
12.5 1.0 
Finally, we highlight an implication of one of our key find ings: that much ofthe acute response is being 
implemented in more chronically stressed contexts, where a swath of the population is continually 
vulnerable- usually dueto poverty. 
In such a context, the emergency response should explicitly work through a lens that anticipates features 
of such chronic stress. At a mínimum, interventions should be avoided that (a) expose farmers to 
increased risk and (b) have the potential to undermine functioning systems. In a positive vein, 
interventions should be promoted that (a) counter the stress but which al so (b) aim to strengthen farmers' 
own capacities, bolster the functioning of their farming systems, and stimulate growth in the local 
economy. We now know firmly, mostly through seed systems studies, that seed (in)security is rarely 
about seed- and almost always about poverty. Hence, those implementing emergency responses should 
now face the obligation to squarely address this poverty link--even during periods of stress. 
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Ahstract 
This case study describes the role of seed fairs in supporting, stimulating, and strengthening the local 
seed system. It analyzes local channels ofseed supply with a focus on understanding how they function 
in times of stress and how seed vouchers and fairs support local seed traders. The study is based on 41 
semi-structured interviews conducted with seed traders who participated in seed vouchers and fairs in 
Kirundo Province, Burundi, in February 2003. 
Results of the study show that seed traders at seed voucher and fa ir activities are an experienced and 
specialized group with formidable trading skills. Selling seed is more likely to be the primary occupation 
and exclusive revenue opportunity for women. Barriers to entry into the trade seed are not excessive. 
Seed fairs have a positive impact on the local seed system by stimulating social capital and kinship ties 
between traders and buyers, building seed-sourcing relationships that extend beyond the seed fair, and 
providing capital, which is predominantly allocated to local comrnercial and farm activity. 
The case should encourage seed aid practitioners in Burundi and beyond to take a longer-term and more 
holistic approach towards assessing and addressing seed needs. lt is also expected to help practitioners 
design and implement seed fairs that stimulate further local enterprise and give farmers access toa range 
ofinnovations, including access to new varieties, new products, and the varied inputs needed to intensify 
production. 
lntroduction 
Located on the westem edge of the Rift Valley, Bumndi is a land of hills and mountains with 11 
agroecological zones. The central plateau is scattered with countless streams, which create a landscape 
of steep-sided hills and wetlands in the val leys. The rainfall pattem is bimodal with rainfall peaking in 
April. The driest period occurs from June to September. The short rainy season usually lasts from 
October to December but is more hazardous and variable in length than the long ra iny season, from 
February to May. 
l. S. Walsh, J .M. Bihizi, C. Droeven, B. Ngendahayo, B. Ndaboroheye are affiliated with Cathol ic Relief Serví ces, Burundi. L. 
Sperling is with the lntemational Center for Tropical Agricu lture (CIAT). 
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Burundi 's economy is essentially based on agriculture, with small fanns providing over 90% of the 
population 's livelihood. The land-use system is diverse and comprised, with regional differences, of 
various components, including coffee, tea, maize, sugar, potatoes, and other food-based cropping 
systems. The natural vegetation has been degraded to the point where there is little forest left except in 
the highest elevations. 
The population of Burundi was estimated at 6,600,000 in 1998, with a growth rate of over 3% per year. 
In 1990, the average population density was estimated at 180 inhabitants per square kilometer. However, 
this figure varíes greatly from regían to region, with sorne areas showi ng a population density as high as 
400 inhabitants per square kilometer. Land pressure is one of the prime underlying causes of the 
Burundian conflict and is a significant contributing factor to food insecurity. 
Since 1993, civi l unrest and conflict has caused over 200,000 deaths and displaced over 700,000 people, 
both internally and externally. Burundian civil society has been undennined as a result of a combination 
of massive population displacement, a poorly functioning and substantially underfunded public sector, 
and continued fear and mistrust among large segments ofthe population. With the signing ofthe Arusha 
Accords in April 2000, the arrival of a government of transition in November 200 1, the peaceful 
transition of the presidency in May 2003, anda cease tire between majar belligerents in October 2003, 
there is significant hope that Burundi has turned the comer. 
Context of the study: The region and farming system, 
and recent interventions 
This study is took place in Kirundo Province, in the extreme northwest of the country, bordering 
Rwanda and covering an area of 1700km2. The province is divided into two natural agroecological 
zones: the Bugesera zone, which covers 65% ofthe province 's total surface and has an average alti tude 
of !350m, and the Bweru zone, with an average altitude of 1600 meters covering the remaining 35%. 
The study is focused on the Bugesera zone, which has the ecological characteristics of dry areas with 
poor rainfall of 900- 11 OOmm/year, a very long dry season of seven to eight months, and poorly 
developed schlerophyllic vegetation. Kirundo Province enjoys a fertil e soil, which can, under optimal 
conditions, produce a large variety of food and cash crops. The Bugesera zone 's economy is based on 
agriculture and Jivestock. The region is traditionally a producer of beans and sorghum, but bananas, 
coffee, cassava, and sweet potatoes are al so cultivated there. 
Agricultura! production and food security at the household leve! ha ve been devastated by the combined 
effects of drought and política! crisis. For the last six years, all ofKirundo Province, and particularly the 
Bugesera zone, has experienced asevere rain shortfall with declines of 70% of the nonn for 2000 and 
200 l . Farming families characterized as very poor and poor, with an average land area of less than one 
hectare under cultivation, make up 65% of households in the region. Households deemed "average," 
wi th one to two hectares under cultivation, represent 25% of the households. "Rich" households, 
accounting for 10% ofKirundo Province, have an average oftwo or more hectares under cultívatíon.2 
In Kirundo Province, as elsewhere in Burundi , seed assessments are based on assessments of household 
food security. without distinguishing between issues of access and availability (where access refers to 
2. Based on compilation of assessments of household food economy conducted by WFP and Save the Children-UK in Kirundo 
Province, July 2000 and January 2001 . 
Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking ReLief with Developmenl 
16 
S. Walsh et al. 
adequate means of acquiring desired seed through cash, barter, and social networks; availability refers to 
the presence of sufficient quantities of desired seed within reasonable proximity to people at critica! 
sowing periods). This conventional approach to seed aid tends to become a Pavlovian response to a 
misdiagnosed problem.3 Moreover, assessments have been based on seasonal calculations without 
regard to potentially more chronic problems related to seed systems. 
Traditional seed and tools interventions are, at a mínimum, two to three times the cost per beneficiary of 
seed fairs, while the economic benefits, to the community at large (who do not receive agricul tura! inputs 
from the intervention) are negligible.4 With conventional seed distribution, there is little evidence that 
the intervention supports the local seed system or addresses more chronic seed-system problems. 
Conventional seed distribution, under the coordination of the Food an Agricultura! Organization of the 
United Nations (F AO) is the dominant intervention through which seed needs are addressed in Burundi. 
The summary ofFAO-coordinated responses in the table be low is not exhaustive but it does provide a 
good representation ofboth the scale and scope of the international community 's emergency agriculture 
response over the past six years. 
Table l . Summary of F AO-Coordinated Responses lo Agricultural Emergencies, 
1997- 2002 
Metric T ons of Hoes Total Households Households served 
Year Beans (units) Served by season 
1997* 1232 o 166,155 83,077 
1998* 2937 210,640 367,962 183,981 
1999* 4742 271,829 547,472 273,736 
2000* 5020 115,725 596,185 298,092 
2001* 7107.5 206,800 677,352 338,676 
2002A** 2557.5 166,500 205,500 205,500 
So urce: F AO Burundí. 
* Two agricultura! seasons. 
** One agricultura! season. 
Catholic ReliefServices (CRS), Burundi has, up to the date ofthi s study, used an altemative approach to 
respond to seed needs in Kirundo Province. Over the course ofthree agricultura! seasons leading up to 
this case study, approximately 30 ,000 fanning households have had their seed needs met through the 
seed voucher and fa ir (SV &F) approach. 5 This approach responds to problerns of seed access, where 
farming families lack the income, resources, or social capital needed to access seed. The approach 
3. " In Pavlovian or 'respondent ' conditioning we simply increase the magnitude of the response elicited by the conditioned 
stimulus and shorten the time which elapses between stimulus and response ."- Skinner, B. F. ( 1953). Science and Human 
Behavior, 65. 
4. Numbers are derived from CRS experience with seed and tools interventions and seed fairs in Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, where the average cost ofseed per beneficiary ranged from $4.4 1 to $ 11 .02 per household ('Getting Offthe Seeds and 
Tools Treadmill with CRS Seed Vouchers and Tools'- Disasters Joumal , 2002, Volume 26(4); 3 16-328.) 
5. Through 2003, CRS and local partners have carried out seed fairs in Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, 
Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambía, and Zimbabwe, serving over 400,000 farming households recovering from 
man-made or climate-induced disaster. 
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involves supplying farming households that lack access with a voucher that is used to acquire seed . The 
vouchers are later redeemed by seed traders for cash. 
No formal assessment ofseed needs was conducted for any ofthe Kirundo seed fa irs. Comrnunities were 
targeted for seed based on a seasonal assessment conducted by F AO and provincial authorities. CRS, in 
coordination with local authorities, was given the mandate to respond to seed needs for specific 
communes in Kirundo Province. Local authorities, in consultation with the govemor of the Province and 
the Provincial Departrnent for Agriculture and Livestock (DPAE), selected the specific comrnunities for 
seed fair interventions. Coverage was, in principie, lOO% in the communiti es selected. 
The Burundi OFDA-funded study focuses on the SV &F traders, large and small, who participated in the 
Kirundo seed fairs.6 The aim is threefold: ( 1) to understand and quantify the impact ofSV &F at the farm 
leve!, (2) to get a better assessment of the economic effects of SV &F events on small seed traders, and 
(3) to get a better understanding of how the traditional seed system functions, its strengths and 
weaknesses, so as to design and implement interventions explicitly geared to alleviating acute and 
chronic challenges. 
Moving heyond access: The need to understand the local seed 
system and the residual impact of seed vouchers and fairs 
The results from the Kirundo seed fairs indicated that when subsidies in the form of a voucher 
redeemable in local currency are provided to stimulate demand among seed-needy households, local 
seed suppliers respond favorably by providing seed that is adequate in both quantity and quality. Hence, 
during the three agricultura! seasons preceding this study, seed needs in Kirundo Province could be more 
aptly characterized as being caused by lack of access as opposed to lack of availabili ty. Otherwise stated, 
there was sufficient seed to meet total seed demand for the dominant crops in the seed system, but a 
number of farming households lacked the buying power and/or kinship networks to access this seed. 
O ver 1200 exit interviews were conducted among seed-voucher holders at the Kirundo seed fairs ( 40 per 
seed fair), which showed that the average seed package obtained by recipients was greater in quantity 
than that received by conventional distribution and that this amount of seed was sufficient to meet their 
planting needs. The average package received by voucher-holding farm families over the three 
agricultura! seasons was 20kg beans, lkg sorghum, 0.5kg maize, and 0.33kg groundnuts; the voucher 
value for each fami ly was US$ 6.00. 
Additionally, the price at which thi s seed was obtained through the SV &F approach did not indicate any 
problem with seed availabili ty. Local market prices for bean seed, the dominant crop in the Kirundo 
system and the dominant seed provided by seed a id practitioners, showed no price spikes at the time of 
any ofthe Kirundo seed fairs that would indicate a lack of seed availabili ty. There were price premiums 
paid at the Kirundo seed fairs (lO% to 20% higher than to the same seed available at local markets in 
Kirundo). This is attributed to voucher recipients being required to spend their vouchers on the day 
received, at the seed fair organized by CRS, and with seed suppliers who were registered by CRS. 
6. Trader is used throughout this document to refer to everyone who exchanges seed for vouchers at seed fairs: those who bring 
seed from their own production to the fair, those who source seed on credit and pay it back credit after the fair, and those who 
never take actual title to what they bring, reimbursing to thc owner for what has been sold and handing back unsold seed to the 
owner after the seed fa ir. 
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Seed quality (defined here as seed that is known and preferred by farrners and adapted to local farming 
conditions) is more problematic. Using the yardstick of conventional seed relief in Burundi, which is 
sourced almost exclusively in Burundi from large traders and undergoes no process that would 
differentiate it in quality from the seed available in local markets, the seed sourced through seed fairs is 
deemed superior by farming farnilies. 
Exit interviews from the Kirundo seed fairs indicated that farmers preferred the seed from seed fairs as 
opposed to seed from conventional distribution for three reasons: ( 1) seed fair seed is more adaptable to 
local soils, (2) seed fairs provide fanners an opportunity to choose the seed they want and negotiate its 
price, and (3) seed fairs provide farmers an opportunity to buy seed from traders they know. 
Seed fairs in Kirundo may have provided adequate seed quantity to needy farming households, but the 
issue of getting new varieties into the hands of farrners in a demand~driven fashion, and understanding 
how this approach through the local seed system can improve seed quality in the medium to long term, 
remains a major challengé. 
The exit interviews from the Kirundo fairs point to the potential for this approach to support the local 
seed system, and perhaps address more chronic problems related to the seed system. Seed traders 
reported reinvesting proceeds from the seed fairs into seed production and seed trade, but the behavior of 
the seed traders in time ofacute and chronic stress, and the characteristics ofseed suppliers in the region, 
was not we\1 enough appreciated or understood to provide a more robust argument for how seed 
vouchers and fairs might support the local seed system. 
The Kirundo seed fairs confinned the need for a better understanding of how the local seed system 
functions under both acute and chronic stress, thus exploring the potential for seed fa irs to address both 
chronic and acute shocks to the seed system, which could be seen as being driven by "access" as well as 
"availability." They also established the need for a better understanding ofthe profi le and characteristics 
of seed traders, particularly women, who constitute a third of all seed traders. In addition, the fairs 
demonstrated a positive impact on the local economy but pointed to the need for a better understanding 
of how they affect the local economy and the local seed system. 
Methodology 
This study was conducted in collaboration with local goveming authorities in Kirundo Province and the 
PDAE. Both CRS and CIA T aided with the fieldwork. 
In February 2003, preliminary (participatory and semi~structured) interviews with local traders and 
farmers, suggested four key insights: 
• There has been no problem with seed availabili ty in recentyears; the last real problem was in 1999. 
• In normal times, most traders source their seed directly from farmers; only in a crisis do they buy 
from traders. 
• Smal l vendors greatly appreciate seed fairs because fairs provide them with fourfold income in one 
day, compared to other sales channe ls, and they don't have to extend credit. 
Traders suggested putting new varieties on offer at lower prices than local vanetles so as to 
stimulate initial client interest. Traders also asked to be provided credit by CRS to bring these 
varieties to the fair. 
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In July 2003, a questionnaire was developed to target seed traders who had part icipated in the Kirundo 
seed fairs during the previous agricultura! season. The questionnaire was pre-tested over two days, and 
fi eld interviews were completed in early August 2003. Semi-structured interviews were conducted by 
three CRS staffwho had been in volved in the planning and implementation ofseed fairs in Kirundo over 
the preceding three agricultura! seasons. 
The questionnaire consisted of thirty questions and was divided into four sections: 
• Seed-trader profile 
• Seed characterizationlsources and sales channels/sourcing in stress periods 
• Seed fair operations and the seed fair impact 
• Trader observations 
A total of 41 seed traders who had participated in the Kirundo fairs during the previous agricultura) 
season were interviewed (16 women and 25 men), roughly half ofthe approximately 80 seed traders who 
had participated in the fairs. Traders were chosen from different sites within Kirundo where the seed 
fa irs were held, specific emphasis was placed on gender representation from all of the fa ir sites and 
representation of traders from the three main categories: sma ll (having gross revenues of less than 
US$ 500 during the previous agricultura) season), medium (gross revenues of more than US$ 500 and 
Jess than USS 2,500 during the previous agricultura) season), and large (gross revenues of more than 
US$ 2,500 during the previous agricultura) season). 
Findings 
Seed trader profile 
More than half of the traders interviewed indicated that they had traded seed for more than 1 O years; 
fewer than 20% had been at it for five years or less. This appears to show that seed traders-at least those 
at the seed fairs- are a well established group. This may also indicate that traders are specialized and 
that trading seed may, ata mínimum, require a medium-term investment in building trade relations and 
acquiring knowledge specific to the trade. 
Twenty percent ofthe traders interviewed described themsel ves as full -time seed traders; 63% described 
themselves principally as traders who also do sorne agriculture; the remaining 17% described 
themselves principally as farmers who also do some trade. Among those self-described as full-time seed 
traders, only one was mal e. Ofthe 16 female traders, only one described herself as more of a farmer than 
a trader. This further supports the idea that seed traders are a specialized group. This difference between 
male and fcmale traders with regard to their self-definiti on oftheir trader status indicates a female bias 
among traders and potentia lly a Jack of access to Jand among female traders (as is the case for Burundian 
women in general). 
More than 75% ofthe traders (33) reported seeing a growth in volume and product line since they started 
trading seed . This could be attributed to reinvesting profits into their trade and the generally 
well-established nature of the group interviewed. This could also mean that this sub-set of traders 
(seed-fai r traders) is more entrepreneurial. Note that with a single exception (a sunflower specialist), the 
seed traders tended not to specialize in any particular crop; they various ly sold beans, sorghum, maize, 
and groundnuts. 
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Start-up assets for seed traders 
Traders were asked about the assets they had needed when they started trading seed. Over one-third said 
they started with no access to financia! capital or credit, making due with their own stock of seed, access 
to land, and their own means of transport. Over two-fifths ( 18) indicated starting up with only financia) 
capital or credit, which includes bank loans, loans from family and friends, and credit for seed from 
larger seed traders as well as family and friends. Almost two-thirds of the traders started up without 
access to transport. 
Traders were asked if their start-up assets were suffícient. Nearly one-third of traders ( 12/41 ) indicated 
that their start-up assets were sufficient and that this was dueto seed coming from their own production, 
gifts from friends and relatives, and small loans from friends. Among the two-thirds who considered 
their start-up assets insuffícient, access to credit for financing was the biggest challenge. 
Traders were asked if there are special requirements, such as knowledge and connections, that are 
necessary for a seed trader to start in the trade. Aside from assets, social relationships and kinship ties 
appear to be important: a large majority of traders (28) mentioned the need for the support of parents, 
fami ly, friends, and neighbors. However, a sa lid minority ( 13) saw no need for anything special and 
indicated that they started with their own stock and made due with what they had. 
Seed characterization/sources and 
sales channels/sourcing in stress periods 
Distinguishing seed from grain 
Traders were asked if they distinguish between seed for sowing and grain for eating, for the crops they 
sell . More than ha lf the traders (23/41) said they made a distinction between seed for planting and grain 
for eating. Fifteen indicated that the population at large does not make this distinction. Only three said 
they made no distinction because when they were selling they were notable to determine the buyer's 
intended end use. 
Traders distínguishing seed from grain provided the following reasons for such distinction: sorne 
varieties are separated because of price variations due to end use, such as with white sorghum for 
porridge versus the more expensive red sorghum for beer. Beans are separated because at harvest they 
are mixed, yet there are price variations within the mixture, and sorne varieties, like yellow beans, may 
be more susceptible to infestation and should be separated out befare storage. 
Traders were asked to discuss the sources ofthe grain versus the sources ofthe seed that they sold. AJI of 
the traders considered the sources to be the same. They noted no difference in production but rather in 
processíng for end use, storage, or for price. 
Five ofthe six traders who had gross revenues ofmore than US$ 2,500 during the previous agricul tura! 
season sorted grain from seed. Among these five, four ofthem sorted by variety for beans and one sorted 
by grain for beans. 
For traders with gross revenues of more than US$ 500 and less than US$ 2,500 during the previous 
agricultura! season, 45% sorted seed from grain. 
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For small traders, who had gross revenues ofless than US$ 500 during the previous season, 66% sorted 
seed from grain . 
Sources of seed u.sed in trade 
Table 2 is based on the total vol u me of seed sold by thc traders during the previous agricultura! season 
and thus portrays an aggregate of al l seed sourced by a ll 4 1 traders. 
Table 2. Sources of Total Volume of Seed Sold among 4 1 Trade•·s in Season 2003 8 
Sources 
Vol u me Own Rural collector Stockist WFP (metric tons) Farmers production /trader /trader (Distribution ) Crop 
Beans 504.65 231.9 32.05 124.4 116.3 
100% 46% 6% 25% 23% 
Sorghum 7.4 4.45 1.25 0.2 1.500 
100% 60% 17% 3% 20% 
Maize 6.7 0.8 5.900 
100% 12% L 88% 
Groundnuts 3.724 1.7 0.284 1.740 
100% 46% 7% 47% 
Own production and direct on-farm sourcing accounted for at least half o f the crops refcrenced above. 
Maize, however, is an anomaly here; Kintndo is not known for its maize production and WFP's food 
distribution s provide a ready stock for consumption. 
Rural collectors are small traders, based at trading centers and in proximity to farmers, who procure seed 
directl y from fanners. They rarely sell retai l and usua ll y, but not always, ho ld the sccd to sell to other 
traders, large as well as small. Rural co llectors are an important link in the supply chain, providing the 
human faceto much ofthe credit and capital that reaches the fanner. 
Stockists are small traders who advance capital and credit to intennediaries who, in tum, source seed 
from fam1crs and then provide the seed to the stockist. Stockists are more likely to hold seed and to sell 
retail. 
Large traders (who had gross rcvenues of more than US$ 2,500 during the previous agricultura! season) 
were far more likely to source seed from their own production than small or medium traders, and "own 
production'' for large traders was likely to take on a different meaning. Subcontracting and crcdit 
arrangements with fanners were likely to be considered "own production" for many ofthe large tradcrs. 
Sale channels 
Cash was used to source 71% of the total bean seed sold among a ll traders in 20038; credit was provided 
for 23%. 
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Social capital is extremely important in seed sa les, as evidenced by over 40 separare seed fairs where 
decisions about "whom to bu y from" were based on whether the trader was known to the buyer and carne 
from the same area (a phenomenon that could also be linked to soil specificity and bears further 
research). And credit is considered a necess ity to establish social relations. In table 3 the use of credit by 
traders, critica! for building on social capital and kinship, is indirectly indicated. 
Seed fa irs represented a tremendous market for all seed traders, with generally higher prices than local 
markets: approximately 12% to 20% above local market prices, on average. 
Table 3. Channels for Sale of Total Volume o f Seed Sold among 41 Traders in Season 
2003B 
Volume L 
Volume by sales channel (metric tons) 
Means of 
Crop (metric tons ) Direct sale on CRS seed sale 
Market Traders fairs 
Beans 503.35 115.96 207.9 180.49 Cash Direct 
100 % 23% 41% 36% 
Sorghum 7.4 4.88 2 0.52 Cash Oirect 
100% 66% 27% 7% 
Maize 6.7 6.55 0.15 Cash Direct 
100% 1 98% 2% Groundnuts 3.724 1.32 1.700 0.704 Cash Direct 100% 35% 46% 19% i 
Sourcing seed durin.g p eriods of stress 
The seed traders described two distinct stress periods in the recent past, one due to drought ( 1997- 2000) 
and an earlier one dueto civil war ( 1993- 1995). lnitially, blanket statements were made to characterize 
the stress: 
Trader characterizations of the drought stress: 
l . no seed on market 
2. prohibitively high prices of seed brought in by large traders from the region 
3. everyone living off aid from NGOs and WFP 
4. even grain planted did not germinate 
5. heavy migration among the able-bodied 
Trader characterizations of the civil war stress: 
1 . no seed on market 
2. own production insufficient for food needs 
3. even large local traders had no seed 
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However, when asked to comment in more detail (on dates, regions)-if there was any time when 
planting material was absolutely not avai lable, the majority of seed traders (32/41) said that there was 
nevera time in their experience when seed or planting material was absolutely not available. Although 
expensive during the drought period, bean seed was available from other parts of Kirundo Province, 
although sorne traders stated that even when seed was avai lable, it was useless to sow because of the 
drought. 
Nine ofthe traders said there were times when there was no seed available at all. Specifically in reference 
to the drought, they said they could not find seed beca use all the seed had been bought up and distributed 
by NGOs. These traders did not sell during this period. 
When asked to reflect on ea eh crop sold and where it is sourced in times of stress, 1 O of the traders said 
they sourced beans regionally (Rwanda, Tanzania), most renting a vehicle. Eleven said they sourced 
beans by traveling on bicycle to other parts ofKirundo Province, and nine said they sourced beans from 
other regions ofBurundi, using a vehicle. 
The definitions of access and availability depend on the size of the trader 's business and access to 
transport. Although seed was available even during times of profound stress, larger traders had a better 
chance of sourcing volume because they had access to transport to regional markets and a greater 
likelihood of having cash or credit. Sourcing seed during thi s period was possible but difficult, with 
many traders giving up. Major sources during this period were small traders on bicycle from Rwanda 
and large traders bringing seed in from the region (Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and other parts of 
Burundi). 
Sourcing under stress by trader size 
All six ofthe large traders reported sourcing during periods ofstress from Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, 
and other regions ofBurundi, using vehicles. 
The majority of these revenues go back into the agricultura( economy as investments or repayment of 
debts. Over 80% of the revenue generated by seed traders from fairs is a llocated to commerce, 
agriculture, or debt repayment. 
Commercia l activity, which includes extending trade credit, accounted for 43% of seed fair revenue, 
while repayment of debts accounted for 27%. There was significant overlap among these categories, as 
credit for seed fairs was considered "commerce" among some traders and "debt" among others . Only 
13% of seed fa ir revenue was invested into agriculture and livestock. Household consumption accounted 
for 17% of revenues. This includes medica! expenses, school fees, home construction, and clothing. 
Social capital 
Social capital is both a widely cited special quality for traders at start-up and an important factor in 
developing and expanding their trade. Knowing the trader and having a relationship with him or her 
appears to be an important factor in determining from whom to buy seed. In this light, seed fairs provide 
a mechanism to build on existing social capital and perhaps can help us gain insights into the challenges 
of getting new varieties into the hands of farmers. 
According to seed traders, the decision to purchase from one trader as opposed to another is based on the 
adaptability of the seed on offer, precision of the scales, the trader's honesty, the confidence the buyer 
has in the trader, price, and the welcome the trader offers. 
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Rough ly half (22) of the seed traders interviewed stated that their seed fair customers had also beco me 
generous customers outside the seed fairs. So me of these traders noted that they had sourced seed from 
these same buyers at harvest. 
Gender: The female métier bias 
Data from the seed fair trade payout sheets over the three agricultura! seasons leading to this study 
showed a growing role for female traders. The total number of individual traders paid in the first 
agricultura! season was 346, 18% ofwhom were female. fn the second agricultura! season, 23% (of289 
traders) were female, and in the third season of January 2003, out of 49 1 traders, 3 1% were fema le. This 
increase of 66% between the first and third seed fairs seems to indicate that seed fai rs provide an 
o o o o 7 
mterestmg mcome opportumty to women. 
The case study revealed that full-time traders may be disproportionately female. Male traders, except for 
very large traders, tend to have other sources of livelihood and hence are far less Iikely to describe 
themselves as full-time traders. Only one of the 16 female traders identified herself as more of a farrner 
than a trader, which may indicate a lack of access to land for female traders and hence a far greater 
likelihood that trade would consti tute their dominant means of livelihood. 
These findings point to the importance of seed trading as an occupation and income opportunity for 
fema les. Seed aid practitioners should pay particular attention to des igning interventions that provide 
access to female traders, particularly small traders, as they appear to play an important role in local seed 
supply channels and seed trade is a valuable income opportunity for thi s vulnerable sub-set which 
derives less entitlement from land than medium to large traders. 
Encouraging traders who don 't come to the fairs 
Twenty-two of the traders (o ver half) said that there were traders who don ' t come to the fairs but who 
should be encouraged to participate. The reasons gi ven for them not coming included being intimidated 
by larger traders; being afraid that they would not sell anything at the fair and would then be left holding 
a stock ofunsold seed; and not having access to transpot1. Additionally, it was noted that many organiza-
tions and comrnunity groups with seed, such as farmer associations, farrner cooperatives, and the Pro-
vincial Department for Agriculture and Livestock (DPAE), did not regularly participate in seed fairs. 
Trader observations 
At the end ofthe questionnaires, traders were asked ifthey had any questions or comments. A sample of 
their responses is given below. 
• Why are yo u asking these questions? You asked these sorts of questions during the last seed fairs in 
February 2003. 
• Why can't we receive vouchers too? 
• Can CRS give us credit? 
• We have realized that in identify ing beneficiaries, you don 't work in close co llaboration with the 
local administration. 
• We like the fairs. Organize more. We are partners; you should do more discussions with us so that 
in the end we can end this repetitive problem of lack of seed. 
7. The data masks the actual number oftraders and the actua l numbers by gender as a trader attending every discrete seed fa ir event 
in a given agricultura! season is counted each time they attend an event. 
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Lessons learned and recommendations 
l. Traders are a specialized group but the barriers to entry for traders are 
not excessive 
The study indica tes that SV &F traders are an experienced and specialized group with formidable trading 
skills. Also, while access to credit or capital is an important start-up asset, it is nota prerequisite. Nearly 
one-third of the traders in this study started up with little more than their own production and support 
from family and friends . 
Seed aid practitioners should make full use of the existing network of seed traders in designing and 
carrying out seed aid and agricultura) interventions. 
2. There is a need for a robust field-.friendly seed diagnostic tool to 
distinguish access from availability, as these terms can vary in meaning 
Although 75% of the traders interviewed sa id there was never a time when seed was " totally 
unavailable," those who made this s tatement were overwhelmingly large-scale traders with access to 
transport and cash or credit, who were able to source seed regionally. The definitions of access and 
availability appear to vary with the size of the trader and his or her access to transport. 
Seed aid practitioners should develop a diagnostic tool that focuses on seed traders and looks at access 
and availability for different categories oftraders. Such a tool should focus on the existing channels of 
seed supply, looking at the different categories, so that seed aid practitioners have a more robust view of 
the local seed supply channels before designing interventions. 
3. Seed fairs support the local seed system, the predominant sourcing 
channel for seed in good and bad times, and have a positive residual 
impact on the local economy 
Seed fairs have a pos itive impact on the local seed system by stimulating social capital and kinship ties 
between traders and buyers. The seed fairs provide a forum through which seed sourcing relationships 
are built and extended. This building of social capital is particularly important in cash-poor rural 
economies and in societies recovering from conflict. 
Seed fairs also provide capital for the local economy, capital that is predominantly allocated to 
commercial and farro activity. The residual impact of the seed fairs include extending credit lines, both 
for traders and others, and stimulating expenditures, which has a knock-on effect on the local economy, 
such as supporting home construction. 
Seed aid practitioners and donors should fund and support seed aid and agricultura! interventions that 
have an explicit link to the local seed system, as opposed to being in competition with it. 
Development and seed aid practitioners should pay particular attention to the efficiency and impact of 
demand-driven subsidies, such as vouchers, on rural-based livelihoods and economies. 
4. Within the seed trade there is a female métier bias 
Seed trading is more likely to be a primary employment and revenue opportunity for women. Female 
traders play an important role in the seed trade, accounting for a large share ofthe small and very small 
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traders. Female traders in this study appeared to have less access to land than their male counterparts, as 
reflected by only one of the 16 female traders identifying herself as more of a farmer than a trader. 
Seed aid practitioners should pay particular attention to designing interventions that explicitly target 
female traders, particularly very small-scale traders, who are more likely to count seed trade as a main 
source of livelihood. 
5. Seed fairs provide a demand-driven mechanism for stimulating the 
spread of new varieties 
Promising new varieties may ha ve a greater likelihood of propagation if local traders are leveraged and 
new varíeties are introduced in more of a demand-driven fashion. The links between the formal and 
informal seed sector are underexploited and the seed fair is one forum where researchers, formal- sector 
seed players, and seed traders can work within the same milieu towards the same end, meeting the 
farmer's demand for seed. 
Seed aid practitioners and researchers should focus more on local seed traders when exploring how to 
introduce promising new material into the seed system. 
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Seed Vouchers & Fairs and 
Agrobiodiversity in W estern Uganda 1; · 
Robbert P. van der Steeg, Tom Remington, 
Mikkel Grum, E mili y Kemigisha 1 
Abstract 
Rebel activities in westem Uganda from 1996 until early 2002 displaced a large number of people a 
relatively short distance from their homes. Following a cessation of hostilities, people began retuming 
back to their farms. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) organized seven seed vouchers and fairs to assist 
people in accessing seed. With seed vouchers and fairs, beneficiaries receive vouchers that they can 
exchange for locally sold seeds. The sellers, in tum, are reimbursed in cash for the CRS vouchers. These 
seed fairs were evaluated by the Intemational Plant Genetic Resources Insti tute (IPGRI), which also did 
a detailed agrobiodiversity analysis. The study showed that sales at seed fairs were dominated by a 
relatively small number of crops and varieties Many more crops and varieties that exist in the region were 
not on offer. On average, beneficiaríes bought only two crops and one variety of each crop. Withín the 
wider comrnunity, no importan! varieties were lost during the war. The conclusion is that when an 
organization wants to include strengthening ofagrobiodiversity in a seed aid activity, it needs to plan this 
thrust explicitly. One method, explained in this paper, is the seed diversity fair, where seed sellers can 
win prizes for having a diversity of seeds to sell. 
lntroduction 
In 1996, rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) began harassing people in the Ruwenzori 
Mountains of westem Uganda, displacing an estimated 150,000 persons. In Bundibugyo (figure 1), 
people fled to nearby camps guarded by the Ugandan army. By February 2002, 1ife had begun to retum 
to normal and people began retuming to their farms. During their di splacement, their farms had been 
neglected, houses destroyed, and assets lost. 
The climate ofwestem Uganda supports the production ofa wíde diversity ofcrops . Cassava, bananas, 
and sweet potatoes are important food crops, and groundnuts, rice, and beans are grown for consumption 
and sale. The cropping system has been described as the "banana and coffee system," where coffee, 
introduced after the Second World War, replaced cotton, which had been predominant in the system 
(Parsons, 1970). Recently, however, coffee has been on the decline in favor of diversified cash cropping, 
with a bias towards cocoa. 
l. Robbert P. van der Steeg is with IPG RI-SSA; Tom Remington is with CRS-EARO; Mikkel Grum is with IPGRI-SSA; Emilly 
Kemigisha is with CRS-Uganda. 
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Figure l. Bundibugyo is located northwest of Forl Portal in the Ruwenzori Motmtains 
In response to the conflict and repeated displacement, Catholic Relief Scrvices (CRS) planned and 
implemented a series of seed voucher and fair (SV &F) events. (These events, developed by CRS, 
support secd demand, in contrast to direct seed distribution, which supports supply.) The lntemational 
Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), which has a special interest in biodiversity and experience 
with seed diversity fairs in Mali, was invited to carry out an extemal, real-time, evaluation of these 
events. 
In the SV &F approach, vouchers are issued to farm families identified as seed insecure (as indicated by 
repeated or prolonged displacement). Voucher recipients then negotiate seed purchases with sellers at 
special seed markets or fairs. At the end ofthe day, sellers redeem the vouchers for cash. Communities 
benefit two ways: ( 1) the seed insecure are able to choose the seed they want, and (2) the seed secure are 
able to sell seed (Remington et al. , 2002). 
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Planning and implementation of seed vouchers & fairs 
Before the seed fa ir, local CRS staff conducted a survey in which 19 farmers were asked what assets had 
been lost and what assets they had succeeded in reacquiring. The interviewed farmers had been 
displaced an average of four years each. Nine out of the 19 reported the loss of crops and farms among 
their top three lost assets. When asked to rank their most important crops, rice, beans, soybeans, vani ll a, 
groundnuts, and cocoa emerged as the top six . Fanners reported that in norma l years, they acquired 
planting material for these crops from a wide range of sources, through social networks and from the 
govemment, as well as the ir own seed stocks . However, during the survey year, they responded 
overwhelmingly that they had had to source rice, beans, soybeans, and groundnuts in the local market. 
In addition, 278 potential seed sellers ( 17 1 women and 107 men) were identified and interv iewed. In 
addit ion to determining their supply of seed and planting material for di fferent crops, this survey was 
used to in form potential sellers of the upcoming seed fairs. Ofthose interviewed, 93 responded that they 
would be able to sell rice, 11 7 had beans, six could sell maize, 23 had vani lla. 38 would be able to 
provide groundnuts, and one could sell cocoa. Women dominated the rice and bean sellers, and w hile the 
men had more vanilla than the women, men and women respondents indicated they were eq ual ly able to 
sell groundnuts . What made this group interesting was thatthe majority ofthem reported fam1ing as their 
primary occupation (77% ofthe women and 85% ofthe men). The remaining 23% ofthe women sellers 
identified themselves principally as traders. In addit ion to traders, severa l of the men li sted thei r 
occupation as carpenter. While many farmers citcd seed insecurity as a result or di splacement, many 
others were indeed able to provide the demanded seeds. 
Over many years, farmer decisions and selections have resulted in a diverse cropping system in 
Bundibugyo. Th is combination of crops and varie ties is referred to as agrobiodiversity in this article. 
Agrobiodiversity has three majar advantages (Grum et al. , 2002; IPGRI, 1999): 
• lt fulfil s different uses. For example, not all banana varieties can be used for local brcw. 
• lt optimizes different resources (labor. land, cash). 
• lt mitigates unpredictabi li ty due to water, soil , and pcsts. 
Research questions 
The scope of this study was to look at the impact ofseed vouchers and fairs on agrobiodiversity, within 
the context of agricultura! recovery from conflict. The central research question was 
What was thc influence o f the conflict and of thc sccd vouchcrs & fairs on agrobiodivcrsity? 
The fol lowing questions related to the effectiveness of the seed vouchers & fairs were asked: 
• How do farmers normally acquire seed? 
• How did they obtain seed this year? 
• How would they ha ve acquired seed in the absence of seed vouchers & fairs? 
• What crops and varieties did voucher holders acqu ire at the fairs? 
• What did voucher holders want to purchase that was not available at the fa irs? 
• Did the people plant the seed they acquired in exchange for their vouchers? 
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Related to the impact on agrobiodiversity, the following questions were asked: 
• What crops and varieties are available in the region? 
• Why do people have specific crops and varieties? 
• Have any new varieties been acquired recently? 
• Have any varieties been lost recently? 
• If so, what was the reason for the loss? 
• What varieties were on offer at the fair and why? 
• What varieties were not on offer at the fair and why not? 
• Did the seed fair increase agrobiodiversity? 
Methodology 
Data was collected with two surveys. The first, "real time" survey was administered to the beneficiaries 
on the day of the fairs. The second survey was carried out two months later, using the four-square 
analysis method. 
"Real time" evaluation 
At each of the seed fair sites, six community enumerators administered the survey to departing 
participants. Responses were recorded for 183 beneficiaries (6% of the 3100 beneficiaries ). 
Four-square analysis 
The four-square analysis is a method that helps obtain g reater detail on agrobiodiversity at the vi llage 
and farm level. In it, a group of farmers brings a sample of each variety he or she is growing. A large 
cross is drawn on the ground to distinguish four categories or squares (figure 2). 
Large area Small area 
Many households Many households 
-' 
Large area Small area 
Few households Few households 
Figtll"e 2. The four squares 
A voluntecr displays the first sample and the other farmers decide whether it is grown on a large or a 
small area and whether or not it is grown by many or by few households. After the first sample has been 
placed in the square, another farmer takes hislher varieties and puts them in the correct square. Ifthere is 
airead y a variety in that square, the group has to decide if it is grown more or less than the first crop. This 
goes on until all crops are placed. Farmers quickly grasp the process and begin to coordinate it. After all 
the existing varieties ha ve been placed, the farmers discuss and identify crops or varieties that ha ve been 
los t. 
For each variety, the following information was collected: 
• What is the variety name? 
• When was it first used? 
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• When was it last used? 
• What was the geographical so urce of the variety? 
• How was the variety first obtained (what was the initial source)? 
• Positive traits of the variety 
• Negative traits ofthe variety 
• What was the normal seed channel? 
• How was it obtained during the displacement? 
• How was it obtained this current season? 
This process results in a display of the present state of the plant genetic resources and history of each 
crop in the area-in this case, Bundibugyo. Important events that changed the number of varieties as 
well as the sources of new varieties al so carne out in our survey (Sthapit et al. , 2001 ). The four-square 
analysis can be adjusted for different purposes (see box 1 ). 
At one location the people in charge did not use the four-square analysis correctly and it was therefore 
not useful to include those results in our analysis. The results from only six locations have been 
synthesized for this report. 
1 Box l. Alternative four squares 
The four squares can be used in many different ways. lt can be used for animals (large/small scale by 
many or few households) or for crops in general, not just varíeties. You can even explain why people 
drink a lot of Coca Cola and not so much Fanta citron. We have also heard people using it to look at 
low-inpuVhigh-input, low-outpuVhigh-output activities on farms. This was done in the case of labor 
restrictions and income possibilities related to HIV/AIDS (Ard Lengkeek, personal communication). Or if 
you want to compare how a system was 30 years ago, you divide the people into young and otd. Men 
and women often have different perceptions. Possibilities are endless. In general, we see the 
four-square analysis too! as simple and understandable for everybody and therefore appropriate for a lot 
of participatory research. 
Results 
Three thousand one hundred families from three sub-counties were targeted in seven seed fairs. Each 
beneficiary received vouchers worth a total ofUS $7.50. From the farmers' perspective, a variety name 
is the basic unit for distinguishing varieties. The same variety can have a different name or varieties with 
the same name might perform differently in different villages. Within a village, different varietal names 
generally indicate a niche of use or growth. Research leads us to believe that diversity in names 
represents diversity within crops. 
The four-square analysis provided useful information. In total , participants mentioned 35 crops and 23 1 
varieties that they were currently growing in the region. Each village seemed to have a number ofunique 
varieties, based on names alone. Adding six varieties brought to the fairs but not mentioned during the 
four-square analyses, we arrived at a total of237 varieties. 
Ten crops and 24 varieties were present at the seed fairs. However, the enumerators did not name cocoa, 
groundnuts, maize, soybeans, and vanilla by variety, which meant that diversity was undercounted. We 
estima te that there were in fact a total of 76 varieties on offer at the fairs. 
----~-----------
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Notably absent at the fairs were bananas, swect potatoes, and cassava. Planting material ofthese crops is 
not exchanged in ordinary markets; during the preliminary survey, fanners explained that vegetatively 
propagated crops are usually sold in situ , so that you can get a perspective ofthe full crop when you are 
buying. 
Based on the amount of money spent on ea eh crop, one can see that beans and rice were the majar crops 
purchased at the seed fa ir (figure 3). 
Crop at the seedfair 
50% .-------~~-------------------------------------. 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Figure 3. Money used on specific crops during the seed fair (The per·centage is the 
percenlage of money that was registered by the questiom1aires.) 
With rice and beans being the most traded crops (83% of the total), it is interesting to look at their 
distribution as described through the four-square analysis. 
Table l. Bean Varie ties in the Four-Square Analysis 
Place in Mean number of Mean number %at 
Crop name square varieties per location Range at the fair the fair 
Beans Large area 1.67 0-3 1.17 70% 
nseedfair = 130 Many hh 
(we registered Large area o o 
a bean transfer 
130 times) few hh 
Small area 0.83 0-3 0.33 40% 
many hh 
Small area 3.33 1-5 0.67 20% 
few hh 
Note: The analysis is based on infonnation from six locations. At each location, we compared what we saw in the four-square 
analyses with the data collected during thc seed fa ir. 
From the four-square analysis, we can see that most ofthe rice varieties are grown by few people on a 
small area, and only 20% of the varieties were seen at the seed fair. When a variety is common in one 
location, it is very likely to appear in another location as well, including the seed fairs. In fact, the more 
comrnon a certain variety is, the more likely it is to show up at the seed fair. In table 2 one can see how 
this pattem emerged with rice. 
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Table 2. Rice Varieties in the Four-Square Analysis 
Place in Mean number of Mean number 
Crop name square varieties per location Range at the fair % at the fa ir 
Rice nseefair = Large area 1.50 1-2 1.20 80% 
99 (99 is the Many hh 
amount of Large area o o transactions of 
rice recorded) few hh 
Small area o o 
many hh 
Small area 2.17 1-4 0.40 18% 
few hh 
Note: The analysis was based on information from six locations. At each location. we compared what we aw during the 
four-square analyses with the data col lected during the seed fair. 
We can also see that rare varieties are less likely to show up at the fair. For example, rice has fewer 
varieties and there are also fewer varieties on the market. There were two rice varieties at the seed fair 
that were not mentioned in the four-square analysis. These were not widely traded (figure 4 ). 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Kamusesere Kaputura Mesi Tatu Padere 
Figure 4 . Money used on specific val"ieties during the seed fair (Note that the percentage 
is the percentage of money is •·egister ed b y the questionnaires.) 
Jt is interesting to note that during the four-square analysis, people did not mention four of the varieties 
ofbeans that were present at the seed fairs. While this is 27% ofthe number ofvarieties we recorded 
during the four-square analyses, financially each of these varieties represents less than 1% of the total 
amount traded at the seed fair, so their contribution is insignificant. 
The conclusion concemíng crop agrobiodi versity is that both demand and suppl y focus on the important 
varieties- those grown by many households in large areas. Rare varieties are either not so ld by farmers, 
not purchased by traders, or they may be mixed with the dominant variety and therefore lost in a varietal 
mixture. 
The varieties purchased at the seed fair 
Most participants purchased rice and beans (table 3). 
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Table 3 . Sunnna ry of Transactions al the Seed Fair 
Number of Estimated total Number of 
Transactions number of varieties 
(based on the transactions Number of bought Percent 
6% ofthe (extrapolated to different crops when women 
beneficiaries 100% of the bought when buying this purchasing 
Crop interviewed) beneficiaries) buying this crop crop this crop 
Rice 100 1694 1.97 1.97 35% 
Beans 130 2202 1.75 1.97 45% 
Groundnuts 39 660 2.21 2.21 38% 
Soybeans 14 237 3 3.07 22%* 
Moringa 11 186 2.91 2.91 11 %* 
V anilla 8 135 2.88 3.00 50%* 
Cocea 7 118 1.86 1.86 20%* 
Onions 5 84 2.8 3.20 40%* 
Maize 2 34 3 3 100%* 
---
*Sample size smallcr than 15; sometimes the gender is not known. 
O ver two-thirds of participants bought beans, and more than hal f of participants bought rice. The table 
shows the average number of crops bought and thc average number of varieties a partic ipant acquired 
when buying a specific crop. In the case of soybeans, for example, thi s means that when a pcrson bought 
soybeans, he or she also bought two other crops. 
According to the survey, 37% of the participants were women. For rice, beans, and groundnut, there is 
no clear gender preference (Chi-square test, 0.90 reliabili ty), a lthough women seem to ha ve a slight (not 
signiticant) preference for beans, vanilla, and onions (however, the sample size for vanilla and onions is 
small). 
According to participants, 89% of all the seeds they bought were of good quality, 5% were average, and 
in 6% ofthe cases, quality was not deterrnincd. Almost a ll ofthe participants (98%) stated that they were 
already working ful l time on their farrn. This d id not mean, however, that they were not spending nights 
in the camps for intemally displaced persons. Ninety percent stated that they would not have been able to 
get seeds for growing without the fair; thc mai n reason given being lack of funds (52% of all 
beneficiaries). Eight percent claimed that thc seed fair would he lp them pay school fees, indicating that 
the seed fa ir enabled them to divert money from buying seed to other priorities. 
Availabüity of seed al the fair 
ineteen percent of the farrners c laimed that they wanted a specitic variety or crop that was either not 
avai lable or not available in suftic ient quantity to satisfy demand. In a ll cases, farrners knew where to 
obtain thc variety. Therefore, we can conclude that no desired varieties were lost. 
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Seed source 
During the four-square analysis, we asked where participants sourced their seed for each variety. Severa] 
sources were possible ( fi gure 5). 
Sources of seed 
• Before the war 
• After the war 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Relatives Market Own CRS 
and Friends 
Figure 5. Plant sources of crops before and after the war, recor·ded al the seed fair (The 
pe r centages are the percentages of farme r groups that used the specific source . The 
total of the colurnns before the war makes lOO% and after· the war makes 100% .) 
The year of our survey, participants received a lmost 20% oftheir seed at the seed fairs- a so urce that did 
not exist befare. Own saved seed was reduced by 10%, seeds from social networks by 5%, and seed 
purchased at the market by 4%, indicating that the conflict and displacement resulted in a shi ft in seed 
sources, especially in a reduction of own saved seed. 
lnfluence of the war and seed fair on agro-biodiversity 
The crops and varieties that are available in tlw r egion 
In table 4, one can see how the crops mentioned by participants were categorized in the four-square 
analyses. 
Table 4 shows the crops grown in fi ve locations. The maximum number of times a crop can be 
mentioned is therefore fi ve. It is puzzling that there were only two maize transactions at the fairs bccause 
maize is grown on large areas by most households in the region. Although sweet potatoes are an 
important crop in four ofthe locations, cassava in three, and yams in two, they were absent from the fairs. 
This indicates a need to devise an altemative mcchani sm to facilitate exchange of thcse crops when 
promoting agrobiodiversity is a priori ty. 
Thf' varie ties at the seed fair 
During the four-square analysis, farmers mentioned most often the following characteristics of popular 
varieties: 
• income generating 
• a crop that also can be used as a food crop 
• high yielding 
• short duration 
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• good taste 
• used al so for firewood ( cassava, coffee, cocoa) 
• additional uses (oil, coffee, flour, lotion) 
• resistant to diseases 
• not labor intensive (no weeding) 
• problems with drought, wind, or water logging 
Although farmers maintained that the rice variety kamusesere was not grown before the war, it was in 
high demand at the fairs. lt yields three times ayear and provides a source of income as wcll as food. The 
fact that it emerged during the conflict indicates that confl ict and displacement do not hinder acccss to 
new crops and varieties- and may actually present new opportunities. 
Table 4. Crops in the Region 
Large area, many households 
Rice (5) , Sweet potatoes (4) , Maize (4), 
Cocoa (3), Bananas (3,) Beans (3), 
Cassava (3), Yams (2), Palm oil tree (2), 
Pawpaws (1 ), Vanilla (1 ), Mangoes (1) 
Large area, few households 
Coffee (1) 
Not grown anymore 
Small area, many households 
Moringa (4), Palm oil (3), Beans (2), Mangoes (2), 
Oranges (2), Fenensi (1 ), Cocoa (2), Cassava (2), 
Bananas (2), Groundnuts (2), Soybeans (2), Jackfruit (2), 
V anilla (1 ), Dodo (1 ), Maize (1 ), Eggplants (1 ), 
Sugarcane (1 ), Pumpkins (1 ), Pawpaws (1) 
Small area, few households 
Avocados (5), Tomatoes (5), Onions (5), Sugarcane (4), 
Coffee (4), Pineapples (4), Eggplants (4), Vanilla (3), 
Soybeans (3), Groundnuts (3), Yams (3), Oranges (3), 
Green grams (3), Passion fruit (3), Pumpkins (3), 
Mighobe (2), Sesame (2), Mangoes (2) , Cabbages (2) , 
Green dodo (2) , Jackfruit (2), Pawpaws (2), Sweet 
potatoes (1 ), lrish potatoes (1 ), Pigeon Peas (1 ), Dodo 
(1 ), Moringa (1 ), Sorghum (1 ), Nswiga (1) 
Sorghum (4), Wheat (3), Sesame (2), Millet (2), Banana fruit (1 ), Pumpkins (1 ), lrish potatoes (1) 
Note: This exercise was repeated in five locations. The numbers in parenthesis indicatc how often a certain crop 
was put in the specific square, which gives an overvicw ofthe importance ofthe crops across the fi vc 
locations. The exercise was also repeated for each crop with the varieties placed in the different squares. 
Change in agro-biodiversity 
Farmers had stopped planting 2% ofthe 23 1 varieties that existed prior to the conflict, but had added 14 
new varieties, which represents a 2% net increase in agrobiodi versity. No varieties were mentioned as 
having been lost due to the conflict; rather, it appears that old varieties were replaced by new varieties 
with superior characteristics (better yield, shorter maturation, higher market value, etc). 
During the post seed fair evaluation, we also asked when a variety was introduced. We were able to trace 
94 varieties (figure 6). 
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A stable ecosystem genera ll y has more or less the same amount of species over time and we can regard 
the agro-ecosystem the same way. Change in agrobiodiversity is a normal process. We can see that every 
decade new varieties come into the system, and we may presume that others exit the system. This is 
called "variety tumover" or replacement (McGuire, 2000). Twenty-fi ve of the 89 varieties that were 
introduced in the period from 1940 to the present were introduced by the govemment; fi ve were 
introduced by NGOs. The rest, 59 varieties, were from individuals or the source was unknown. Yariety 
tumover in an iso lated area like Bundibugyo is dominated by fam1er-to-fam1er exchange, with a 
secondary contribution from the formal sector. 
Period of origin of varieties 
18r-------------------------~.-------------------------¡ 
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Figure 6. Pet·iod of origin of varieties in the Btmdibugyo at·e a 
(These are varieties that are still grown there. V arieties that were introduced in the same 
period but are no longer grown are not include d in this graph. This probably m e ans that 
in the period 1940-1969 m an y more varietie s were introduced than are shown here .) 
Discussion 
Diversity at the seed fairs 
The four-square analysis presented a very diverse farming system, but we saw that the majority of 
participants bought only two crops and varieties at the seed fairs. Although no farmer would have al! or 
even most of the 237 varieties, every farm would have substantially more varieta l di versity than the two 
varieties that farmers acquired at the fairs. Therefore, we can conclude that seed vouchers and fai rs do 
not significantly contribute to an increase in the agrobiodiversity on the average farm. 
lt is not clear why varieties grown by many people on a small area were poorly represented at the seed 
fair. There are severa] possible explanations: it could mean that they are also poorly represented at 
regular markets, but it could al so mean that a seed fa ir is an exceptional event and sellers bring a different 
set of varieties compared to what they normally would. This may depend on what they think they will 
sell on the basis of information they obtain before the fair. A ltematively, it might also be a question of 
demand since these varieties are cultivated on small areas for consumption. Without strong demand, 
sellers would not bring them to the fair. It might also be an issue of price. If rare varie ties are more 
expensive, sell ers might believe that the demand will be low. 
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There are no agriculture input stockists in Bundibugyo who carry commercial seed. lt was not 
surprising, therefore, that commercial seed companies did not participate in the fairs and that the formal 
sector offerings were restricted to cocoa and coffee seedl ings. 
The question of whether fanners could have accessed seed themselves (e.g., bought or exchanged it 
without assistance) is problematic. Although 63% ofthe respondents stated that it would not have been 
poss ible, it is likely that difficulty obtaining seed was exaggerated in order to increase the likelihood of 
receiving assi stance in the form of physical capital (seeds and tools) or financia! capital (cash or 
vouchers). 
Seed diversity fairs and seed vouchers and faírs 
Reference to seed fairs is common in the literature. The more common form of secd fairs, known as 
"diversity fairs" or "seed diversity fairs," generally refers to special venues designed to encourage and 
facilitate agrobiodiversity through farmer exchanges. On the other hand, seed vouchers and fairs support 
fanners' demands for seed to assist with immediate recovery from a disaster. 1 f the objective is to 
promote agrobiodiversity, perhaps in a follow-on recovery phase, then a "seed diversity fair" might be 
considered as the appropriate intervention. The difference between the two is explained in table 5. 
As we have seen from this document, as a rel ief activity, seed vouchers and fairs help restare 
agrobiodiversity. It would be good practice to increase the resilience of the fanners' seed system by 
promoting agrobiodiversity or increasing agro-varictal tumover as well. We think this could be done by 
integrating the seed voucher and fair approach with some ofthe key elements ofthe seed d iversity fa ir. 
Thi s might be achieved by giving the most vulnerable group vouchers to buy seeds and, at the same time, 
Box 2. Puppet Shows 
During the seed vouchers and fairs around 
Bundibugyo, puppet shows were presented by a 
local puppet theater group, Dove Puppeteers, 
facilitated by Kabarole Research Centre in 
collaboration with Catholic Relief Services -
CRD Program. The aim was to sensitize the 
beneficiaries as well as the buyers and the 
communities in the area about corruption, 
human rights, and domestic violence. This 
activity was usefuJ for the community beca use it 
drew their attention to sensitive issues that 
concern them, and showed how they can be 
handled. 
Puppet show at one of the fair sites 
(Photo: Roger Furrer, CRS Uganda) 
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Tahle 5. The Difference hetween Seed Vouchers and Fairs and Seed Diversity Fairs 
Seed vouchers and fairs Seed diversity fairs (Rijal et al, 2000) 
- - --
Objective 
---
Enable farm families access seed immediately 
following disaster 
Concept 
Provision of vouchers to a target group of 
farmers increases demand for seed - from 
community seed sellers who, in turn, accept 
vouchers for later reimbursement in cash 
Target group 
Households that do not have access to enough 
and/or appropriate seeds 
Type of seeds and other material involved 
No restriction on type of seed - demand for 
seed of principie food and cash crops. Focus 
on market and farmer seed, but includes 
research and commercial seed. 
Other aspects 
To strengthen seed security or support 'culture' by 
increasing the diversity of crops and varieties on 
offer and exchanged. 
Event organized for the exchange of seed of 
varieties and the knowledge related to these 
varieties. A supply side incentive (prize for the 
most varieties) used to increase the diversity of 
seed on offer. 
All farmers in an area, whoever is interested in 
diversity, local knowledge and culture. Research 
organizations and commercial companies can 
also get involved 
No restriction on type of seed - incentive used to 
increase diversity of crops on offer (including 
vegetative propagated). Focus on farmer seed, 
but includes market, research and commercial 
seed (Rareness and range of types is often 
emphasized.) 
Both events- seed vouchers & fairs and seed diversity fairs can be used for education and 
communication activities. For example, during seed voucher &fair events in Bundibugyo, a puppet 
show was organized (see box 2). In diversity fairs, drama, songs, poems and other cultural 
expressions are used to emphasis the importance and use of biodiversity. 
stimulating farmers to bring as much diversity as possible by awarding prizes to the one w ith the most 
varieties and associated knowledge. 
When the target group involved in a seed voucher and fair activity is experiencing a less acute/more 
chronic stress situation, it might be use fui to explore whether sorne aspects of seed diversity fairs could 
be included in the more emergency-oriented seed voucher & fair activity. 
Conclusions 
Seed vouchers and fairs enable seed-insecure farm fa milies to access seed of preferred crops and 
varieties in the fo llowing ways: 
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• People are able to choose what they need . 
• The material that is available is local, so it is adapted to the growing conditions. 
• The local seed system is part of the rel icf effort 
However, the seed vouchers and fairs carried out in Bundibugyo, western Uganda, did not specifica lly 
promote agrobiodivers ity. While there was a fairly good representat ion of diversity among the mai n 
crops at the fair, there were unexplained gaps. Maize was hardly present at the seed fai rs, in spite of its 
importance, and numerous minar crops and varieties were completely absent. 
There are a couple of important considerations to keep in mind: 
• New varieties have to be promoted along w ith knowledge. Accepting new varieties is always 
accompanied by risk beca use farmers do not know if the material is sui tablc for their region and 
their specific management practices. 
• The introduction ofnew material is perhaps not suited to acute situations, but it is crucial in chronic 
si tuations. 
• For the promotion ofbiodiversity, seed di versity fa irs are a suitable option to promote both the new 
and the o ld. 
• The combination of seed vouchers and fa irs with seed diversity fai rs can lead to increased variety 
tumover and, therefore, toa more producti ve and resilient seed system. 
There is no clear indication that current seed sources are different from what there was befare the 
confl ict, but it appears that agricultura! recovery is nearly complete. I t also appears that farmers did not 
lose varieti es worth keeping and that variety tu mover is as good or even better (i.e., there are more and/or 
better varieties) than befare the confiict. 
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Ahstract 
This report presents a comparative analysis of two different approaches used in emergency seed 
distribution in predominantly semiarid eastem Kenya: direct seed distribution (DSD) and seed vouchers 
and fairs (SV &F). The decade from 1992 to 2002 witnessed intermittent droughts in eastem Kenya, with 
major crop failures reported in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2000. The Govemment of Kenya and other relief 
agencies responded to the disasters with DSD. Based on experience in northem Uganda, SV &F was 
tested in six districts in eastem Kenya and one district in central Kenya during the periods preceding the 
short rains in 2000 and 2001 . 
The results ofthe analysis show that more funds are invested in DSD and therefore larger quantities of 
seed are procured and distributed to more beneficiary fam ilies over a wider geographic area than in 
SV &F. However, DSD has problems of targeting and timeliness, and due to the wider coverage and 
broader targeting, less seed is distributed to each beneficiary family. In contrast, SV &F was better at 
targeting individual beneficiaries and was timed better: the seed reached the target beneficiaries prior to 
the on-set of rains. DSD seed is procured mainly from registered prívate seed companies that supply 
certified seed, although there are a few cases where "emergency-grade seed" was procured and 
distributed through the system. SV &F provides vouchers to identi fied seed-needy fanners who use them 
for the seed oftheir choice during organized seed fairs. The amount ofseed received by each benefitting 
household was higher under SV &F compared to DSD. V arieta! composition and number of crop species 
distributed was also higher under SV &F. Conceming the costs involved in the implementation of the two 
schemes, SV &F was associated with higher faci litation costs compared to DSD. However, the analysis 
of cost effectiveness revealed that SV &F was financ ially more attractive in benefit-cost ratios. Provision 
of seed through the SV &F al so tends to enhance the local seed system. 
The study recommends a policy change to facil itate a combination of the positive attributes of both 
approaches, as well as a policy change to allow procurement of "emergency-grade seed" of better-
adapted drought-tolerant crops by relief agencies during drought emergencies. 
l. Michael Makokha is the Communicating Author: C/0 Box 30148, Nairobi , Tel: 254-66-32884, 254-722-328563, 
254-733-685808, mikemako67@yahoo.com. 
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lntroduction 
Approximately 80% of Kenya's 583,000 km2 is c lassifi ed as arid and semiarid lands (ASALs), 
characterized by low and unreliable rain fall. The ASALs are spread over all seven provinces, covering 
33 districts and supporting over 20% of the total population, 50% of livestock herds, and 5% of 
agricultura! output. Al! 13 districts in eastern Kenya are ASALs and are categorized as agro-ecologica l 
zones 3 to 7 (table 1). based on Braun 's (1 982) classification 
Table l. Chat•acterization of the Districls in Eastern Kenya Based on Cropping and 
Livestock Activities 
Districts 
Meru Central 
Nyambene 
E m bu 
Machakos 
Makueni 
Mbeere 
Kitui 
Mwingi 
Tharaka 
Meru North 
lsiolo 
Marsabit 
Moya fe 
Farming systems; 
Major crops and livestock activities; 
Chances of crop failure 1 Agroecological zones 
----
Mainly zones 3 and 4: semi-humid to 
arid between 600 and 11 O O mm rainfall 
per year in two seasons 
Predominantly zone 4, but zone 5 also 
found 
--+-
Mainly cropping 
Suitable for maize and beans 
Livestock, especially small ruminants and 
cattle 
Crop failures in 2 out of 5 seasons 
Agro-pastoral 
Crops and livestock: mainly maize, 
beans, cowpeas, pigeonpeas, green 
grams, dolicho beans, sorghum, millet, 
cassava, and sweet potatoes. Crop 
failures in 3 out of 5 seasons 
Predominantly zones 4 and 5; zone 6 Agro-pastoral 
is also found in sorne parts of these Crops and livestock: millet, sorghum, 
districts cotton, cowpeas, green grams, and 
Mainly semiarid, receiving 450-900 pigeonpeas; sorne maize and beans 
mm of rainfall per year in two seasons Crop failures in 4 out of 5 seasons 
Predominantly zones 6 and 7 Mainly pastoral 
Mainly arid, receiving 300- 550 mm J Very little cropping activity 
rainfalf per year 
Source: District Development Plans ( 1997-200 1 ). 
The !ive!ihood ofthe approximately 3.8 mili ion inhabitants ofeastern Kenya is mainly from sma ll-scale, 
subsistence-based agriculture. Both crops and !ivestock are important parts of the farming system and 
form the main sources offood and income for over 90% ofthe populati on. Farm s ize varíes between two 
and seven hectares per household, larger in more arid zones. The land each fam ily devotes to crops 
ranges from 30% to 50%, agai n depending on the zones; the remainder is used for livestock. 
ln the subsistence agriculture common in the ASALs, farmers produce a broad range of crops and 
varieties to meet their basic needs and also to avoid the risk of total crop fa ilure. The majar crops include 
cereals (maize, sorghum, and millet) and grain legumes (beans, pigeonpeas, cowpeas, green grams). 
Cotton, cassava, sweet potatoes, sunflowers, dolicho beans, castor beans, gourds, and chickpeas are a!so 
grown as part of the common mixed-fanning system. 
Severa! socioeconomic factors ha ve contributed to the dec lining productivity of ASAL regions. Farmers 
face problems selling surpluses produced in good seasons because they are poorly linked to markets. 
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Few know where, when, and how to market their produce because they lack market information and 
have been unable to organize themselves into effective marketing groups. Consequently, they rely on 
local markets and middlemen who rarely offer attractive prices. Poor infrastructure further complicates 
the time\y delivery of inputs and sale of produce. The problem ís most severe during the rainy seasons 
because most roads become impassable. Transport is costly and often very unreliable. High transport 
costs ínflate the cost of inputs and reduce profits from commodity sales. Although many producers have 
traditionally relied on family labor, availability is no longer guaranteed since most ofthe young people 
are either in school or have left in search ofpaid employment in urban centers. Few fanners can afford 
hired labor because of the need to finance education, health, food, and clothing, among other things. 
Although policies to improve the quality of living in the ASALs have been forrnulated , their 
implementation has been poor. 
Drought and its effect on agricultura[ production in eastern Kenya 
The ASALs of the eastem Kenya region are characterized by a bimodal rainfall pattem with peaks in 
April (the long rains) and November (short rains). Ranging between 400mm and 800mm annually, with 
a mean of700mm, rainfall is scant, unreliable, and poorly distributed . The short rains receive a mean of 
400mm and are more reliable compared to long rains, which ha ve a mean of 300mm. 
The seasonal rainfall during the 12 years ffom 1990 to 2001 is presented in figure 1 for Katumani 
Station, which is located in Machakos and is representative of ASAL areas. lt can be seen that the long 
rains were below average in nine of the 12 years and above average only in three. The more-reliable 
short rains were abo ve average in five of the 12 years, average in two, and below average in five. 
The majority of the households in the ASAL agro-ecosystems depend on crops for their food security. 
The prolonged droughts that result from below-average rainfall, such as occurred between 1990 and 
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Figure 1 : Comparison of r·ainfall in short and long rains in Katumani Machakos, 
1990-2001 
2001 , compel most farm families to exhaust all their available grain, includ ing what is normally kept for 
seed. Thus, food insecurity is usually associated with seed insecurity. For instance, in the year 2000, the 
estimated 178,978 households that required food in ASAL districts also required seed. 
Seed delivery systems in Kenya 
Two seed delivery systems, the formal and infmmal, are operational in Kenya. 
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In the formal seed production system, processing, packaging, labeling, and marketing of certified seed is 
done by registered producers. This normally involves prívate or public seed companies with outlets in 
many parts of the country, especially in town centers. Leading seed companies in Kenya include the 
Kenya Seed Company, East African Seed Company, Westem Grain and Seed Company, and Faida 
Seeds. There are about 38 registered seed companies in Kenya, most of which produce seed for cereal 
crops, especially maize, wheat, barley, sorghum, and legumes (especially beans), and vegetables. 
Except for maize- which Kimenye (1999) says are mainly open-pollinated varieties (OPVs)--the 
comrnercial seed sector accounts for less than 5% ofthe seed sown in ASAL areas during the years with 
normal rainfall (personal comrnunication, District Crops Officer, Tharaka District). Very little certified 
seed of open-poll inated crops such as pigeonpeas, cowpeas, sorghum, millet, and green grams (which 
are usually grown by resource-poor farmers who mainly live in ASALs) is produced by private seed 
companies, and 95% of what is produced is exported directly and/or sold to NGOs for distribution 
locally or in foreign countries (Kimenye, 1999). The prívate seed companies do not produce seed of 
vegetatively propagated crops either. They are profit-driven and consider the seed of crops adaptable to 
ASAL areas not only expensive to produce and market, but also subject to unreliable demand. 
ln the informal seed delivery system, production, processing, marketing, and/or distribution of seed is 
done by unregistered farmer seed producers. This seed is variable in quality and is not produced under a 
certification scheme. Production and marketing are often localized and based on low-input technology. 
Key players in this system include NGOs, farmers, farmer groups, researchers, and comrnunity-based 
organizations. The informal system produces localland-races, improved OPVs, anda blend ofthe two. 
For most of the crops grown in ASALs, farmers obtain seed from local sources, especially their own 
saved seed, and social networks (relatíves, neighboring farmers, and grain traders in open-air markets). 
The majority of farmers rely on seed saved from their own harvests and continue recycling seed as long 
as the harvest is "adequate" and they are able to keep some for subsequent seasons. Local traders play a 
critica( role in rural communities by purchasing grain at harvest, storing it and later selling it back to the 
same fanners, either for food oras seed at planting time (Sperling, 2001 ). These traditional seed systems 
are critica! to the livelihoods of poor households in the supply of both food and seed. During 
emergencies, relief and seed given as gifts beco me an important source of acquiring seed (Audi 2000). 
This is best exemplified by a Kamba saying, "mbeu ndivatanawa," which, literally translated, means 
that "one cannot be denied planting seed." Seed bought from local markets also proves key (Sperling 
2001 ' 2002). 
The informal sector accounts for over 90% of the seed sown in ASAL regions. Beca use it is based on 
rain-fed cropping systems, it is highly vulnerable to drought stress, resulting in severe shortages. 
Although producers in the informal sector ha ve limited access to breeders and basic seed of improved 
varieties, the local system has potential for sustainabili ty partly because it is derived from traditional 
systems and has Iimited demand for extemal inputs. 
Seed relief approaches: An overview 
Seed relief is a relatively new development in Kenya. lt began in 1992 as an effort to supply seeds to 
communities faced with food and acute seed shortages following drought. No record or report is 
available for an assessment of the seed situation in Kenya, but seed distribution has always followed 
food di stribution in the majority of locations. A number of factors have been considered in identifying 
geographicallocations and potential beneficiaries for seed, usually provided by Ministry of Agricul ture 
staff and including the following: 
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• the prevailing food/seed insecurity in drought-prone areas 
• the actual nwnber of households that are affected by food/seed insecurity 
• the existing crop and farming systems in the targeted areas, including the crop planting density per 
population and cropping seasons (long- and short-rain seasons) 
• suitable crop species and varieties, based on agro-ecological conditions and existing crop and 
farming systems 
• the land area to be planted to different crops 
• the total amount of appropriate seed in terms of quantity/quality required for the affected areas, and 
existing capacity for packaging and distributing the seed 
• the potential sources of seed and their availabili ty among the licensed merchants, approved 
stockists, and small seed enterpri ses 
• weather forecasts and advice on suitable crops for the anticipated amount and distri bution of 
precipitation 
During droughts, governmental and nongovemmental organizations have responded not only with food 
aid, but also with "a package" that includes seed and, in sorne cases, tools for land preparation and other 
crop-husbandry operations. lt has been anticipated that the seed distributed to farmers would serve as a 
boost in restoring their capacity to produce crops and seed for subsequent seasons. 
Tn the l990s, most of this seed aid followed a centralized tendering and distribution system to the 
affected areas, with little participation ofthe target groups. However, with the introduction ofthe World 
Food Program's (WFP) community-based food distribution system in 2000, Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) started shifting their seed distribution policy towards strengthening community-based systems 
and promoting the use of seed of locally avai lable and adapted crop species. 
Two approaches, direct seed distribution (DSD) and seed vouchers and fairs (SV &F), ha ve been used to 
distribute emergency seed in eastem Kenya. Many organizations (both NGOs and government agencies) 
have followed and continue to foll ow the DSD approach. 
In this approach, the organizations request seed quotations from registered seed companies. Once the 
companies respond, the quotations are assessed, based on the unit cost and the abi li ty ofthe company to 
supply the types of crop, varieties, and amounts required. Successful bidders transport the seeds to the 
district headquarters in the affected area, where it is received by the implementing agency for storage, 
awaiting delivery to the divisions and finally to locations where the seed is distributed to the 
beneficiaries. Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Office of the President ha ve been used to 
distribute seed to beneficiaries. Where NGOs are involved, ground staff supervise the distribution. 
CRS and its local partners used the SV &F approach to distribute seed to needy households in Kenya for 
the first time during the short rains of 2000 and 2001. This approach involves special markets (fairs) 
organized for farmers and local traders with surplus grain to be sold as seed. Seed stockists and 
companies are also invited to bring certified seed to the fairs. Seed-needy farmers are identified and 
issued vouchers of given monetary value, which they exchange for seed of the crops, varieties, and 
amounts of their choice, depending on the monetary val u e of the seed vouchers. When the fa ir is o ver, 
seed sellers redeem the vouchers for cash. 
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Comparison of DSD and SV &F systems: Basic features 
The overall aim of emergency seed distribution is to contribute to food and livelihood security by 
ensuring that fanners, especially the vulnerable ones, have access to adequate seed and planting 
materials. An effective emergency seed distribution system should therefore ensure that a large number 
of seed-needy households are reached. The basic features ( operational processes) of emergency seed 
distribution involve geographical and beneficiary targeting, identification ofseed sources, procurement, 
transportation to distribution points, setting up the distribution procedures, and communicating 
extension infonnation. 
Descriptive features 
Table 2 compares the operational features (processes) of the DSD and SV &F approaches. Most 
important to note is the fact that SV &F in vol ves and empowers the community in all the stages, thus 
building their capacity. As opposed to DSD, where farmers have no option but to accept the seed brought 
to them, SV &F empowers the community to identify seed-needy households, choose the crop, variety, 
and amount of seed to plant, bring seed to be exchanged, and even participate in seed quality inspection 
and price setting. With DSD, the community is involved only at the receiving end- they receive the 
seeds that are distributed. The process of seed sourcing, acquisition, transportatíon, and distribution is 
done by the govemment and NGOs. 
Comparison of operations 
ln Kenya, emergency seed distribution is mainly associated with drought whose effect is gradual in both 
geographical and population coverage. It usua lly starts from the most drought prone moving to the lesser 
drought prone districts as drought persists across seasons. 
Geographical coverage 
Between 1992 and 2002, Kenya suffered through three major drought periods (1992- 1993, 1996-1997, 
2000- 2002), in which food and seed were distributed to the affected regions and population. During 
these major drought periods, o ver 42 districts benefitted from seed distribution in Kenya. In the droughts 
of 1992- 93 and 1996-97, the govemment and other development organizations used the DSD approach 
to distribute seeds to seed-needy households. In 1992- 93, seed was distributed to 32 districts, and 
between 1996 and 1997, it was distributed in 41 districts. In the period between 2000 and 2002, both the 
DSD and SV &F approaches were u sed to distribute seed in 42 districts in the country, out of which, the 
DSD approach was used in 34 and both DSD and SV &F in eight districts, mainly in eastem Kenya. 
Data available from implementing organizations reveal that SV &F has only been implemented in three 
years in nine districts in Kenya. However, OSO has been implemented for o ver 1 O years in all the 42 
districts where seed distribution has taken place. The NGOs and the Ministry of Agriculture stafftend to 
agree that as long as seeds are available with seed companies and transport logistics are in place, the 
DSD approach is easily replicable and can cover a wider geographical area within a short time period 
compared to the SV &F approach. This is mainly beca use DSD is implemented through govemment and 
other development agency structures that already exist and which are easily mobilized for seed 
distribution. However, seeds and transport are usually not in place in the quantities needed at the 
required time. Although more of the targeted districts can be reached through DSD, the distribution of 
seed from the districts to the divisions, locations, and households is usually delayed beyond the 
necessary planting period. 
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The nature of the SV &F approach, which involves targeting the most affected locations or divisions 
within a district, may limít it to smaller geographical coverage. However, with time and more capacity 
building in the implementing institutions, SV&F may be a better approach since it targets the neediest 
locations. 
Table 2. Comparison of Operational Features of DSD and SV &F 
oso ¡ SV&F 
Targeting of regions and locations 
Done at regional leve! based on drought. Little 
effort is made to identify the most affected 
divisions and locations 
-------
At district leve! targeting is based on food 
insecurity and occurrence of drought. Divisions 
and locations are selected based on rainfall data 
and crop performance in the current or 
preceding season 
Targeting of beneficiaries 
Targeting depends on the distributing agency. 
Some NGOs do their targeting according to 
criteria set by officials within their grassroots 
networks. ALRMP at times offers blanket 
distribution mainty to satisfy potitica\ interests, 
though, theoretically, frontline extension officers 
are supposed to target needy households 
Community sets criteria through sub-village 
committees to identify and rank seed-needy 
households 
--- - ----
Seed sources 
Seed companies, and at times small-seed 
enterprises such as irrigation schemes and 
community seed butking units 
--------
Farmers, local market traders, research 
institutions, community seed bulking groups, 
small- and large-scale seed companies 
-------
Seed procurement 
Requires a tendering process, or direct 
agreement with small seed enterprises 
1 No tendering process required . Seed vendors 
bring grains and certified seed to the seed fai r 
si te 
Seed transportation to distribution points 
---------
Transportation has to be arranged by the 
implementing agency and seed companies or 
small seed enterprises for long distances 
Transportation arranged by the seed suppliers 
l (vendors) 
Seed distribution 
Done by chiefs, assistant chiefs, extension 
agents and grassroots network of implementing 
NGOs 
Beneficiaries are issued vouchers, which they 
exchange for seed 
Oecision on amount received by each beneficiary 
------- - ----- - ---- - -
Centrally decided by extension and 
administration officials. Depends on the number 
of beneficiaries coming for seed, or households 
targeted by grassroots networks, relative to 
available seed 
Made by each beneficiary, depending on the 
voucher value 
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B eneficiaries targeted and r e ached 
The number of beneficiaries targeted and those receiving seeds through DSD and SV &F in eastem 
Kenya are presented in table 3. For the three drought periods, the number of bene ficiari es reached 
through DSD in the affected districts of eas tem Kenya exceeded the targets by between 15% to 23%. In 
2000-2002, the distribution through both OSO and SV &F also exceeded the targets by 23%, indicating 
similarity in both approaches. The fewer number of benefician es targeted and reached by SV &F was 
determined by the project design and limited by project funds. However, if more funds could be made 
available for SV&F, more benefic iaries could be reached. 
Tahle 3 . Scale of Operation of Seed Distrihution in Terms of Districts Covered, 
Number of Beneficiaries and Quantitie s of Seed Distrihuted during the Three 
Major Drought Periods in Eastern Kenya 
No. of beneficiarias Value of 
Drought Quantity of seed Percent 
period and Number of seed distributed achievem'nt 
approach districts Targeted Achieved distributed (Mi Ilion (targeted/ 
u sed covered (M tons) shillings) achieved) 
1992-93 10 79,050 90,907 1,741 157 115 
(DSD) 
1996-97 12 66,750 80,100 979 81 120 
(DSD) 
2000-2002 9 95,682 117,369 499 64 123 
(DSD) 
2000-2002 8 33,800 41 ,583 1,020 23 123 
(SV&F) 
Oiscussions with those who implemented DSD and SV &F (Ministry of Agriculture and NGO staft) 
revealed that when OSO approach is used, even households that were not seed deficient received seed; 
SV &F is more efficient in targeting seed-needy households. 
Types of crops/varie ties distrihuted 
DSD relies on the crop varieties and quantities of seed available with seed companies. These are mainly 
improved crop varieties, which are released for cultivation in specified regions. For most ofthe dryland 
areas ofKenya, only a few crop varieties have been released for cultivation (Omanga, 2002) . This limits 
the number ofsuitable crops/varieties that are distributed to fam1ers through DSD. Nevertheless, maize, 
sorghum, beans, and cowpeas are the main crops that seed companies supply for emergency seed 
distribution. 
Discussions with Ministry of Agriculture crop officers in the various districts revealed that the most 
common maize varieties supplied for distribution in eastern Kenya during drought emergencies were 
DLC, KCB, H5 11 , H5 12, and H5 13. However, it is not uncommon to find that maize for high-potential 
areas, such as H5 12, H513, H61 4, and H6 14, have also been included in the supplies (Mohamed, 200 1). 
Two varieties of sorghum, Seredo and Serena, are the most common, while, in beans, the seed 
companies usually supply mwatimania and rosecoco. 
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For drought-tolerant crop species like millet, cowpeas, green grams, pigeonpeas, and Dolichos beans, 
where few varieties have been released by research, the seed companies have been able to supply seeds 
but with no variety tag or )abe!. In most cases, it is only the name of the crop that is written on the 
package. This indica tes that some of the seed for these crops could be not certifíed but was purchased by 
seed companies from local markets. 
A sample of crops, varieties, and quantities supplied and distributed to benefíciaries through DSD are 
presented in table 4 for Makueni District, which is representative ofthe other districts. 
The crops and varieties/cultívars available during SV &F is representative ofthe cropping system ofthe 
area. In most SV &F distributions, various crops grown by farmers in the regían were avaiJable (table 5). 
These included maize, sorghum, millet, beans, cowpeas, green grams, pigeonpeas, Dol ichos beans, and 
chickpeas. Other crops that were brought to sorne ofthe seed fairs included cassava, sweet potatoes, and 
cotton. For each ofthese crops, farmers, traders, and seed companies brought completely differentiated 
varieties and cultivars. More crops and different crop varieties were brought for sale to farrners at SV &F 
events, compared to the number of crops and varieties that seed companies supplied through DSD. 
Quantities of seed given in each approach 
For DSD, the amount of seed supplied during the three drought periods largely depended on the 
availabi lity ofseed through seed companies, the price ofthe seed, and the availability offunds. Between 
1992 and 2002, over 3219 tons ofseed worth 302 million shillings were supplied and di stributed by the 
govemment and NGOs in eastem Kenya using the DSD approach. During the drought period of 2000 
and 2002, CRS and its partners distributed about 1020 tons ofseed worth 23 million shillings using the 
SV &F approach in eastem Kenya . A total of 51 SV &F events were conducted. At these events, 2169 
seed vendors (farmers, traders, and seed companies) brought over 2500 tons of seed and sold 1020 tons 
to voucher ho lders (table 6). 
Despite the fact that beans and maize are not the best-adapted crops for the drought-prone areas of 
eastem Kenya, they sti ll comprised the highest proportion of seed distributed by both DSD and SV &F. 
This is mainly due to taste preferences and suggests that a greater effort is needed in promoting 
drought-tolerant crop varieties through on-farm trials and demonstrations. 
Quantities of seed given to each household 
Generally, most of the stakeholders who are involved in emergency seed di stribution rely on technical 
backstopping from Ministry of Agriculture staffto provide estima tes ofthe amount ofseed to be given to 
each household. This is based on the average area of land per household and prevailing agroclimatic 
conditions. For most districts in ASAL eastem Kenya, the average land holding is between two and 
seven hectares. The seed budget per household is about 1 Okg of maize, 1 Okg ofbeans, 5kg of sorghum or 
millet, and another 5kg of cowpeas, pigeonpeas, or green grams, according to d istrict crops officers. 
The amount of seed that each househo1d got through govemment channels, in practice, depended on the 
number of members of each household who present at the dí stribution point. In most cases, the 
benefíciaries received between 3kg and 1 Okg of seed of various crop varieties (according to district 
crops offícers). However, when NGOs were involved, the quantities received by each household ranged 
from 8kg to 25kg (table 7). Seed distributed through govemment channels went to everyone who carne 
to the distribution point, but the NGOs were more targeted, giving seed to the already identified 
seed-needy households only. Through SV&F, the average amount of seed received by each benefíciary 
was 28kg. 
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Table 4. Summary of Diversity of Crops, Varieties, and Quantities D elivered and 
Agencies lnvolved in the DSD System in Makueni Dish·ict 
Year/Donor/ 
Sea son 
1995, Drought 
Recovery Program 
(DRP), LR 
1995, GAA/KFFHC, LR 
1996, DRP, LR 
1996, WVK, GAA, 
DANIDA, &GTZ 
2000, WVK,GAA, 
&MAP 
2001, DRP, LR 
2001 , FAO/AMREF , 
LR 
No. of 
beneficiaries 
reached 
No Records 
No Records 
No Records 
No Records 
No Records 
No Records 
Crop type and 
quantities supplied 
(tons) 
Varieties of each crop and 
quantities supplied (tons) 
----~-
Maize (63.0) 
Sorghum (5.0)/ Millet {5.0) 
Legumes (18.0) 
Maize (30.0) 
Sorghum (9.0) 
Beans (7.0) 
Maize (120.0) 
Legumes (90.0) 
Sorghum (5.0) 
Maize (48.8) 
Legumes {52.0} 
Sorghum (35.6) 
Cotton (19.2) 
Maize (15.1) 
Sorghum (13.5} 
Cotton (24.4} 
Legumes (22.8) 
Maize (36.0) 
Sorghum (24.0) 
Legumes (6.0) 
Sorghum (13.0) 
Millet (13.0) 
Legumes (52.0} 
·---- ---
KCB, DLC1 , and H511 (assorted) 
Serena and seredo 5.0 (assorted); Bulrush 
and finger millets 5.0 (assorted) 
Beans (15.0), (mwitamania and rosecoco, 
assorted); Cowpeas (3.0) (M66 and 
kenkunde, assorted) 
KCB (30.0) 
Seredo (9.0) 
Mwitamania (7.0) 
DLC1 , KCB, and H511 (120.0, assorted) 
GLP2, GLP92, GLP1004, kenkunde (90.0) 
Seredo (5.0) 
Maize (48.8) 
Beans, cowpeas, green grams (52.0) 
Sorghum (35.6, assorted) 
Cotton (19.2, assorted) 
Maize {15.1, assorted) 
Sorghum (13.5, assorted) 
Cotton (24.4, assorted) 
Beans, cowpeas, green grams, 
pigeonpeas, soybeans (22.8, assorted) 
KCB (36.0) 
Seredo (7.0), serena (1 7.0) 
Mwitemania (4.0 ), kenkunde (2.0) 
Sorghum (13.0, assorted) 
Millet (13.0, assorted) 
Cowpeas (13.0), green grams (13.0), 
beans (26.0) 
Source: District Agriculture Office Mak ueni (2003). 
Note: LR == long rains. For other acronyms, see the list at the end of the chapter. 
Table 5. Comparison of Varietal Composition of Seed Distl"ibuted through DSD and 
SV&F 
Number of Varieties Supplied/Available 
Crops DSD SV&F 
Maize 7 5 
Sorghum 4 6 
Millet 2 4 
Beans 6 8 
Cowpeas 4 7 
Pigeonpeas 4 
Green grams 1 3 
Chickpeas 2 
Dolicho beans 4 
Total 25 43 
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Table 6 . Cr op s and Quantities (in MT) Distributed in Drought-Mfected Districts of 
Eastern Kenya tht·ougb the SV &F Appt·oach , 2000-2002 
Crop 2000 2001 2002 
Maize 19.2 261.0 30.5 
Sorghum 5.4 104.4 10.1 
Millet 3.5 87.0 7.9 
Beans 28.5 294.1 18.6 
Cowpeas 3.4 69.6 8.5 
Green grams 2.6 27.4 6.3 
Pigeonpeas 1.5 22.2 3.6 
Dolicho beans 0.3 3.5 0.5 
Chickpeas 0.2 0.8 0.0 
Total 64.6 870.0 86.0 
Tahle 7 . Quantities of Seed (kg) Received b y Each Household through NGO Ch a1mels 
Using DSD , 2000 
Quantity of seed received by each household by crop 
Sorghum/ Cowpeas/ 
NGO Maize millet Beans greengrams Pigeonpeas Total 
Red Cross 3 2 2 1 8 
GAA 5 10 5 5 25 
Catholic Diocese 5 2 5 4 16 
DAN IDA 10 5 15 
ADRA 5 2 5 7 19 
DSD versus SV&F: Process and product 
An analysis of process and product compares the two approaches in emergency seed distribution in the 
context of logi stics and timeliness, quantit ies supplied and del ivered, capacity building, and process of 
seed acquis ition. It also addresses spin-offs such as choice leeway, pricing, income redistribution, and 
gender composition ofkey players. In the product analys is, we addressed the appropriateness oftypes of 
crops and varieties distributed, adaptability ofthe seed to local conditions, quality of the seed- viabili ty, 
purity-and the composition of the seed in tenns of crop species and varieti es. 
Logistics and timeliness 
For any emergency seed distribution, logistics have to be put into place to ensure a timely supply ofseed 
to needy households befare the onset ofthe rains. The two systems ofemergency seed distribution (DSD 
and SV&F) differ markedly in terms of the logistics involved, which begin from the identiftcation of 
drought-affected areas through to the procurement and distribution of seed to the targeted benefic iaries 
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(table 8). The OSO involves a lengthy time consuming tendering process. lt also entails that the seeds 
have to be transported to the affected districts and locations. This is time consuming and more often the 
seed reaches the beneficiaries long after the onset of rains. For example, during the seed distribution of 
2000 October short rains, most ofthe districts reported receiving seeds two weeks after the onset ofrains 
and sorne more than one month la ter (Mohamed, , 200 l ). 
In SV&F, most ofthe seed distributed comes from the affected areas. lt only requires mobilization and 
sensitization of farmers, traders, seed stockists, and seed companies to take seed to selected seed fair 
sites that are closer to beneficiaries. The mobilizati on may take about two weeks. In fact, discussions 
with agriculture officials and farmers revealed that through SY &F, farmers received seed in time to plant 
before or at the onset of the rains in 2000 and 200 l. This is further supported by Mohamed's (200 1) 
evaluation findings. 
Secondary b enefits 
Apart fro m the seed-needy farmers who are the purported beneficiaries of both systems of emergency 
seed distribution, other stakeholders also benefit. Table 9 gives a summary of various categories of 
beneficiaries in each system and the nature of benefits. Under the S V &F approach, the farming 
cornmunities benefitted twice: once from seed received and also from money received by local seed 
vendors, which was injected into the local economy. On the other hand, under OSO, the farming 
cornmun ities only benefitted from receiving seed. The funds used to purchase the seed went to the seed 
companies. The active role played by the farming communities under SY &F helps enhance the 
sustainabili ty ofthe local seed market system because local seed vendors and farmers play a key role in 
the actual exchange ofvouchers for seed. 
Quantities of eed received by each household 
In SY &F, the amounts of seed the voucher holders received depended on the prices ofthe grain (seed) in 
the seed fa ir. With the voucher value of700 shillings given to farmers during the seed fairs in 2001, most 
of the beneficiaries used 250 to purchase maíze, 250 to purchase beans, 1 00 to purchase sorghum and 
millet, and 100 for other grain legumes (table 1 0). Atan average price of 16, 38, 26, and 35 shillings per 
kilo of maize, beans, sorghum/mi ll et, and other legumes, respective1y, the beneficiaries took home an 
average of30kg of grain to be planted as seed. Only 8kg of certified commercial seed could be purchased 
for 700 shillings. 
In the OSO approach, the amount of seed received by households was decided by the implementing 
agency or the Ministry of Agricu lture. In most districts, each household was to receive about 1 Okg of 
maize, 5kg ofsorghum, 5kg ofbeans, and 2kg ofeither cowpeas, green grams, or pigeonpeas- a total of 
22kg. However, the amount of seed finally received by the househo lds depended on what was supplied 
to the 1ocation or division and the number of househo1ds ata distribution point. Ouring 2000 and 2001 , 
most farmers receiving seed through DSO, took home an average 3kg to 1 Okg of seed to plan t. 
Table 11 gi ves a summary ofthe seed distributed in each district, the targeted farmers, and the estimated 
seed per household under the two systems. The average amount of seed supplied under the SV &F system 
was 28kg. T he highest amount of.seed was received in Tha,raka Oistrict, with each beneficiary receiving 
about 36kg of assorted seeds, whi1e the lowest amount was received in Kitui, where each beneficiary 
received 21 kg of assorted seed. 
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Table 8. Comparison of Logistics and Timeliness of DSD and SV &F Systems of Seed 
Distribution 
oso SV&F 
ldentification of Sea le and Scope of Disaster 
• Elaborate system that starts with frontline extension 
staff, village-level provincial administration, 
district-level officials, to national Office of the Presiden! 
(based ALRMP) and NGO head offices 
For !he case of seed from the government in Kenya, 
the system is time consuming because of bureaucratic 
red tape-hence not capable of quick response to an 
emergency. For the case of NGOs, they are more 
focused on certain target areas and have less red 
tape-hence capable of quick response 
• Existing information used to determine areas that 
deserve intervention 
• Combination of existing information and sub-village 
committees used to target beneficiaries 
• Focused on specific disaster-affected areas-hence 
easy to react in time with appropriate intervention 
Procurement and Distribution to Districts 
Procurement achieved through an elaborate tendering 
system that involves decisions and goodwill of a 
number of stakeholders, such as members of Office of 
the Presiden!, Treasury officials, and Ministry of 
Agriculture officials for seed from the government, and 
top-level management of NGOs for seed distributed 
through NGOs or their grassroots collaborators 
Availability of adequate and adaptable varieties of 
given crop species subject to stocking policies of major 
seed companies or small seed enterprises whose 
operations are independent of needs of Office of the 
Presiden!, Ministry of Agriculture, or NGOs 
Transportation from source to target areas involves 
contracting transporters and loaders. with associated 
cost implications 
• Too many independent players involved-hence not 
capable of quick response to emergency situation 
High proportion of seed supplied comes from within the 
disaster area 
Benefitting communities double as suppl iers of some of 
the seed-hence limited transport and packaging 
logistics 
Majority of the players in the exchange process are 
local 
• Minimal time required to sensitize the suppliers and 
organize potential beneficiaries to meet in a central 
place 
lnherent ability to support quick response to disaster 
because of few independent and spatially distributed 
players in decision making 
Distribution to Target Beneficiarias, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Budget for distribution normally allocated to provincial No physical transportation by an independent 
administration yet Ministry of Agriculture officials are transporter requi red to reach targeted beneficiaries 
supposed to distribute seed to targeted beneficiaries. No officials of provincial administration nor extension 
Individual NGOs involved in seed distribution organize staff required to supervise distribution 
their grassroots network for actual distribution to No elaborate packaging and storage facility required at 
targeted beneficiaries grassroots/village level 
Most ALRMP lorries in the districts are in disrepair and 
no specific funds are allocated for hiring lorries from 
prívate transporters to carry seed to target locations 
Some new districts lack adequate storage facilities for 
large quantities of seed sourced and distributed by the 
government. Most NGOs also lack storage facilities in 
target locations 
• Adequate time and properly planned logistics required 
to have the seed reach the beneficiaries-hence not 
capable of quick response to emergency 
\ . ~ -
• Literally no time spent on distribution to target 
communities, as each beneficiary gets hislher share to 
carry home 
• Decentralized system with ta rgeting on smaller 
scale-hence more accurate and easier to monitor and 
evaluate 
• Both buyers and sellers benefit-hence ensures 
targeting without creating confl ict with in the community 
. -· 
lnformation contained in vouchers allows 
implementation to be tracked, forming the basis for 
monitoring and evaluation 
- ----
U.\ l. A- or ,. rr N y 
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Table 9. Comparison of Benefits Accruing to Various Stakeholders mtder DSD and 
SV &F Systems of Seed Supply 
oso SV&F 
Benefits to Farmers 
Primary beneficiaries and the main recipients 
of the distributed seed 
Primary beneficiaries of the seed purchased 
through the system: they comprise the 
majority of suppliers of seed and thus redeem 
vouchers for cash 
Benefits to Seed Vendors 
Benefits only in situations where NGOs 
purchase locally bulked seed for distribution 
to farmers 
Secondary beneficiarias from profits earned 
when they sell their grains as seed during the 
fairs 
Benefits to Seed Companies 
Main secondary beneficiaries: they supply Secondary beneficiaries: they supply part of 
most of the seed distributed through DSD certified seed purchased during the fairs 
Benefits to Local Seed Stockists 
Secondary beneficiaries: normally benefit 
when NGOs choose to purchase seed locally 
Secondary beneficiaries: they supply part of 
certified seed purchased during the fairs 
Benefits to Community in General 
Benefit from agricultura! outputs from the 
seed and, hence, food security; increased 
crop diversity occasioned by new species; 
small seed enterprises/community seed 
bulking agents sell part of their "seed" as 
emergency grade seed 
---
lnject cash into local economy (70% remains 
in the community); capacity building in terms 
of issues relating to seed quality; capacity 
building in terms of seed bulking and seed 
exchange systems; contributes to 
sustainability of the local seed market system 
Table 10. Arnow1t of Seed That Each Bt>neficiary Took Home 
Seed Fairs Commercial seed 
Household Average Amount Amount that 
Crop seed budget 
Unit price of seed purchased Unit price could have been 
(Ksh) (Ksh/kg) (~ (Ksh/kg) purchased (kg) 
Maize 250 16 15.6 100 2.5 
Beans 250 38 6,6 80 3.2 
Sorghum/millet 100 28 3.8 70 1.4 
Other Legumes __ 100 35 2.9 100 1.0 
Totals 700 30.0 8.0 
- - -- --
--
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Table 11. Estimated Seed Distributed per Household under DSD and SV &F, 2000 
oso SV&F 
Amount of Amount of 
Seed Seed per Seed 
Oistricts No. of Oistributed Household No. of Oistributed Seed per Beneficiaries {kg) (kg) Beneficiarias {kg) Household 
Tharaka 6,125 45,642 7.50 4,600 164,000 35.61 
Mbeere 8,307 49,900 6.00 4600 93,000 20.22 
Macha kas 41,100 1,014,100 24.00 4600 150,000 32.60 
Makueni 7,700 129,492 16.80 4600 146,000 31.74 
Kitui 13,530 50,150 3.70 4600 98,000 21.30 
Mwingi 40,607 312,814 7.70 3278 86,000 26.24 
Average 10.95 27.9 
For each of the dryland crops, there are a number of varieties/cultivars that fanners can easily 
differentiate by local names and preferred characteristics. Indeed, different Iocall y adapted crops and 
crop varieties, which are not available in the formal seed sector but are important to food security in 
drought-prone areas, were brought for sale to the fairs. This helps develop an understanding of the 
biodiversity in crops and varieties and fanners' preferences for the various crops in each location. The 
seed fairs provided an opportunity for local seed vendors and seed-needy fanners to interact. lt also 
provided an opportunity to gather infonnation on the kinds of crops and varieties available for sale and 
fanners' preferences. In this way, the SV&F system strengthens the operation of local seed systems 
rather than undermining it. 
The promotion of seed-quality issues related to seed preservation, selection, and management of 
good-quality seed during sensitization meetings and fairs, as well as the involvement of local vendors 
and fanners under the SV &F scheme, considerably enhances the local seed supply system. Conversely, 
under the DSD scheme, all seed is purchased elsewhere and brought in for distribution in target 
Iocalities. The well-organized publicity and involvement of a considerable number of vendors, fanners, 
and commercial seed companies associated with SV &F make it possible to access a wider range of crops 
and varieties (see table 5). For example, during the implementation of the "Emergency Provísion of 
Seeds to Drought Affected Farming Households" project in Kenyan ASALs, sorne 43 varieties ofnine 
crops were bought at seed fairs, compared to only 27 varieties for seven crops provided through DSD. In 
the long tenn, the repeated provision of relief seed associated with DSD could unintentionally increase 
fanners' vulnerabili ty by promoting false expectations, contributing to dependency on free assistance, 
and disrupting local seed markets (F AO, 2002b ). In this context, SV &F is less "hannful" as it enhances 
the local seed supply. Seventy percent ofthose who bring their own seed under SV &F are from the local 
communities, which ensures that a larger proportion ofthe funds committed to relief seed remains in the 
benefitting communities. For instance, of the US$ 276,000 spent on vouchers in the six districts under 
srudy in 2001 , approximately US$ 193,200 remained in the benefitting communities. 
Flexibility 
The SV&F approach presents a " leve! playing field" upon which the commercial seed sector (seed 
companies and stockists) and the fanner seed system (fanners and market traders) can compete. 
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However, the playing field can be easily tilted in favor ofthe commercial sector iffarmers are lectured 
on the superiority of commercial seed of improved varieties. lt can also be tilted towards the farmer 
system by encouraging voucher holders to buy locally so asto prevent the proceeds from the sale Jeaving 
the community. 
The SV &F methodology provides beneficiaries a choice of crops, varieties, and seed quality. It is an 
open process in which commercial seed companies, stockists (input supply shopkeepers), market grain 
traders, and small farmers can all participate. With competent, experienced, and proactive management, 
SV &F can provide farm fami lies with a choice between farmer and formal seed, as well as small 
quantities of seed of new varieties. 
Beneficiary access to information concet•ning quality of the supplied seed 
Interviews with representative farmers (F AO, 2002a) and officials of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(district crop officers) revealed that farmers have more leeway accessing information regarding 
adaptation to local environments and seed quality in SV &F, compared to OSO. This is mainly dueto the 
fact that in SV &F, farmers ha ve the freedom to choose the crop, variety, and amount of seed they want, 
within the constraint of the value of their vouchers. They al so have the freedom to choose what to bu y 
from a number of suppliers, who range from local stockists, seed companies, seed vendors, and fellow 
farmers. This way, they ha ve control over the quality of the seed that they take home. Under SV &F, 
farmers are al so in a position to choose the seed or combination of seeds that they prefer. The majority 
(over 50%) ofthose displaying seed for sale are fellow farmers and the benefíciaries are able to rate the 
quality oftheir seed based on experience because they live in the same community. On the other hand, 
under the DSD system, farmers are compelled to contend with what is provided to them, as they do not 
play any role in deciding either what is to be purchased or the crop mix in terms ofwhat is provided to 
them. 
Contribution to biodiversity 
Interviews with various stakeholders (farmers and extension staft) revealed that both the OSO and 
SV &F systems of emergency seed distribution enhance biodiversity through the introduction of new 
varieties and, even at times, crop species. The DSO system brings in certifíed seed, sorne of which is 
totally new to the target areas and, thus, enhances diversity of the crop species in such areas . SV &F 
involves participation of seed companies and other seed merchants who introduce new crop species and 
varieties in target areas. For instance, Westem Kenya Seed Company was able to display and sell new 
varieties of pigeonpeas, beans, millet, sorghum, and maize during the seed fairs in 2001 , which is an 
indication that farmers in the region actuall y seek seed of new varieties. 
Ability of supply to satisfy the estimated demand 
Comparison ofthe two systems in terms ofability to satisfy the estimated demand revealed that the OSD 
system under ALRMP has rarely supplied the districts with the requested amounts. Using Machakos as 
an example (table 12), it can be seen that the amount of seed supplied for the much-needed varieties of 
maize, beans, cowpeas, and sorghum was far below the quantities ordered. On the other hand, the supply 
under SV&F is such that all vouchers are exchanged for seed and no farrner goes home with unused 
vouchers. 
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Table 12. Quantities of Emergency Seed Ordered and What Was Actually Received for 
the See d from ALRMP, Machakos Distric t , 1997 
CropNariety Quantity Ordered (kg) Quantity Received (kg) 
Maize H511 38,800 20,000 
Maize H512 Nil 12.000 
K ale 20 5 
Onions 30 100 
Tomatoes 40 180 
Green grams 19,200 793 
Maize (KCB) 317,400 115,000 
Beans 304,600 2,000 
Sorghum 4000 Nil 
Cowpeas 37,160 2,080 
DSD versus SV&F: Financial analysis 
In a rder to implement emergency seed distribution, funds are required to meet the costs of purchase, 
transportation, and distribution. Depending on the approach used to distribute seed, these costs vary with 
the types of seed distributed and the distances between the di stribution locations and the district and seed 
company headquarters. At the NGO leve!, it was diffícult to get information on the amount and value of 
seed purchased and distributed. However, sorne data were avai lable from FAO Kenya, which 
coordinated seed distributions during the droughts of 2000 and 200 l . Based on the available data, we 
used two methods to compare the cost implicatíons ofDSD and SV &F: 
• information on the number of targeted beneficiaries and total project costs that was available for 
2000 and 200 l from the F AO Kenya office, wh ich provided the overall costs involved in 
di stributing seed to each benefitting household under each of the two schemes. 
• the estimated costs of seed procurement, transportation, handling, and faci li tation, which 
addressed the cost effectiveness of each ofthe two schemes (adapted from a study on "Compara ti ve 
Financia! Analysis ofthe Seed Vouchers and Fairs Scheme," FAO, 2002b). 
Overall costs 
Table 13 compares the average cost and estimated amount of seed per beneficiary, and the estimated unit 
cost of seed for the DSD and SV &F distributions conducted in eastem Kenya during 2000 and 200 l. 
Only the cost of purchasing seed was included in this analysis since it was difficult to get other costs 
related to transportation and faci litation for DSD. 
The average cost of distributing seed to each beneficiary through DSD (545 Ksh) was almost identical to 
that ofSV &F (560 Ksh) in 2000, but less by 102 Ksh for the 2001 distribution. However, the amount of 
seed received by each household was far less in the DSD distribution: 4 .3kg through DSD in 2000, 
compared to 12.2kg in 2000 and 28. 7kg in 2001 through SV &F. The estimated unit cost of 128.2 Ksh/kg 
ofseed for DSD in 2000 was considerable more than the cost ofa kilo ofseed distributed through SV&F: 
almost three times more for 2000 and six times more for 200 l. 
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Table 13. Aualysis of Costs of Seed Distributed Using DSD and SV&F in Eastern Kenya 
in 2000 and 2001 
oso SV&F 
ltem Year 2000 Year2000 Year 2001 
Amount of seed distributed (MT) 499 98 870 
Estimated value of seed distributed (million Ksh.) 64 4 .5 19.6 
Number of beneficiaries 117,369 8,027 30,270 
Average cost per beneficiary (Ksh) 545 560 647 
Estimated amount of seed per beneficiary (kg) 4 .3 12.2 28.7 
__Étimated cost per kilo of seed (Ksh) 128.4 45.9 22 .5 
Source: FAO (2002b). 
Considering the cost of seed, the DSD system is more expensive to implement than SV &F. The cost of 
the certified seed distributed in OSO is approximately s ix times more expensive than the local grain that 
domina tes the seed exchanged in SV &F schemes. 
Cost effectiveness 
The relative cost-effectiveness the two schemes is presented in table 14, as adapted from FAO (2002b). 
Due to lack of data on all emergency seed dis tribution operations, the analysis was conducted on the 
basis of final reports and financia! statements from AMREF, the implementing agency of DSD in 
Makueni District, and CRS, the implementing agency of SV &F in Mbeere, Tharaka, and Embu. Both 
schemes were implemented under the "Emergency Provision of Seeds to Orought-Affected Farming 
Households" project (OSRO/KEN/001 /SWE) funded by OFID through FAO. The CRS financia! budget 
and preliminary results for implementation of the "Emergency Seeds Distribution by Voucher System 
for the ' Long' Rains in Eastem Kenya" project (OSRO/KEN/101/UK) were also used. 
The maja r costs involved in implementing OSO included procurement ofseed, transportation, handling, 
and facil itation. There were al so expenditures to cover the costs of procurement missions. In contrast, 
the costs of seed provision through the SV &F seed fairs in volved facilitation and the value of the 
vouchers. In table 14, a summary of the cost comparison is given, revealing that the combined costs of 
facilitation and transportation per benefíciary (and therefore the total costs per benefíciary) are lower for 
SV &F than for DSO (US$ 1.0 and US$ 2.3 for SV &F projects OSRO/KEN/00 1/SWE and 
OSRO/KEN/ 10 1 /UK, respectively, compared to US$ 3.3 under DSD). The total cost of US$ 13.8 per 
household for OSO is e ven more expensive when one compares the amount of seed that each household 
rcceived . 
lt is evident in table 14 that the average price of seed was lower for SV &F in both 2000 and 2001 , 
compared to the price for OSO. However, the average cost for SV&F in 2000 was tvvice that ofSV&F in 
200 l . This was attributed mainly to a change in market grain prices betvveen 2000 and 200 l. The grain 
prices were higher in 2000 due to grain shortages and high demand. 
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Table 14. Summary of Financia! Costs fot· DSD and SV &F 
Project Project 
Unit OSRO/KEN/001/SWEa OSRO/KEN/101/UKe 
Description oso SV&F SV&F 
lmplementing NGO AMREF CRS CRS 
Number of benefitting households No. 6.217 8,027 30,278 
(hh) 
Quantity of seed distributed Kg 74,604 64,678 956,324 
Costs of seed acquisition US$ 65,262 42,103 243,589 
Costs of seed facil itation US$ 12,108 8,282 69,800 
Costs of seed transportation US$ 8,530 o o 
Costs of seed transportation US$ 20,638 8,282 69,800 
&facilitation 
Total costs< US$ 85,900 50,385 313,389 
Costs of seed per hhd US$ 10.5 5.2 8 .0 
Average quantity of seed per hh Kg 12.0 8.0 31.5 
Average price of seed US$/Kg 0.9 0.6 0.3 
Cost of seed facilitation per hh US$ 1.9 1.0 2.3 
Cost of transportation and US$ 3.3 1.0 2 .3 
facilitation per hh 
Total costs per benefitting hh US$ 13.8 6.2 10.3 
Cost of seed facilitation as % of % 19% 19% 28% 
seed value 
Cost of seed facilitation as % of % 14% 16% 22% 
total costs 
Cost of seed facilitation and % 32% 19% 28% 
transportation as % of seed value 
Cost of seed facil itation and % 24% 16% 22% 
transportation as % of total costs 
a. "Emergency Provision ofSeed to Drought-Affccted Farming Households in Kenya," actual numbers. 
b. "Emergency Seed Distribution by Voucher System for the ' Long· ra ins in Eastem Kenya," est ima tcd numbers. 
c. F AO monitoring and evaluation costs are excluded. 
d . The SV &F seed package under OSRO/KEN/ 1 O 1/UK project does not include the cost of promotional seeds. 
Lessons learned, reflections, and next steps forward 
Lessons leam ed 
Although direct seed distribution is based on the assumption that after a drought disaster, farm ing 
communities do not have enough seed, the experience with seed vouchers and fairs in eastern Kenya 
shows that despite the intermittent droughts that lead to repeated acute stress, the main constraint is one 
of access to seed as opposed to local seed availabili ty. This is ev idenced in the fact that during SV&F 
activi ties, over 70% of the seed supplied was by local seed vendors and/or farmers w ho double as 
suppliers of"seed" during such fairs. This implics that thc local seed system is capable ofproviding the 
required seed even in situations of acute stress. Lack of access, which might be a result of widespread 
poverty, is the most likely exacerbating factor for the seed-related problems observed under conditions 
of acute stress. 
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Comparison of Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution 
In the nonnal planting season before any prolonged drought, fanners in drought-prone areas prefer 
planting landraces from their own sources and/or open-air markets (Audi, 2001 ). This implies that there 
is a built-in tendency for communities in ASALs to keep their own seed for planting or for sale to others 
through open-air markets, a factor that further supports the theory that during acute seed problems, the 
required seed is available in the communities but not accessible to all . 
The normal supply of seed for distribution through OSO has been come from govenunental or 
commercial sectors. This has led toa narrow range of crops and varieties available to beneficiaries. The 
commercial seed sector produces mainly for the reliable markets in medium- to high-potential 
agroecological zones, which means that they are not likely to ha ve adequate stocks of species or varieties 
adapted for ASAL districts. A shift towards empowering local bulking and availability of crops and 
varieties that are appropriate to local conditions could facilitate the procurement of seed for emergency 
seed di stributions, if only the donors and relief agencies could be convinced to be more flexible in their 
seed-sourcing policies. There are many cases where locally produced "emergency-grade seed" has been 
sourced and distributed. For instance, fanners in the Yala Oivision, Siaya Oistrict in Kenya (in 
collaboration with KARI, CIMMYT, and KEPHIS, and with financia! support from the Rockefeller 
Foundation) are currently bulking and selling unpacked and unbranded "semi-certified seed" among 
themselves in a cluster of 20 fanner groups. The same arrangement co uld be replicated in the ASAL 
districts of eastern Kenya. 
The fact that interventions have been needed each time there has been prolonged drought in eastem 
Kenya means that intennittent interventions have not resulted in establi shing a more resilient seed 
system that could sustaín itself through períods of acute stress without externa! intervention. There is 
therefore a need for a deeper understanding of the impact of relief seed on the rehabilitation of the seed 
system and promotion of system stabili ty. 
At present, seed fairs are only used as a means of enabling seed-needy fanners to access seed for the crop 
or variety of their choice in desired quantities, subject to the constraints of the value of the seed 
vouchers. However, the SV &F approach holds the poten tia! for stimulating local seed enterprises 
because it empowers even the small-scale sellers to participate. The approach could be modified to 
facilitate seed fairs on a regular basis, where those with vouchers and those willing to buy with cash 
could be brought together. Thís would help exploit the inherent empowennent and economic support of 
the approach, resulting in a more resilient and stable seed system in the drought-prone ASAL districts. 
Rejlections and recommended way forward 
The use of OSO and SV &F in emergency seed di stribution in eastern Kenya reveals that both 
approaches have strengths and weaknesses. OSO has been in ex istence longer and is therefore more 
familiar to donors, relief agencies, and govemment departments-both at top levels and grassroots. This 
means that it is easy to access funds from donors for OSO and to implement it on a wider scale. Also, the 
seed distributed through OSO is obtained mainly from commercial seed companies, so it is of known 
quali ty. An analysis ofthe cost effectiveness ofthe two approaches reveals relatively lower facilitation 
costs associated with SV &F compared to OSO. Further more, the OSD approach al so suffers the 
weakness of being implemented from the top down, with little room for participation by players in the 
local seed system. This has the potential ofundennining local seed system and its stability. The reliance 
of OSO on seed from commercial seed sources means that it might fa il at times to get species and 
varietíes suítable to the target areas. The inherent bureaucratic red tape in procurement and di stribution 
al so has a negative impact on the timeliness of delivery and targeting of actual seed-needy households. 
Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: {,ínking Reliefwith Development 
64 1 
Providing seeds through SV &F has the potential of enhancing the local seed system by giving the 
farmers the opportunity to choose seeds of the crops and varieties they want, which can save for 
following seasons; contributing to the development of social capital by recognizing the dignity of the 
beneficiaries and empowering them to choose seed of their preferred crops and varieties; us ing and 
supporting local crop diversity; linking to development through their capacity to choose, competitive 
seed markets, and development of agro-enterprises; enhancing local seed marketing systems by 
reinforcing existing market mechanisms and reducing externa! dependence; and strengthening the local 
cash economy because it provides financia! injections into the communities. 
The inherent weaknesses in SV &F include the inability to ascertain seed quality; its lack offamiliarity to 
most donors, relief agencies, and beneficiaries; and the risk associated with moving large amounts of 
cash. 
The study team is of the opinion that there are inherent strengths in both DSD and SV &F that could be 
built on to enhance the capacity ofthe interventions not only to bring the local seed systems back to their 
feet but to rehabilitare, stabilize, and sustain the systems. This study recommends that the program 
designs in emergency seed distribution should always include capacity building at all levels, which 
provides the recipients with the required ski lls and experiences necessary to maintain the stability and 
sustainability of the local seed system. 
SV &F opera tes on the premise that the seed is available in the communities and it is only access to that 
seed that crea tes a problem in a situation of acute stress. To ensure the sustainabihty of SV &F, 
small-scale production of open-pollinated varieties for sale as "seed" needs to be enhanced and 
strengthened in order to facilitate jump-starting small-seed enterprises, as well as intluencing policy on 
the production and sale of "emergency-grade seed." 
More resources are currently being used under the DSD scheme, compared to SV &F. DSD also has a 
wider geographical reach than SV&F. However, comparative analysis ofthe two schemes reveals sorne 
inherent weaknesses in DSD, particularly with regard to targeting, timeliness, and lack of support for 
local seed systems. This study propases that the key stakeholders in the implementation of the two 
schemes should work collaborati vely with a view to incorporating the positive attributes of both for 
enhanced targeting, timeliness, and stabi lity of local seed markets. 
Activities for backstopping and institutionalization of small -seed enterprises in the production of 
standard or "emergency-grade seed" should be encouraged and supported. The govemment, through 
ALRMP, has shown its willingness to purchase and supply such seed (for example, the purchase of 
sorghum in Turkana). Stakeholders and other policymakers should exploit the precedent set by ALRMP 
and start lobbying for legalization of purchase and distribution of such seed by a l! relief organization 
during emergencies occasioned by droughts. 
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Comparison of Seed Vouchers & F airs and Direct Seed Distribution 
Acronyms 
ADRA 
AMREF 
ALRMP 
ASAL 
CDTF 
CRS 
DAN IDA 
DRP 
DSD 
FAO 
GAA 
GoK 
GTZ 
KARI 
KCB 
KEPHIS 
KFFHC 
LR 
MAP-
MoA&RD 
OPV 
SIDA -
SR 
SV&F 
WVK 
Adventists Relief Agency 
African Medica! Research Foundation 
Arid Lands Resources Management Programme 
arid and semiarid land 
Community Development Trust Fund 
Catholic Relief Serví ces 
Danish Intemational Development Agency 
drought recovery program 
direct seed distribution 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
German Agro Action 
Govemment of Kenya 
German Technical Cooperation 
Kenya Agricultura! Research Institute 
Katumani Composite B 
Kenya Plant Health Jnspectorate Services 
Kenya Freedom from Hunger Council 
long rains 
Makueni Agricultura! Project 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
open-pollinated varieties 
Swedish lntemational Development Agency 
short rains 
seed vouchers & fairs 
World Vision Kenya 
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Ahstract 
/ 
This case focuses on key aspects ofthe spread ofroot-rot- resistant bean germplasm in westem Kenya. It 
evaluates the provision of new varieties as an emergency response, as well as the varied seed channels 
used for reaching farmers in crisis. The case started from a premise that informal seed producer groups 
played an importan! role in moving new varieties. This could not be veri fied . Whether the groups 
produced seed or grain proved secondary to the observation that they moved only limited quantities of 
beans. The study developed a secondary focu s on local market channels, as this conduit proved to be a 
nexus for moving larger quantities of the resistant varieties for food, seed, or both. Analyses of a broad 
range of local markets showed the resistant varieties to be available throughout the region, and in \arge 
quantities. 
Quality of seed was also examined. If markets are used as a significan! diffusion channel, what are the 
implications in tenns of seed purity, gennination, and health? Two separate collections and laboratory 
analyses showed that seed from local markets in westem Kenya, including that routinely produced by 
farmers, is good in terms of purity, germination, and overall seed health. 
Finally, the study shows that to move new varieties, seed production models need to be carefully 
evaluated. At least as importan! as quality is the socioeconomic organization of production: who 
produces, at what scale, for whom, and with what strategies for distributing or marketing. Seed 
production models have to be (a) sustainable and (b) affordable and (e) must have an explicit 
impact-oriented outreach focus. 
Introduction 
Background 
Agriculture forms the core livelíhood in western Kenya. Maize is the main staple food, with the 
predominant farming system being the maize-bean intercrop. Bananas, vegetables (both exotic and 
l. R. O tsyula, G. Rachier, N. Ambits i, R. Juma, C. Ndiya are from the Kenya Agricultura! Research lnstitute (KARl), Kakamega 
Station, westem Kenya. R.Buruchara and L. Sperli ng are with the Center for lntemational Tropical Agricu lture (CIAT). 
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local), cassava, sweet potatoes, sorghum, and finger millet are also widely sown, and there are a few cash 
crops: tea, coffee, snap beans, and sugar cane. 
Westem Kenya produces 12% of the total bean production in Kenya, although cultivation is largely 
concentrated on small plots and among small-scale farmers. Crop production has been constrained by 
low soil fertil ity anda build-up of pests and diseases. This is mostly dueto continuous cultivation, with 
very little use of fertilizer, soil amendments, or chemicals (for pest/disease control). 
Starting around 1989, bean production (and particularly yields) started to drop dramatically in westem 
Kenya. About 10% of farmers gave up bean production altogether in the more severely affected areas 
(Addend et al., 2004: 1 0). One ofthe causes ofthe decline was soon identified as bean root-rot, a complex 
of fungal pathogens which often emerges in depleted, intensively used soi ls. 
A great deal has been written about the response ofresearch institutions and development col laborators 
alike to the "bean root-rot crisis." Among the more notable partnerships has been the collaboration ofthe 
Kenyan Agricultura! Research Institute (KARI), The Intemational Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIA T), and the Organic Matter Management Network (OMMN). Within a fairly short period, this 
group jointly diagnosed the root-rot problem and tested severa! options for pathogen control, both 
on-station and with farming communities. One ofthese options, the sowing ofbean varieties resistant to 
root-rot, subsequently achieved widespread adoption. A forma l survey in 2001 showed 35%- 80% of 
farmers using the resi stant bush-bean gennplasm in the two districts in question, Kakamega and Yihiga 
(figure 1) (Addend et al., 2004). 
This case study focuses on key aspects of the spread of the root-rot resistant bean germplasm in the 
context of the overall OFDA-funded project. More generically, it examines the provision of new 
varieties asan emergency response and analyzes the varied seed channels for reaching farmers affected 
by stress. In particular, this case study was spurred by the observation that informal seed groups in areas 
in western Kenya Kakamega and Yihiga Districts) that had been devastated by root-rot seemed to be 
diffusing the resistant varieties widely and quickly. The starting point of analysis was to understand how 
these informal seed groups functioned and how effective they were in a stress period such as the Kenyan 
one, where there was severe pathogen infection . The investigations were subsequently expanded to look 
at the role oflocal markets as well as the fonnal seed supply, asking how well each channel was reaching 
affected farmers and assessing the quality of the product on offer. 
Diagnosis of the stress and initial responses 
The stress 
While the build-up of root-rot is a gradual problem, its manifestations on-farn1 were perceived by 
farmers as rather abrupt. This may be beca use a certain pathogen threshold has to be reached befare there 
is a marked drop in production. Starting about 1989- 1990, farmers and extensionists alike started to 
perceive this drop as dramatic. In participatory rural appraisal exercises (KARl, 1997), fanners vividly 
described the yellowing (and then death) of plants just weeks after first emergence. Declining soil 
fertility, which aggravates the severity and enhances the manifestation of bean root-rot, was also 
increasingly evident at this time: subsidies of fertilizers for maize had just been withdrawn and many 
farmers who had regularly used fertilizer with maize (in a routine maize/bean intercrop) had to do 
without. A survey carried out in 200 1 reported that bean root-rot did reach calamitous proportions in the 
1990s, with 76% and 80% of the farmers in Kakamega and Yihiga, respectively, reporting clear 
experience w ith and destruction ofthe bean crop dueto bean root-rot (Addend et al. , 2004). Note that 
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Figure l. Location of study ar·eas in Kenya 
R. Ots ula el al. 
Kakamega/Vihlga 
District 
farmers did not necessarily understand the speciftc causes (e.g., witchcraft was sometimes postu lated as 
the agent), but they had leamed to recognize the symptoms of root-rot. 
Diagnostic surveys followed- formal and informal (KARJ, 1999; Nderitu et al. , 1997; Nekesa et al., 
1998)- along with an arra y of on-station trials and laboratory tests (Otysula et al. , 1998). The complex 
of fungal pathogens causing the root-rot was eventually isolated into its varied forms: Fusarium solani 
fsp phaseo/i, Rhizoctonia sola ni, Sce/erotium rolfsii, and Pythium spp (Bu ruchara et al., 200 1 ). These 
diagnoses were made by varied actors, using both qual itative and quantitative methods, and moving in 
time toward greater scientifíc ri gor. 
lt is not easy to characterize this type of stress within the larger set of emergency scenarios. The root-rot 
epidemic probab ly straddles the acute/chronic stress divide. The bui ld-up of soil pathogens and 
subsequent rot, while technically a gradual process, mani fested itself on-farm and, as perceived by the 
farmer, as a dramatic, acute decline in production . Many varieties in use at the time, including the most 
popular, GLP2, simply no longer produced yields. Howcver, the causes of the rot and decline in yields 
ha ve been shown to be ftrml y systemic. Poverty, leading tono use of inputs or land rotation, meant that 
farmers had chronic production problems, which could be lessened by variety/seed inputs that, alone, 
could not solve the problem. 
This case also straddles diagnostic categories in terms of a seed-security analysis, which theoretically 
distinguishes between seed-related problems of avail abili ty, access, and qua lity (Remington et al., 
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2002). The complete dropping of bean cultivation by sorne farmers suggcsts the degree to which seed 
simply was not available locally (that is, nothing was available that would grow). Sorne fanners did buy 
a local variety from northem Tanzania (around Lake Victoria), ipunda, fro m the market. Thi s variety 
had sorne roo t-rot tolerance, so a limited amount of seed was accessible- if farmers had the funds. The 
fact that this bean did subsequently produce indicates that the issue of varietal quality could be sol ved, 
by sorne. However, since many local fanners dropped beans altogether, rather than sowing the 
Tanzanian option, the problem (lack of availability? access? quality?) is not clear-cut. 
In sum, this case study contains elcments of acute and chronic stress, in which all constraints of a seed 
security framework might be brought forward as concerns: problems with availability, access, and 
aspects of seed, such as varietal quaJity. 
Mitigating options 
The districts of Kakamega and Vi higa are typical of regions affected by root- rot: fann sizes are small, 
(2.6 ha in Ka kamega and 2.0 ha in Vihiga), population dens ities high (404 persons/km2 in Kakamega 
and 938 in Vihiga [GOK data reported in Addend et al. , 2004]), and crop rotation is v irtual! y ni l. Farmers 
generally pl ant beans in both ofthe two seasons: March to July (the long rains) and August to November 
(short rains). Beans are their main source of protein. 
When it was recognized that there was a problem, researchers and development personnel mobilized 
relatively quickly (in research tenns) to identify options for helping fanners control and mitigate the 
root-rot stress. From 1990 to 1995, experiments were undertaken on three bas ic thrusts. The first 
concentrated on improving soil fcrt ility (to counteract soil pathogens and enhance plant tolerance). 
Experiments were conducted with green manures, mulching, inorganic fertilizer, and ridging. All 
proved somewhat effective. The second thrust focused on enhanc ing existing seed, e ither coating the 
seed itself (employing local varieties) or using certified seed of already released materials. e ither of 
these had marked results. The third thrust, the promotion of varieties resistant to root-rot has been the 
most effective and most w ide ly adopted. 
Kenyan researchers screened hundreds of bean lines locally and found no resistance (Otsyula et al., 
1998). However, they had an advantage in that as promising varieties had already been identified 
through regional breeding programs and in the pathology nurseries of ncighbori ng countries where 
root-rot pressure had come earlier and with great severity. From among these varieties (orig inating from 
the Great Lakes region), researchers and fanners selected severa! promis ing lines, among them KK8, 
KK1 5, and K.K22 (KK standing for K.ARI Kakamega). These eventually emerged as both resistant to the 
root-rot and acceptable to users in the western Kenyan region. They di ffer in seed color, maturity, and 
yield poten ti a l (see annex 1 ), but a ll ha ve been widely adopted, largely due to a single factor: their 
resistance to the root-rot stress. 
Focus of this case study 
This case study seeks to understand the opportunities and constraints of us ing varied diffusion channels 
to spread new varieties. The study started with a focus on one particular conduit, the informal (farmer) 
seed producer groups, as these were among the least understood ofthe diffusion channels in the region of 
interest and because initial observations suggested some potential impact. Seed production among small 
fanners in East and Central Africa, in general, is becoming a popular implementation option (especially 
during post-disaster recovery periods), so it bears closer scrutiny. 
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Practically, the study seeks to gain insight into how these K.K varieties actually spread. As ofmid-2004, 
they still have not been formally released. This means that, in theory, these varieties cannot be increased 
or sold by govemment agents or in certified seed stores (commonly know as stockists in Kenya). 
Certified bean seed has never been in strong demand in such formal channels because farmers find the 
cost high and feel they can control the seed quality sufficiently themselves. (Certified bean seed 
con tributes about 1% of the total bean crop sown in Kenya.) However, farmers usually need an initial 
infusion of genetic materials to spur the broader diffusion process. In this case, without fonnal release, a 
first infusion was not available. 
Case-study methods 
Fieldwork for this study was primarily carried out in the districts of Kakamega and Vihiga in westem 
Kenya. Select market surveys were also carried out in these districts, as well as in Mumias-Butere. 
Four basic methods were used for gaining insight into the general agricultura\ context and conducting 
specific seed system analyses. 
Literature review 
Documents, mostly in refereed joumals and gray literature (annual and progress report publications), 
were reviewed to give a background of l 0-year trends. The themes pursued included (a) agriculture in 
the westem Kenya region in general, (b) research and experimentation results in on-station and on-farm 
trials, (e) diagnostics on farming systems (including participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), and (d) 
adoption surveys of bean varieties in relation to root-rot. 
lnterviews 
lnterviews were carried out among different types of seed suppliers and seed cl ients. These included 
groups of seed producers trained by KARI or OMMN (N=6), as well as individual seed producers 
(N=20), sorne ofwhom stated that they had received outside training. Those buying seed from these seed 
producers, seed buyers (N=30) were followed up in the chain. A third majar group, those in the more 
formal sector, were al so interviewed (N=8) to record their views on types of seed and seed sources. This 
formal-sector group included extension personnel, prívate seed company managers, and representatives 
from farmer cooperatives. All interviews used semi-structured questionnaires and elicited qualitative 
and quantitative insights. 
Market surveys 
Surveys were carried out in eight regional markets in the s ix-week period prior to sowing time (from the 
end of January to mid-March). All bean sellers (N=202) were visited and their products inventoried, 
with 30% (N=6 1) directly interviewed. The purpose was to understand the profiles and sources of seed 
being sold and differences in beans for sowing versus eating. Market analysis also aimed to assess the 
overall availability of the resistant KARI varieties in public fora. 
Seed quality analysis 
Finally, formal analyses for seed quality were carried out in two separare research laboratories to 
compare standards among varietal materials (KK8, KK 15, and KK22) and among seed from a variety of 
sources (seed produced by trained farmers versus untrained farmers versus KARI seed versus seed 
procured on the open market) . Samples were tested for purity, germination, and seed health, including 
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both seed-bome pathogens (relating to disease, per se) and saprophytes (relati ng largely to infection 
introduced in post-harvcst hand ling, which subsequently affects rates of germination). Annex 2 
describes in sorne detail the laboratory analyses can·ied out at KARI /Kakamega (Kcnya) a nd 
CIA T/Kawanda (Uganda). 
Research strategy 
In brief, the overall aim of the research strategy was to trace the main channels by which new varieties 
(and seed) might be accessed (markets, individual seed producers, groups of seed producers, etc.) and to 
compare and contrast their effectiveness a long varied criteria. Seed quality is one ofthese criteria. It was 
added because quality is often perceived as an obstacle to allowing development or emergency aid 
groups to use more local channels. 
Survey imdings 
Market analysis 
The market analysis gives an overview of the extent of diffu sion of the root- rot- resistant KARl 
varieties. lt bears emphasizing again that these varieties have yet to be fonna lly released and, in theory, 
are not available from any of the formal channels with which research might normally interact (i.e., 
govemment stockists, extension agents, or prívate seed companies). The KARI station itself has 
produced li mited quantities of these materials for the public, between about IOOkg and 300kg per 
season, since 1995 and at least through 2003 (KARI-Kakamega, Seed Un it, communication). 
The eight markets surveyed represent an area of about 90 kilometers (55 miles) in radius. Each was 
visited for a si ngle day, chosen because it was the principal selling day for that particular market- but 
with no other bias. As stated in the methods section, for all those selling beans, the products on sale were 
inventoried . 
Table 1 shows that across these markets, 43% to 77% ofall bean sellers had some ofthe resistant KARI 
varieties on sale. In six of the markets, all three varieties were found, and in the other two, KK 15 and 
KK22 were avai lable. 
The findings are unexpected; in such a short period ( 1998- 2003), an impressive network of market 
sellers has been moving improved varieties, resistant to root-rot. Market analysis was also done on the 
full range of beans on o ffer among a subset of sellers (N=6 l ) eh osen randomly from the whole group. 
Within this subset, inventaries wcre made of all the bean baskets on di sp lay, separating beans according 
to whether they were (a) research generated (improved) or " local" and (b) root-rot tolerant or not. It is 
important to note that somc ''local" varieties (non-research generated) do show some tolerance to 
root-rot (see annex 1 ). 
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Tahle l. Market Sm·veys, Wester·n Kenya Region: Focus on KARI-Generated 
Root-Rot- Resistant Bean s, January-March 2003 
# Sellers % Sellers 
Total with RR with RR 
Date of bean resistant Resistant Varieties at # Sellers 
Market survey sellers varieties varieties Market interviewed 
Ka ka mega 25/1/03 51 38 74.5 KK8, 15, 22 6 
Mudete 30/1/03 8 5 62.5 KK8, 15,22 8 
Luanda 30/1/03 40 20 50 KK15, 22 8 
Se re m 8/2/03 23 11 43.5 KK8, 15, 22 8 
M bale 712103 13 10 76.9 KK8, 15, 22 7 
Lubao 20/2/03 24 16 66.7 KK8, 15, 22 8 
Shinyalu 22/2/03 14 9 64.3 KK8, 15, 22 8 
Butere 17/3/03 29 15 51 .7 KK15, 22 8 
Total 202 124 61 .4 61 
Table 2 shows the profile of beans for this market subset (with proportions expressed in terms of 
"baskets," rather than volume or weight). During this sowing period, January to March, relatively egua! 
sets of beans that were root-rot tolerant and those that were not were on offer. As traders explained, 
"There are beans for food and beans for seed-and customers know the difference- and they need 
both." 
Tahle 2. Full Set of Beans on Offer among 61 Sellers in Eight Markets, Western 
Kenya, 2003 
Category of beans 
- - ---
lmproved , root-rot tolerant 
lmproved, not root-rot tolerant 
Local, root-rot tolerant 
Local, not root-rot tolerant 
------
% of baskets on display (N=211) 
- - -----
33 
26 
13 
26 
lnterviews with individual sellers indicated the degree to which varieties res istant to root-rot are 
particularly valued for sowing. Their preference was also reflected in the price analysis, with resistant 
material sometimes fetching up to 20% to 35% more than the nonresistant material at peak planting time. 
Traders were quick to remark, however, that so me of the local varieties are sti ll considered among the 
tastiest and that post-sowing, the prices of root-rot materi als tend to drop quickly. In severa! markets, 
sellers commented that KK.l 5, though black and traditionally not preferred, remains a highly demanded 
item as it appears to be early maturing and fast cooking, and homemakers can easily remove the black 
coat for food preparation. 
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Where did the market sellers obtain their stocks?. Interviews with traders and sellers showed that the 
sources were varied and, most of all , dispersed. No single source provided all the varieties on sale; 
rather, they were sourced from farmers in the countryside, middlemen, and even other market sellers. No 
market seller specifically mentioned specialized groups of seed producers as a so urce. 
Seed-producergroups 
Rural groups of seed producers were originally postulated to be an important means of diffusing these 
new varieties in the countryside. Five such groups were identified, all having been facilitated by sorne 
outside agency and having received sorne training related to seed production techniques. Table 3 
summarizes the size and composition of the groups, when they started, and the breadth of activities in 
which they were engaged. lt is important to note that these groups might be considered to be "informal" 
seed producers: seed was just one of severa! enterprises they pursued, and they had received seed 
production training only once. 
Table 3. Informal Farmer Groups lnvolved in Seed Production: Selected Sample from 
W estern Kenya, 2003 
Starting Starting Current 
Group Affiliated with date members members Activities 
Ebusoli AHI 1999 25 46 Horticulture 
(36 women, 10 men) 
Shihíngo FARMESAIFAO 1998 40 18 Maize vegetables, 
(8 women, 10 men) chickens 
Chavakalí RPK 2000 25 18 Soil conservatíon, 
(including men) (all women) poultry, vegetable 
productíon 
Lunyu FARMESA/FAO 1998 44 Composting 
(36 women, 8 men) vegetable farming 
Esiekuti OMNN 1995 21 17 Bee-keeping 
(9 women, 8 men) 
Note: AHI = African Highland Initiative; FFS = Farmer Field School: FAO-supported Project; FARMESA = 
Farmer Research Management in East and Southem A frica; OMMN = Organic Matter Management 
Network; RPK = Resource Projects Kenya. 
As Table 3 shows, all groups started between 1995 and 2000, with between 25 and 50 members, and all 
but one seem to be in membership decline. All are also engaged in multiple activities in addition to seed 
production to give them income and greater sustainability. 
Tnterestingly, all groups clearly stated that they embarked on bean seed production because the new 
varieties became available and because, due to the big disease problem, there was a strong demand for 
them. So, they started producing seed beca use of a varietal opportunity, not beca use there was a demand 
for clean seed or because seed quantities overall were low. 
In terms of organization for seed production, the actual joint ( or group) activities seem few. Most of the 
production is still done on an individual basis on farmers' home plots, although one group experimented 
wíth renting land together and, at the time of research, were waiting to see harvest results. In terms of 
seed, group activities seem limited to pooling for purposes of sale. In general, however, members each 
seem to dec ide their price alone and dispose ofthe beans (seed or food) as they wish. 
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In group interviews, farmers described in detail how the resistant beans were being produced. All groups 
had received sorne seed-related training (two of them having been instructed by KARI scientists), yet, 
across the five sites, farrners described no special treatment between grain and seed in the field. As 
severa! ofthe groups had also been instructed in "better agricultura! practices," they were starting to add 
manure and to plant beans in rows. After harvest, sorne used ashes or actellic to coat the beans. When 
sorting for their own use, farrners picked out the healthier beans at sowing time; such sorting was also 
sometimes done with beans destined for sale. 
Their recounting of distribution specifics gave further insight into how these groups function. All stated 
that at the beginning, the new beans they sold brought higher prices than those available Jocally, but no 
Longer ("at the beginning, 100 Kenyan shillings (Kshs) per kilo; now, maybe 30 Kshs/kg"). Among their 
constant buyers ha ve been the schools, who use thi s "seed" as food for their pupi ls, and hotels, who serve 
bean meals on a continua! basis. 
None of the groups has done any financia! analysis of their operations, although most of the farrners 
sense they are making money individually. Farmers variously described how bean production helped 
them to pay school fees (about 2000 Kshs/year) and buy school unif01ms, fertilizer, chickens, a bull, 
health care, and other necessities. The issue of scale of sales is pursued below, under "individual seed 
producers," because it was easier to get quantitati ve data on bean dis tribution when farrners were 
interviewed one by one. In short, supply was neither sustained, nor very large: those who sold the largest 
quantities moved beans destined for consumption- and sold to schools and hotels. Sorne also sold the 
beans they did not immediately need for their own use. 
The conclusions to be drawn from speaking with the seed-producer groups are the fo llowing: they 
function little in terrns of direct collaboration, the beans they produce can be cons idered equally as grain 
or seed, and the amounts delivered tend to be modest. Financially, it seems clear that the groups 
themselves perceive that bean production (whether for seed or food ) results in profits, but alone, such 
production cannot give them a stable income-a vari ety of additional income-generating activities is 
required. 
Individual seed producers 
The case study identified indi vidual seed producers through local word ofmouth. All 20 individual seed 
producers interviewed were local farrners, integrated within the rural countryside. All had also devoted 
themselves to "special bean production" when the new KK varieties arrived on the scene. Like the seed 
producers associated with groups, these individuals saw a niche or a new demand because of the 
build-up of bean disease. About 40% of the individuals had further been in volved in the production of 
seed for other crops, including maize, local beans, cowpeas, and local vegetables. When asked if any 
special qualities made them seed producers, 75% said no, but the other 25% indicated two strengths: 
their other seed experience and, especially, the fact that they had larger p lots and, in a few cases, more 
fertile land. 
The analysis ofthe individual seed producers' profiles adds insight to the inforrnation on those who are 
associated with groups (who also seem to work primarily as individuals). Individual producers saw the 
demand for a new variety, not for seed, per se. Sixty per cent indicated that their production methods in 
the field were exactly the same for bean seed and food. The other 40% indicated that they did separate 
varieties when planting for seed, and 5% used fertilizer and planted in rows. The main treatment 
specifically for seed was applied post-harvest, when farrners sorted out the inert material along with the 
physically damaged and immature beans, and when they dusted the beans with ash or actell ic. 
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The individual producers indicated that, at the beginning, the price for the new beans was higher than 
that oflocal varieties, but this was no longer true (five to six years later) as the new varieties had become 
more conunon. They were also not always clear whether their buyers were acquiring beans for seed or 
for food (and the use did not seem to make any difference to them because they did not demanda price 
differential). ln terms of the quantities distributed, the figures were highly variable. Taking the long 
rains of 2002 as an example, 20% did not distribute at all , and the four farmers (again 20%) who 
distributed most- an impressive 195kg, on average- sold the beans entirely for food to schools and 
hotels. On average, those who distributed or sold beans that were "possibly used for seed" sold about 
20kg per season either to other farrners or rniddlemen . Assuming optimistically that half of this is 
planted, each seed producer provided 1 O kg of KK material s per season. 
Ninety percent of the individual producers perceived this production to be profitable, again using 
mi testones of purchase ( e.g., paying school fees or purchasing livestock). They al so indicated that the 
demand for beans is always there: "Even when the new varieties are known, there is the demand for 
food." In terms of seed, per se, severa) of the producers anticipated an ongoing set of customers: "When 
a farrner buys from another fanner, slhe knows what is being received- and can count on that quality. 
Also they may have seen it in the field. " Sorne further observed that traders mix GLP585 and KK22 
(both small red-seeded types), whereas fanner producers don't. 
In sum, it is not clear that the individual seed producers were specificall y producing seed, or whether 
they even considered their goal as selling seed, rather than food. lt appears that only limited quantities of 
beans are moved as seed, per se. Having said this, the individual producers, like those associated with 
groups, saw their bean transactions as profitable and aimed to continue producing and sellíng. 
Seed-buyer analysis 
The research agenda subsequently followed the chain to those who actually bought seed from the 
well-identified seed producers. Thirty farrners , a ll ofwhom were traced through specific producer links, 
were interviewed on-farrn to assess the importance of the root-rot- resistant varieties in tenns of their 
total bean sown, and to assess their satisfaction with the purchased seed product. 
Varieties 
In sorne respects, the seed buyers interviewed (N=30), seemed to have made radical changes in their 
bean production over the previous ti ve years. Ninety-three present (28 out of 30) were sowing only the 
resistant KK varieties, having completely dropped local types because of their poor performance. This 
step could be quite risky for such farmers, putting all their beans in one basket, so to speak. 
Seed sourcing 
ln other ways, however, these farrners seemed typical of small-scale holders. Their modest holdings 
meant that they sowed, on average, limited amounts ofseed: 7.25kg during the short rains of2003, with 
a range of0- 22kg). Further, as table 4 shows, they tended to source their seed (nearly completely) from 
their own home-saved stocks: 88% ofthe quantity sown ca me from home stocks, with five farrners using 
solely home stocks. The farrners all commented that although they had at one time purchased the seed of 
the new variety from the seed producer (buying small initial quantities of 0.05kg to 1 kg), they had not 
purchased it again (and had no intention of doing so). These farrners simply re-sowed what they 
themselves harvested, again and again. 
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Tahle 4. Sources of Seed Plante d in the Shor·t Rains, 2003, b y Those Who Had Bought 
New Varieties Resistant lo Root-Rot ft·om Specialist Producers (N=30) 
So urce Amount in kilograms Percentage 
Home saved 191.5 88.0 
Local market 4.0 1.8 
Stockist 0.0 o 
Relativesfneighbors 22.0 10.1 
Others 0.0 o 
Seed qualíty 
Most buyers assessed the quality of seed received from seed producers as "good" (better than average). 
However, most also felt that it was not particularly different from the seed they themselves routinely 
produced (table 5). 
Tahle 5. Buyers' Assessments of Quality of Seed Received from Specialist Pt·oducer·s, 
Compared to Seed They Routinely Produced Themselves (N=30 ) 
How would you assess the quality of seed obtaíned from the 
specialíst producer, overa/1? 
Good 
Average 
Poor 
How would you compare the quality of the seed purchased in 
relatíon to that you usual/y produce? 
S ame 
Better 
Worse 
% of responses 
86.6 
13.4 
o 
56.6 
40.0 
3.4 
Finally, each of the one-time buyers was able to li st severa! sources where she could obtain these 
resistan! varieties again, if needed. Getting a future supply s imply was not perceived as a problem. 
Formal-sector analysis 
Diverse representatives from the formal sector were also interviewed, for two majar reasons: the 
resistant varieties were not released and, hence, this sector was not offi cially responding to the stress. 
Second, varieties were being moved through uncertified channels and uncertified seed has a varied 
reputation within formal-sector circles. The formal seed sector (and forma l research sector, in general) is 
often contrasted to fanning communities in terms of types knowledge- and viewpoints--on offer. 
Formal-sector personnel (seed and otherwise) are in charge of giving expert advice and steering 
communities to options. It is of interest to examine how fom1al-sector personnel perccive the rot 
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problem, the varieties on offer, and the seed channels though which the varieties could presently be 
accessed. 
Eight professionals from different formal -sector institutions and levels were interviewed: Four worked 
direct ly with certified seed: representatives from the Kenya Seed Company, the National Cereal Board, 
L'Agrotech (a prívate company), and the Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA). The other four give 
advice to farmers on a regular basis: district extension officers (DEOs) or the district agricul tura! and 
lives lock extension officer (DALEO). 
There were sorne commonalities in the eight sets ofresponses: all knew ofthe root-rot problems in their 
zones of action. All but one also knew about the root-rot- resistant varieties being tested by KARl and 
also that they had not been released (the exception was the Cereal Board representa ti ve who dealt only in 
maize). 
The differences emerged when discussing whether farmers themselves produce seed of resistan! 
varicties for sale, and when evaluating its quality . 
As tabl e 6 shows, two specialists from the fom1al sector (seed-production company representatives) felt 
that farmers should not be producing seed for sale, and that what they were producing was not of good 
quality: " It is grain." "Seed production practices are not followed: there is no isolation and no separating 
of off-types." The representative from the KF A, which al so se lis inputs to fanners, fc lt otherwise, and 
asserted that he himself, on his own plot, sowed bean seed from the market. 
Table 6. Formal-Sector Views on Farmer Production of Resistanl Seed 
Representatives from 
---
Kenya Seed Company 
National Cereal Board 
L'Agrotech (private company) 
Kenya Farmers' Association 
DEO 
DALE O 
DALE O 
DEO 
Should farmers produce seed 
for sale? 
No 
N/A 
No. lt is grain, not seed 
Yes (but there is no demand) 
Y es 
Y es 
Yes, as a stopgap 
Y es 
What is the quality of farmer 
seed? 
Quality not good 
N/ A 
Not good 
Good 
Good 
Good seed: the problem is that 
varieties are sometimes mixed 
High, when sorne supervision 
Good, but should be monitored 
Jn contrast, all four extension agents expressed the need for farmers in the region to have the resistan! 
varieties quickly. They knew the varieties were not released but stressed that this was a bureaucratic 
issue and that they needed to focus on raising productivity- and quickJy. All agents supported farmer 
production , either as a continua! process ora stop gap measure (to be bolstered by outside monitoring). 
The extens ion agents further gave insights into the positi ve and negative attributes of forma l versus 
fanner channels- and how farmers in their zones perceived both. Agents emphasized that formal 
channels may also not be within geographic reach of farmers. Such channels supply a few varieties 
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(GLP2, GLP24, GLP585 , GLP1004, GLPX92) but fanners like many others in addition to these. Most 
fundamentally, the agents reported that fanners perceived the seed from the formal sector as not 
genninating well (it is not handled well post-harvest). 
As assets of farmer-produced seed, the extension agents offered the following insights: fanners in the 
countryside can provide good channels of distribution because seed can be given as a gift to friends and 
relatives, exchange is possible (seed for grain), and the channel is physically nearer to fanners. 
In tenns of quality, all considered fanner seed as viable. However, they stressed that sorne fanners are 
known for producing better seed than others. The only real caution for the resistant varieties was that 
fanners might mix resistant and susceptible varieties (KK22 and GLP585). It is interesting to note that 
this is the same complaint fanner seed producers made against traders. 
So, in general, the seed-sector companies did not value farmer seed, except for the representative from 
the Kenya Fanners' Association (a nationwide body) who said he sows it himself. The extension agents 
generally felt it was "okay" in tenns of health, but wamed about mixing. However, they al so saw great 
advantages of using local channels in tenns of distributing a range of varieties, making seed available 
financially, and easing the logistics of distribution. 
Seed quality analysis 
As "quality of seed" seems to be a pivota) point for implementers deciding what kinds of production and 
diffusion channels to support, in the final step, laboratory analyses were carried out to assess key aspects 
ofthe quality (purity, gennination rate, and seed health) ofseed procured from a variety ofsources. Seed 
from four sources was compared and contrasted: seed produced for KARl (the fonnal sector), purchased 
from the market (local traders), produced by fanners trained in seed production, and produced by 
untrained fanners. Two separate batches of seed were collected and analyzed at two different 
laboratories, one in Kenya (KARl-Kakamega) and one in Uganda (CIAT/Kawanda). See annex TI for 
more methodological detail. 
Laboratory analysis, KARI-Kakamega 
The tests carried out at KARl-Kakamega were conducted on 36 samples of beans (encompassing the 
three KK varieties from four sources). Key results appear below (see annex II for detailed methodology). 
Purity 
The mean purity percentage of seeds tested was 97 .5%. There was no significant di fference (p > .05) in 
bean purity between the three varieties (KK8, 15, and 22), but there was a significant difference (p S: .05) 
between local market samples and KARJ samples (figure 2). Having said this, all groups produced seed 
with purity above 95%--quite acceptab1e levels, even for commercial producers. 
Germination 
The mean percentage gennination of seeds tested was 71 .6%, with a maximum gennination of98% from 
KK 15 and a mínimum of 34% for the same variety. Figure 3 shows the seed germination percentage 
from seed samples collected from the four groups. There was no significant difference in gennination in 
bean samples among the four groups (nor, in another analysis, between the three varieties). 
As the recommended mínimum lirillt of gennination is 70% (Aggrawal, 1994), on average, the 
germination rate ofthe seeds was good, both for seed produced fonnally and otherwise. In this analysis 
from KARl-Kakamega, the higher mean gennination ofseeds from the local market can be attributed to 
the long exposures in the sun during selling. When sell ing beans, sellers put them on traditional trays or 
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Figure 3. Percent germination in b ean seed samples from different groups 
sacks in the open. Such sun-dried seed is less prone to infection by storage pathogens, which attack seeds 
stored under high moisture levels, that reduce viability and ability to germinate. 
The relatively low gem1ination rates ofthe KART-produced seed are noteworthy. 
Seed health 
Seed health in the KARI analyses gave the most unexpected results, with infcction rates running from O 
(from a KK8 and KK22 sample) to 24.0% (rrom a KK8 seed sample sourced from KARI), with a mean 
seed infection of 9.24%. Figure 4 illustrates the proportion of infected seeds infection in the bean 
samples collected from the four groups in the study. (Note that in this first ana lys is, disease counts did 
not separa te pathogens and saprophytes, per se.) 
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Figure 4. Percent saprophyte/pathoge n infection in bean seed samples 
ft·om different groups 
There was a significant difference (p :5: .05) between the infection rate in KARI seed samples and those of 
the trained farmers, in particular, with the formal sector having higher rates of infection. (Another 
analysis showing no significant difference between the varieties themselves.) Seeds were especially 
affected by storage-related pathogens, such as Penicil/ium spp. The high mean rate seed infection in the 
KARl samples was thought to be the result of one set of seeds that had very poor gennination and were 
al so highly infected. This was attributed to inadequate drying, which encourages storage problems ( and 
saprophytes). In addition to the large quanti ty ofseed harvested by KARI, drying is difficult because it is 
usually done using sunlight only. The area has a great deal ofrain, and there fore drying can only be done 
for a few hours. 
Laboratory analysis, CIA T/NARO-Kawanda (Uganda) 
The observed high rates ofinfection in the KARl bean samples spurred a re-collection ofbean seed and 
re-analysis of germination qualities and seed health. This second analysis was done at the laboratory of 
ClATfNARO (National Agricultura\ Research Organization) in Kawanda, Uganda. There, laboratory 
facilities allowed analysis to distinguish between seed-bome di sease, per se (i.e., true pa thogens), and 
infections caused primarily by post-harvest handling (manifest by saprophytes). Salienl insights are 
abbreviated below. Again, refer to annex IJ for more detail. 
Germination 
The analysis showed that seed from the market had a lower germination rate than seed from other 
sources, but it was still within an acceptable mean of 73.3%. Fanners remarked that they can raise thi s 
level by sorting market seed (a procedure, which, unfortunately, the researchers failed to orchestrate 
prior to analysis). There was also wide variation in gennination between different marke t samples and 
KK 15: 17% to 84%. Overall , there was no s ignificant difference in mean values between the other 
sources (figure 5). 
Seed health 
Pathogens: A wide range of pathogens associated with bean seed were identified in the more focused 
CIAT-Kawanda study: Fusarium solani (whi ch causes root-rot), Colletotrichum lindemuthianum 
(anthracnose), Phoma exigua (ascochyta blight), and Macrophomina phaseolina (ashy stem blight). 
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Others identified included Fusarium oxysporum and Rhizoctonia solani. which are soi l-bome 
pathogens. However, the mean level ofseed infection for different pathogens from a ll sources was low. 
The highest mean value (5.2%) was observed with Phoma exigua on KK8 (table 7). 
Tahle 7 . Mean Percentage lufectiou by Major Seed-Bm·ne Pathogens and Saprophytes 
of Different Varieties Collected fr·om Different Sources 
% Seed infection, by 
seed-borne pathogen % Seed infection, by seed-borne saprophyte 
Fusarium Phoma Aspergillus Penicillium Rhizopus Cladosporium 
Source• Variety sola ni exigua spp spp spp spp 
KK15 0.86 1.1 46.4 30.3 18 2.0 
KK8 1.4 11.5 13 0.7 7.8 
KK22 2 3.1 6.1 10.1 o 2.3 
2 KK15 0.25 2.8 10.5 4.9 o 8.1 
KK8 0.8 3.2 6.6 3.8 6.7 13.4 
KK22 2.8 1.3 5.3 3.2 o 6.8 
3 KK15 0.08 1.2 6.9 4.3 0.3 8.4 
KK8 1.2 0.5 4.2 13 2.5 12.9 
KK22 0.2 3.6 4.3 7.7 0.2 13.1 
4 KK15 0.83 6 7.8 o 9.8 
KK8 0.1 5.2 10.5 8.4 8 12.8 
KK22 1.3 19.4 15.4 o 3.4 
*1 = Market; 2 = untrained fanners; 3 trained fanners; 4 = KARJ Kakamega Station. 
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Saprophytes: The major saprophytic fungi observed were Aspergillus, Penicillium, Rhizopus, and 
Cladosporium spp. Market seed fared less well than it did in the KARI-Kakamega analysis, but still 
showed generally low infection levels. The high leve! of saprophytic infection in certain samples from 
the market may have been due to poor post-harvest handling or storage. Poor storage conditions, seed 
not well dried, or attack by insects (mainly bruchids) may lead to high levels of secondary infection by 
saprophytes. Although saprophytes do not cause di seases on crops, they do lower germination rates (see 
figure 5). 
Seed from trained farmers al so fa red less well in that there was no significant di fference in infection rates 
between trained and untrained producers. Again, overall , the seed looked healthy. 
Seed quality: Overa/1 rejlections 
8oth sets ofanalysis showed that a ll four sources delivered seed that can be considered "acceptable," not 
only by farmers' standards, but also by extensioni st and even intemational standards (such as those of 
Quality Declared Seed of FAO). 
one ofthe bean seed sampled reached the levels of certified seed for germination and health , not even 
that produced by KARI. However, farmers, extensioni sts, and most ofthe formal-sector representatives 
interviewed did not sense that certified seed was needed. Farmers can obtain very good-quality seed 
from local channels- at a fraction of the price of certi fied seed . 
Summary and conclusions 
The aim ofthe study was to examine channels for diffusing seed in a period of cris is. We started from a 
premise that informa l groups of seed producers played an important role in moving new varieties. This 
could not be verified. Whether the groups produced seed or grain proved secondary to the observation 
that they moved only limited quantities of beans. Thi s raises the issue of whether a focused group of 
small rural producers, with smalllandholdings, can be expected to produce the "excess" needed to move 
new varieties quickly in a crisis. 
The study then developed a secondary focus on local market channels, as this conduit had proveo to be a 
nexus for moving a larger quantity of the root-rot- resistant varieties for food, seed, or both. Traders' 
sources for obtaining local varieties were varied , including purchasing directly from farmers in the 
countryside and from other small traders, and even self-production. 
Analysis of a broad range of local markets showed the resistant varieties to be on easy offer throughout 
the region, and in large quantity. 
The quality of the seed then carne to the forefront as a defining issue. lf one is to use markets as a 
significant diffusion channel, what are the implications in terms of seed purity, germination, and health? 
ls the product on offer supporting livelihoods in crisis? Two separate collections and laboratory analyses 
gave firm results that the seed in local markets in westem Kenya, including that which farmers routinely 
produce in the countryside, is good in terms of purity, germination, and overall seed hea lth . 
In terms ofthe wider issues, the study showed that an injection ofnew varieties can make a difference to 
the stability ofthe farming system. Farmers did shi ft the profile of varieties sown (many dropping local 
varieties altogether), and wide price differentials among bean types at sowing time provided strong 
evidence that farmers place a high value on varieties that wi ll grow in the context of root-rot stress. 
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However, the study also suggests that one seed channel is not necessarily as effective as another for 
moving new varieties, although both may be locally based. Large numbers of farmers do not seem to 
ha ve been reached through the intervention of training for seed producer groups. The evidence is al so 
mixed on whether these groups produced higher quality seed than those who had not been trained. 
The unexpected prevalence of the root-rot- resistant varieties in the local markets raises the question of 
building on channels farmers routinely use-in emergencies and otherwise (assuming these channe ls 
can function in stress periods) . Traders, like fanners, recognized the value ofthe KK varieties relatively 
quickly and scooped them up from a wide array of farmcr suppliers in the countryside. Suppliers were 
not initial ly concentrated, but the number grew through ti me. Nom1a l farmers (at al! levels- large, 
medium, and small), who had not been trained, seem to have supplied the core ofthe available seed. So 
building on local channels in a period of stress can pay off. 
The work al so shows that to move new varieties, seed production models need to be carefully evaluated 
beyond their technical dimensions (e.g., beyond the quality of seed). At least as important as quality is 
the socioeco nomic organization of production : who produces, at what sea le, for whom, and with what 
strategies for distributing or marketing the seed. Seed production models have to be built that are (a) 
sustainable, (b) affordable, and (e) which have an explicit impact-oriented outreach focus. 
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Annex l. Bean varieties generally found in western Kenya region 
Variety 
GLP 2 
(U pala) 
(Lwakhakha) 
GLP 585 
Red haricot 
Wairimu 
GLP 24 
GLP X92 
Punda (Okwoto) 
Alulu (Rosecoco) 
Mugasa 
Rosebella 
Shiyigwa 
Nylon 
KK 22 
KK 15 
KK8 
lmproved/local 
lmproved 
(relea sed) 
lmproved 
\(released) 
lmproved 
(released) 
lmproved 
(re\eased) 
Local from Tanzania 
(around Lake Victoria 
Local 
Local (yellow type) 
Local 
Local 
lmproved 
lmproved 
lmproved 
Reaction to 
bean root-rot 
Very 
susceptible 
Susceptible 
Susceptible 
Toleran! 
Toleran! 
Susceptible 
Susceptible 
Susceptible 
Susceptible 
Resistan! 
Resistan! 
Resistan! 
Characteristics 
Commercially grown 
High yielding 
Large seeded, preferred by farmers 
Rosecoco type 
Commercially grown 
Small seeded 
Red haricot type (preferred) 
High yielding 
lndeterminate (grows over maize and farmers do not 
\ike this) 
Commercially grown 
Canadian Wonder type 1 
High yielding 
Commercially grown 
Pinto type 3 
High yielding 
Early maturing 
Grayish 
Small seeded (type 1) 
Late maturing 
Moderate yields 
Preferred by farmers {laste) 
Yellow type 
Early maturing 
Small seeded (type 1) 
Rosecoco type: black mosaic 
Large seed 
Medium maturity 
Preferred by farmers (laste) 
Rosecoco-type 
Large seeded 
Medium maturity 
Red haricot type 
Small seeded 
Late maturing 
High yielding 
(deliberately mixed sometimes with red haricot) 
Black 
Large seeded 
Early maturing 
High yielding 
Medium seeded 
Rosecoco type 
High yielding 
Sometimes mixed with GLP 2 (accidental) 
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Annex 2. Analysis of bean seed quality 
KARI/Kakamega analyses 
At the KARI seed-quality laboratory in Kakamega, Kenya, parameters of purity (analytical and inert 
matter), gennination rate, and general rates of pathogen infection (seed health) were examined. For the 
first set of laboratory analyses, 34 seed samples ofbean varieties KK8 ( 1 0), KK 15 ( 13 ), and KK22 ( JI ) 
were obtained from individual seed producers, both trained and untrained, and six local markets in 
Vihiga, Kakamega, and Mumia Butere Districts (the six being serem, luanda, mbale, shinyalu, 
Kakamega municipal , and butere). The majority of the seed samples were from the harvest of the 
previous season (short rains 2002), whi le a few samples were from the long rains harvest. Laboratory 
analysis of the seed was done at KARI-Kakamega on blind samples (samples were submitted for 
analysis without identification). 
Purity test 
The purity test was to first determine the percentage composition by weight ofthe samples. The working 
samples were separated into three component parts: pure seed, inert matter, and other crop seeds, which 
included varieties of beans other than the one that was being tested. The percentage of each part was 
detennined by weight. The second objective was to identify various species of seeds, including the 
species being tested and other seeds found in the samples, such as weeds and other crops. 
Germination test 
The objective of the germination test was to determine the maximum gennination capacity of the seed 
samples. In this test, sand was used as the substrate. The working samples were made up of 100 seeds and 
divided into five replicates of 25 seeds each. The seed samples were kept at room temperature (20° to 
25°C. The first count of germination for crotalaria was after seven days, and the second count was after 
14 days. The gennination test involved taking the percentage by number of hard seeds, non-germinated 
seeds, abnonnal seeds, germinating capacity, and pure germination capacity, which is obtained through 
the calculation of (P * Gil 00), where P = purity and G = percent germination capacity (1ST A, 1999). 
Seed h ealth test 
The seed health tests were done to determine the state of health of the seed samples. lnstead of a full 
sample of 400 seeds, only 100 seeds were used to test seed health. This is because samples collected 
from fanners were relatively small and therefore would not be enough for the usual working sample of 
400 seeds. The samples were divided into four replicares of25 seeds each. Blotters, which were used as 
substrates, were soaked in water and placed on petri dishes. Seeds were not subjected to any 
pre-treatment; they were directly plated on blotters and then incubated in 12 hours ultra-violet light 
alternating with 12 hours of darkness for seven days. After seven days of incubation, the seeds were 
exarnined for the presence or symptoms of disease organisms. The incubated seeds were then examined 
thoroughly under a stereo-microscope for growth of di fferent types of fungi and bacteria, but not all of 
the fungal and bacteria( diseases were identified. 
Data collected from purity, germination, and seed health tests were analyzed using ANOV A to 
determine any differences between the varieties. The means ofthe purity. germination and health results 
were also analyzed and compared with the standards for bean seed, as given by Kenya Plant Health 
lnspectorate Services (KEPH IS). 
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For the second set of analyses, 59 seed samples were collected, and fanners and bean-seed traders were 
interviewed. Only those whose seed samples were collected were interviewed. The min imum number of 
samples required for each variety in each group was five. 
Col/ection sources 
Local markets: Seed collectors went to local markets, identified the bean varieties, and then purchased 
them if the traders were willing to sell. 
Trained farmers: Fanners who had been previous ly trained by KARl staff on bean-seed production 
were individually visited and asked if they had the required varieties and if they were w illing to sell 
samples to the collectors. A few had all three; others had only one or two of the desired variet ies in 
sufficient amounts. 
Collection from untrained farmers: Fanners who had not been fonnally trained by KA.R l staff were 
also visited individually and asked for samples ofthe required bean varieties. The bean collectors found 
sorne individual fanners who had all three varieties, while others had one or two. 
Collection from KARI-Kakamega: Collection was made from two seasons' planting of the bean 
variety KK8. 
Germinatiou test 
The germination test was done using the ro ll paper-towel method on 200 seeds per sample. Ten days 
later, samples were evaluated for germination and were categorized as normal or abnormal seedlings, 
rotten, or fresh ungenninated seed. 
Seed health test 
Seed-bome in fection was detennined using the standard blotter method. Two hundred seeds per sample 
were incubated at 20°C for seven days in petri dishes containing moist filter papers. Seeds were then 
examined under a stereo-microscope for funga l growth, and identification was made on the basis of 
fungal characteristics. 
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Abstract 
This study presents the case of a disease on a vegetatively propagated crop: cassava. During the 1990s, 
fanners in northem Mozambique became aware of problems with root rot on cassava, a d isease later 
identified as cassava brown streak disease (C8SD). In the District of Memba in the Province of 
Nampula, where this study was undertaken, C8SD was disastrous for both the livelihoods and the seed 
securi ty of the people depending on agriculture. The dominance of cassava in the production system 
made farming comrnunities particularly vulnerable. ln addition , genetic unifonnity and reliance on 
varieties very susceptible to the disease made cassava production even more precarious. Fanners were 
unable to obtain either appropriate cassava planting material or sufficient amounts of seed for alterna ti ve 
crops, such as sorghum and maize. The onset ofthe crisis was slow, starting in the ' 90s and developing 
into an acure situation of food insecurity by the autumn of 2002, by which t ime the si tuation was 
considered critica! and there seemed to be a need for externa! action. 
Two separare operations were launched in November-December 2002: one by Save the Children USA 
(SCIUSA) and one by the Provincial Govemment of Nampula (PDA). 8oth aimed at giving fanners 
altemative and tolerant varieties ofcassava or altemative crops as a supplement to the cassava. SC/USA 
based their intervention on assessments of the impact of C8SD both on the cassava and on the 
livelihoods of the people, while the PDA assumed seed insecurity on the basis of livelihood 
measurements only. 8oth are working in collaboration with a wider national and regional scientific 
network aimed at solving the problem of C8SD in southem and eastem A frica. 
The case shows how the fonnal scientific sector can be essential in the process of identify ing resistan! 
and tolerant planting material when coping with a disease in vegetatively propagated crops. As, at thi s 
point, only tolerant varieties have been identified, the case also indicares the importance of d iffus ing 
knowledge about the disease and effective cultural practices to ensure clean planting material-along 
with the new plants themselves. 
The govemment strategy of distributing cuttings on credit does not seem feasible because of the low 
quantity and (very likely) low quality of retumed material. Supporting local seed systems to produce 
adequate cassava planting material (i.e. , quantity and quality) might be a stratcgic focus for futurc 
institutional support. 
lntroduction 
When di sasters ha ve affected farming areas, rehabilita tion is commonly constrained by a lack of seeds. 
But a id agencies often fail to address seed issues appropriate ly in relief operations, which can slow down 
and complicare recovery. Many agencies clearly need education on how to ana lyze the prob lem ofseeds 
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and how to con tribute to restoration of seed supply systems. For that purpose, the review of cases is a 
necessary leaming process. The case of a crisis caused by a virus disease in cassava, the most important 
subsistence crop in coastal areas of East Africa, represents one kind of disaster for which relevant 
authorities and aid agencies must be prepared. 
This case study compares the relief and rehabilitation strategies of two different agencies-Save the 
Children USA (SC!USA) and the District Directorate of Agriculture (ODA) in the Memba Distric t of 
northern Mozambique (figure 1)-in responding to an outbreak of cassava brown streak disease 
(CBSD) in cassava, the staple crop in the area. 
SCF DAP Pro&ram Taraet Districts 
FY02-FY06 
Source: SCIUSA Nampula. 
kllometers 
Nacala 
Nacala-a-
Velha 
Figure l. Nampula Province, Mozamhique, indicating the six district s where 
the SC/USA DAP2 program is rw1 
The outbreak ofCBSD in northem Mozambique started in the 1990s, affecting only a few cassava plants 
at first. But in a few years, rotted roots were observed over a wide area. The disease had been building up 
year by year until it finally devastated whole fi elds. Farmers lost both the food harvest and their 
reproductive materials. Since the disease occurred over a wide area, many affected fanners had nowhere 
to go for new planting materíals: accessibfe cuttings were also likely to be in fected . 
Methodology 
Fieldwork for this report included one vis it immediately befare planting time in December 2002, when 
the crisis was assessed. Varíous group interviews were conducted with farmers in Memba Dístrict and 
with representatives from the SCIUSA and DDA. Another field visit in July 2003 allowed for study of 
the interventions and their impact. 
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In July 21- 31, 2003, data were collected using semi-structured interviews with both farmers in the 
impacted area and representati ves of SC/USA and di fferent levels of the govemment. Yarious reports 
and documents of relevance to the operations were consu\ted. ln addition to co\lecting infonnation on 
the experiences of both the implementers and benefi ciaries, the main goal of the fi eldwork was to get 
infonnation on the background, scale, and impact of the operations. 
Infonnation was also gathered in semi-structured interviews with individual farmers in communities 
that had received assistance from SC!USA, in communities that had received assistance from DDA, and 
in communities that had not received any seed assistance, although it was difftcult to find communities 
that had not received any assistance at all. Interviews were carried out in one community (Chipene) 
where no distributions had taken place, but it appeared that thi s community was not affected by any 
production crisis in the year 2002 season. CBSD is nota problem in all of Memba; north of Mazua (see 
figure 2), the disease is not considered a problem. Communities in Memba that were visited and that are 
referred to in the text were Mekuta, Chopite, Chipene, Yamene, and Muipia (figure 2). 
During interviews with individual fanners, other members of the family or neighbors often also 
participated. Thus, sorne ofthe interviews took the form of group interviews, which sometimes enriched 
the information but other times limited the value of the interview. 
Guides were developed for interviews with the implementers (SC!USA and the govemment), but those 
interviews were generally carried out as informal conversations and discussions. 
Limilations of the data 
The difficulty finding communities that had not received assistance from any relief operations does not 
mean that such communities were nonex istent; the district is large, and we were only able to visit 
communities a long the roads. The di stribution of seeds and cassava sticks depended on road transport, so 
it might not have adequately reached the more remate areas--communities that may be the same ones 
we were unable to visit. Thus, our sample may not be representative ofthe overall impact ofthe disaster 
or the sea le and impact of the relief operations. 
The context of the crisis 
F arming system 
Fanners in Memba practice bush fallow in various rotations but usuall y with fairly short fallow, 
commonly two years-a system that people said had not changed during the ir time. There is enough 
unoccupied bush land for fanners to take as much landas they can manage for cultivation, which is done 
by hoe only. They bum the bush during the dry season. Family members work together or separately, 
according to traditional gender roles. 
The primary crop is cassava. In addition, the farmers grow maize, sorghum, and sorne pearl millet. Grain 
legumes are grown mostly in small amounts and include groundnuts, cowpeas, pigeon peas, beans, 
green grams, and bambara groundnuts ( Voand=eia subterranea), of which, cowpeas are probably the 
most important. Mixed cropping is common with these crops. Other crops include sweet potatoes, 
bananas, and ata few places, rainfed lowland rice. A little cotton is also grown in the north ofthe di strict. 
People do not invest money in production s ince it is primarily for subsistence. Sources of income are 
from the sa le of surplus cassava, maize, groundnuts, and cashew nuts. However, the cashew trees are 
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Figure 2. Memba and Nacala-a-Velba Districts (fieldwork for this study took place near 
Chipene and Muipia lo the west of the district capital of Me mba) 
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poorly maintained and produce little. Those living near the sea also fish, and for them, fi shing is the main 
so urce of money. There is no integration of crop and livestock production, and 1 ivestock seem to be quite 
insignificant in the farming and food system. Only a few farmers keep goats and poultry. 
Food security 
The people say that this system nom1a ll y produces suffi cient quantities of food for their subsistence 
needs. This was the case even during the exhausti ve civil war from the late 1970s to the Rome Peace 
Accord in 1992: "During the war we were disturbed, but we had enough to eat." Unfavorable weather, 
such as droughts and cyclones, sometimes causes loca l problems, but when the cassava d iscase struck, 
the district experienced its first widespread hunger crisis. 
The farming system has not experienced any major transition in recent history. There has been some 
tumover ofvarieties and introduction ofnew crops, but technology--cultivation by burning, the use of 
hoes and pangas, and no use of inputs- has not changed. In such subsistence economies, therc is little 
surplus capacity to meet major calam ities. 
Seed supply and genetic resources 
Note that we use the word seed here in a broad sen se, covering any means of reproduction of crop plants. 
Thus, using cuttings for reproducti on of cassava and sweet pota toes has been íncluded in th is description 
of the sced supply system. 
Cassava 
In the past, cassava stems were abundantly ava ilabl c for making cuttings. Traditionally, farmers saved 
c uttings from their own fields, but if they lacked planting materials, they could ask anybody and they 
would get them for free. Cassava cuttings had no price. However, that system co llapsed with the cassava 
disease. At present, sources ofnew, clean planting materials are so far away that farmers in the affected 
areas cannot get them on their own. 
At the time ofthe CBSD outbreak, many farmers were growing only a s ingle cassava variety . As in many 
other parts of Africa, there has been some tumover in varieties over time. New ones havc been intro-
duced and old ones discarded, often beca use of damage caused by pests or diseases (Tresh et al. , 1994 ). 
The current dominan! variety in Memba was introduced (together w ith other assistance) after 11 Apri l 
1994, when the area was devastated by a cyc lone. Beca use of the circumstances of its introduction, peo-
ple called the variety calamidade (calamity), although that name might also have been attached to other 
varieties associated with severe crises, such as cyclones in the l 980s. Some suspect that thc variety re-
ferred toas calamidade is the one that brought the virus into the area. But initially it was found to y ield 
well and most farmers stopped growing other varieties, wh ich meant that there was an extreme degree of 
genetic unifom1ity in locally grown cassava when the disease later started to bui ld up. 
Ca/amidade appears to be very susceptible to thc disease. When farmers were asked if any of the 
previously grown varieties could have resisted the disease, one group said that they had other varieties 
when the d isease came and that all ofthem were equally affected. However, when farmers were asked to 
name cassava varieties that had been grown before the introduction of calamidade, they mentioned 1 1 
different named varieties, some of which were still bei ng grown when SC/USA surveyed the area for 
varieties to screen for disease tolerance. 
Farmers in many communities knew these varieties and some expressed regret that they had been lost. 
Farmers in this reg ion have traditionally cultivated both bitter and sweet varieties of cassava, a lthough 
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curren ti y, bitter varieties ( like mulapa) seem to domínate the farming system. Most farmers claimed that 
the bitter varieties yield better than the sweet ones, while others claimed that the sweet cassava have 
other advantages that the bitter ones lack. The sweet variety can also be eaten raw, whereas the bitter one 
is preferred for cooki ng. 
In sorne places people said that they never grew more than one variety ata time. When a new introduc-
tion carne and did better, the older variety was discarded. Others said that they grew severa! varieties ata 
time and had them in separate fields. One fanner group sa id they had a few varieties until recently but 
that the disease had devastated all ofthem. 
Such stories suggest that virus diseases could have been around for a long time. lfviral infections build 
up year by year, new introductions from unaffected areas would naturally appear more vigorous than 
infected materials grown locally. If that is the case, they have replaced varieties instead of getting 
disease-free cuttings of existing varieties. The tragedy is that farmers switched to the new introductions 
befare these varieties were suffi ciently exposed to the virus to assess their degree of disease tolerance. 
Seed c•·ops 
Befare the cassava crisis, maize was only grown to a limited extent. There used to be many local 
varieties, but few are left now (e.g., kanyangulu and calamidade). To help farmers expand maize 
production , the commercial varieties matuba and manica have been distributed in recent years. 
The only local sorghum variety mentioned was lannla, but all farmers havc sorne sorghum. Relative to 
maize, sorghum is more reliablc on the local soils and under the uncertain ra infall pattem ofrecent years. 
However, birds are considered a serious problem with sorghum. 
Various local varieties of pearl millet, cowpeas, and bambara groundnuts (both black and white) are 
cultivated. There are also severa! named varieties of sweet potatoes. 
The seed crops are nonnally maintained through on-farm seed saving. Grains intended for seed are 
selected and stored separately from food grains by the women, who have the main responsibili ty for thi s 
process. They decide on how much ofthe harvest should be kept for food and how much should be kept 
as seed for the next season. The interviewed fanners said that some people do not separate seeds and 
food but keep it all together and plant w hatever is left in the granary at planting time. However, the 
separa te storage of seed is considered the norm. 
While food grains are vulnerable to insect damage during storage, fanne rs said they were able to 
maintai n their seeds well. They described a number of storage and protection methods, some traditional 
and sorne learned from govemment and SC/USA extensionists: ( 1) keeping unshelled/unthreshed 
cobs/panicles/pods on the roof, (2) tying the seed in grass bundles and keeping it on the roof, (3) ty ing it 
in grass bundles and suspending it in trees, (4) storing it in celeiros (granaries), or (5) sticking it under 
the cei ling near the cooking area so that it is exposed to smoke. Threshed seeds may also be kept in 
sealed bottles or pots, in which case some protective agent, such as ash, sand, cooking oil, hot pepper, or 
leaves from a certain wild plant, is mixed with the seeds. Hot pepper can be added whole or dried and 
pounded. Leaves from the wild plant can be pounded and mixed in or burned and added as ash. 
In nonnal times, most farmers are able to save all the seeds they need for the next planting. They do not 
keep reserves for replanting because one planting is considered to be enough. [f sorne farmers do not 
have seeds, they can go to othcr fanners and offer work for seeds. They then have to help with the hard 
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work of hoeing the land to prepare it for seeding, but they would get the seeds they need as payment. 
That was the traditional "safety valve" that ensured access to seeds for everybody. 
Considering that cassava used to occupy most of the land and therefore only small amounts of seeds 
were needed, it seems likely that this system provided reasonable seed security for a11 befare the demise 
of the cassava. In inland Nampula, however, where farmers depend less on cassava (see liTA, 2003 , 
indicating approximately 50% ofthe land in Nampula was planted to cassava in the 1997/98 season) and 
more on seed crops, farmers save twice the normally required amounts of seed. 
In Memba, selling and buying seed is very limited. A significant market for seed has not developed and 
certified seed from the commercial sector is not available in the district. However, local shop owners in 
Memba have started buying grain seed from farmers at harvest time and selling it back at p lanting time. 
Un like commercial seed companies, the shopkeepers deal with local seeds only-mostly sorghum, 
maize, groundnuts, sesame, and green grams. They "rescue" small quantities of local seed from being 
consumed, but currently, this isjust a few sacks, far from a solution to the district's seed problem. Even 
when farmers are desperate for seed, they may not have the money to buy it. One shopkeeper said that 
few farmers are able to buy, and those who do, can only afford small amounts, lkg to 2kg. Sorne visitors 
from outside the are a bu y larger quantities. Thus, so me of the traded seeds were exported from Memba 
during a time of critica\ seed shortage. 
The nature of the crisis 
This was a crisis of slow onset. According to Hillocks (2003), the disease was described in Tanzania as 
early as the 1930s. When it spread to Mozambique is uncertain, but many farmers blame the introduction 
and wide distribution of susceptible varieties that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. The first local 
report ofthe disease was in 1998. ln 2002, the impact ofthe disease had reached a leve\ that threatened 
people's livelihoods in a number of coastal districts. The problem went beyond known coping 
mechanisms; there was no experience with that sort of crisis, and little was known about sources of 
disease-resistant cassava material. Communities faced a major challenge in identifying and multiplying 
disease-tolerant cassava. 
Because of cassava' s dominant positton in the cropping system, it was difficult for farmers to 
compensate with other crops. On the contrary, the food shortage caused by the cassava disease made ít 
difficult for farmers to save enough seed. By the planting season ofDecember 2002, when the first field 
visit too k place, households in the district were facing shot1ages of cash and seeds in addition to the lack 
of cassava cuttings. Food stores were running dry and many fami lies depended on bush food for their 
subsistence. 
Since everybody had the same problem, there was nowhere to go to get seeds. In the group interviews, 
only one farmer group said they knew about a place where seeds could be obtained. But that place was 
far away, and the owner would only give seeds after having seen that his own fields had germinated and 
been successfu lly established. 
By autunm 2002, the situation seemed to be acute for the livelihood security ofmany househo\ds. lfnot 
dealt with in a proper way, it was feared that the situation would cause widespread chronic food and seed 
insecurity. The need for a response was apparent. However, the total population in Memba di strict at that 
time was almost l l 0,000, ofwhich 95% were living on fanns (figures provided by District Agricultura) 
Office). That makes a farm population of s lightly more than 100,000. With an average family size of 
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around five persons, the number ofhouseholds would be approximately 20,000. So identi fying tolerant 
varieties and multiplying them to meet the needs of all the farmers in the area would be a major 
undertaking. Even with the disease only seriously affecting the southem part of the district, the total 
requirement amounts to 50 mil! ion cuttings if we calculate 10,000 farms in need of assistance, and if 
each ofthem plants half a hectare of cassava and uses 10,000 cuttings per hectare. In addition, there were 
similar needs in other affected districts . Since cassava cuttings do not constitute a regularly traded 
commodity, al l ofthis would have to be produced and distributed in a separate operation organized as a 
response to this particular crisis. 
Seed interventions 
As mentioned above, the situation at the 2002 planting season was considered critica! in severa! coastal 
districts in the Nampula Province, and development actors decided to distribute planting materials, 
including cassava s tems and seeds of cereals and Iegumes. In M emba District, SC/USA Mozambique 
and the District Directorate of Agriculture (ODA) were involved. 
The seed operations carried by SC/USA and ODA are described in terms of ( 1) the diagnosis made by 
the implementers about the food and seed situation in the area befare the distributions, (2) the actual 
process ofimplementing the distributions in the communities, and (3) experiences with the di stributions 
from both the implementers' and the farmers' points ofview. 
Diagnosis of the situation 
Both SC/USA and the ODA based their interventions on qualitative and quantitative assessments and 
assumptions about the food and seed security in the area. 
SC/USA diagnosis 
A "strange phenomenon" affecting cassava in N acata-a-Velha and Memba Districts was reported in 
1998 (Noticias, Maputo, 13 October 1998). In 1999, a farmer contacted SC/USA asking for pesticides to 
use against the root decay on cassava, symptoms that were later identified as cassava brown streak 
disease. However, farmers recounted that they had observed the symptoms for the first time in 1994. 
According to the SC/USA assessment, the disease multiplied by eight- to tenfold per year through the 
use of cuttings taken from infected plants. lt reached a disastrous leve! during the first SC/USA 
development activity program (DAP) in the period 1996- 200 l . This USAID-funded program was 
operational in Nacala-a-Velha and Memba. Its main goal to strengthen food security and nutrition 
among farmers in those two districts. Since C BSD was identified as a huge problem for farmers in these 
districts during this period, the disease was given a central position in the DAP2 proposal (SC/USA, 
2002a). As early as 1999, SC/USA Mozambique had started small-scale multiplication of cassava to find 
resistant varieties. 
Two fonnal assessments of the disease's impact on the production system were carried out: first, leaf 
symptoms were assessed in 2000. That involved 19 extension workers, each investigating at random 20 
plants per farm, and covering 391 farms in six districts. Second, an investigation ofroot symptoms took 
place in 2002, which showed that the disease affected 75%-85% ofthe plants in the area.ln addition, a 
baseline survey was carried among fanners in early August 2002, mainly focusing on food availability, 
access, and utilization. In this survey, 587 households were interviewed (about 2.3% of the estimated 
number of households in the program area) (SC/USA, 2002b ). The investigators concluded that there 
was low availabili ty of appropriate cassava material in the area and that there was therefore a need to 
Addres.1i11g Seed Securit_r in Disastf'r Response: /,inking Relief uúh Development 
. 98 1 
L. T. Tra!dal and T. Berg 
identify and di stribute res istant varie ties of cassava. Furthermore, in DAP2, SCIUSA identi fíed a need to 
make farmers less reliant on bitter cassava. 
ODA diagnosis 
Parallel to the SC/USA operations, in December 2002, the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (PDA) 
also organized distributions of cassava sticks and seeds in coastal areas of Nampula, including the 
District of Memba. This operation was based on reports that had come in from govemmenta l fíe ld 
technicians in 2002 on food securi ty problems and problems with too high a consumption of bitter 
cassava (which can cause death from dietary cyanogen exposure). In this context, the provincial 
Technical Secretary on Food Security and Nutrition (SETSA N), a govemmental group in Nampula, 
made a crop assessment survey, w here farmers were asked questions on access to food, amounts of food 
in storage, availabili ty offood in markets ( including prices), altem ative sources ofincome, general local 
li velihood strategies in stress situations, and movements of people caused by the famine and reasons for 
their move (which was asked of community leaders). 
The report described the food security situation as critica! , particular! y in N acata-a-Velha and Memba 
(SETSAN, 2002). Recommendations were divided into two categories: long- and short-term 
interventions. Among the short-tem1 interventions, distribution of seeds was considered as an 
appropriate measure to help fa nners cope with the critica( s ituation. To encourage self-re liance, the 
govemment prefers measures that stimulate production rather than distributing free food, so food aid 
was not considered an altemative. For the long-term di versification of the agricul tura( sector, the 
introduction ofaltemative crops adapted to local soil and water regimes was proposed (SETSAN, 2002). 
lmplementing the operations 
The diagnosis made by the SC/USA and the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (PDA) in amput a 
resulted in two separate seed operations in December 2002. In the fo llowing more details on the main 
goals of these operations, their scale and scope, and the processes of selecting beneficiaries are 
presented. 
SC/USA distributions 
Objectives 
Seed distributions by SC/USA are part of the second USA ID-funded development activity program 
(DAP2) with the overall objective of improving ' ' household farming systems and food consumption by 
introducing sustainable technologies and nutrition prac ti ces" (SCIUSA, 2002a: 1 ). An expressed goa l of 
the program, which is being run during the period 2002- 2006, is to eradicate the current threat o f CBSD 
by having disseminated disease-resistant cassava material to 50,000 househo lds by the end of the DAP 
period in 2006 (SC/USA, 2002a). In addition, SC/ USA aims to diversify the agricultura( production 
system by presenting other, more nutritious and marketable, crops as altematives for the farmers. 
ldentification of material for distribution 
As mentioned above, SC/USA Mozambique had startcd small-scale experimental multiplication of 
cassava in Memba and Nacala-a-Velha Districts to find resistant varieties shortly after the disease was 
identified in 1999. As part of DAP2, four more di stricts (Nacala, Mossuril, Ilha de Moyambique, and 
Mogincual) were included in the program . In each of the s ix districts, primary multiplication fields 
(PMF), ranging between one and two hectares in size, were established under the clase supervision of an 
SC agronomist for multiplication of cassava sticks. In Memba the average PMF is 1.37 ha (SC/USA, 
2003a). 
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Cassava materia ls being multiplied include both local varieties and materials that are provided through 
the South A frican Rootcrops Research Network (SARRNET) and liT A networks. Res istance to CBSD 
is tested, a nd four varieties (nikwalta, m 'povatakwa, chigoma mafia, and nachinya) are under 
multiplication. The fírst two are of local origin, and the last two are from the Province ofCabo Delgado 
north ofNampula. These are al l sweet varieties except for m 'povatakwa. They have been identifíed as 
tolerant, implying that they show only leaf symptoms. The roots are not affected and can be used as food. 
Infected Jea ves still ha ve value as food and can be used for making the traditionallocal sauces, which are 
prepared from stamped cassava leaves, often mixed with different kinds oflegumes, such as groundnuts, 
bambara groundnuts, etc. 
ldentiflcatiorz of beneficiaries 
In December 2002, cassava sticks of the nikwaha variety were distributed to fanners for further 
multipl ication in secondary multiplication fields (SMFs). Nikwaha was chosen because it was 
considered tolerant and, at the time, was the one most readily available. The di stributed material was 
from both SC/USA's PMFs and material collected from Namina, Nampula Province. Within each 
community , three to four groups of 15- 20 fanners were established under the supervision of SC/USA 's 
local extension workers, and each group was given a plot for the cultivation of the distributed cassava 
sticks. Each fam1er received 20 sticks of cassava (in !-meter lengths), which in tu m , were cut into four 
pieces of25 cm, giving each fanner approximately 100 cuttings. The leftovers after the cultivation of the 
SMF were for farmers' own prívate fields. In the interviews, fanners said that they had between fíve and 
seven one-meter sticks left after the SMF cultivation. 
Distributions in Memba included 10,400 sticks from SC/USA 's primary multiplication fields in 
December 2002 and another 14,500 sticks from SARRNET in February 2003 (SC/USA, 2003b). 
Facilitated by SC/USA 's extension workers, meetings with fanners were held in each community befare 
the distributions. The famers who received the sticks volunteered for the project. They got no monetary 
compensation but had the rights to the produce ofthe SMF after harvest without any further obligation. 
This supplied both roots and lea ves for eating and disease-tolerant planting material for the next season. 
The only condi tion was that fanners had to participa te in SC/USA ' s training programs, where they were 
trained in identifying CBSD symptoms, crop lining and spacing, and mixing of crops in the fíeld. In 
addition, fanners had to form groups to cultivate the SMFs. The groups were responsible for cleaning the 
fields, harvesting the produce, and weighing and distributing the produce among themselves after 
harvest (which was not yet finished at the time of the field visit in July 2003). 
According to SC/USA records, the total number offanners trained in the groups in the program area was 
5236. In Memba, 1 108 fanners were participating in the program (SC/USA, 2003a). 
ODA distrihutions 
Objectives 
As a response to the critica! food security situation in the coastal area of ampula, the Provincial 
Directorate of Nampu la established a three-year project, running from 2002 to 2005. The overall 
objective is to increase agricultura! production and improve toad security by diversifying agriculture in 
the area. The project has been implemented in the districts of Memba, Nacala-a-Velha, Mossuril, 
Mogincual, Erati, Nacaroa, Nacala Porto, and Ilha de Moc;ambique. 
One important element ofthe project is to replace some ofthe bitter cassava with sweet varieties, as well 
as replacing sorne of the cassava production with altemative, more nutritious, short-cycled crops 
(Furede, 2002), which are adapted to local soil and water regimes (SETSAN, 2002). 
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A further objective, which has influenced who the beneticiaries of the project would be, has been to 
promote cultivation of the most ferti le land. 
ldentification of material for distribution 
In November 2002 , based on the knowledge of CBSD tolerance accumulated by SC/USA, l iT A, 
SARRNET, and INIA, the nikwaha variety of cassava was provided from the District ofRibaue; most of 
the other seeds were improved varieties of mil let, maize, sorghum, cowpeas, and groundnuts from 
SEMOC, the Mozambican seed company. The exception was millet, which was of local origin. While 
most of the seeds were sourced from the commercial sector, most of them were known and had been 
cultivated befare by many farmers in the area (interview with the Provincial D irector of Agriculture in 
Nampula, E.M. Furede, 3 1 July 2003). 
The intention has been to provide 1000 cassava sticks, 3 kg of maize, 1.5 kg of sorghum, and 3 kg of 
cowpeas to each family (table 1 ); however, it was di fficult to veri fy the actual amounts distributed, 
particularly the number of cassava sticks. Amounts of millet and sorghum are not mentioned in the 
project description. The project has an ultima te goal of reaching 3000 families (households) during the 
three-year project period (Furede, 2002). 
Tahle l. Seed Distrihution in Memha by DDA: Amounts Distrihuted in December· 
2002 and Returned by End of July 2 003 
Amounts distributed Amounts returned by 
Crops distributed in December 2002 end July 2003 Varieties distributed 
Maize 7911 kg 5486 kg (69.3%) Manica, matuba,* kalahari 
Sorghum 4000 kg 237 kg (0.6%) Macia 
Cowpeas 8799 kg 958.5 kg (1.1%) Brown mix 
Millet 1564 kg 570.5 kg (36.5%) Local variety 
Groundnuts 345 kg 249.5 kg (72.3%) Natal comum 
Note: The amounts indicated here as having been retum ed are percentages ofthe amounts distributed. Since 
farmers were expected to retum twice as m u eh as they received. their repayment oftheir commitment is even 
less than indicated here. 
* Matuba was the variety distributed in Memba. Because ofits short growth cycle, it does not need a lot ofrain to 
grow well and was considered the best-adapted variety for the sandy soils in Memba. 
Identification of beneficiaries 
It has been di fficul t to get c lear in formation on the exact process by which beneficiaries were selected in 
this distribution. In the project description, farmers were to be selected, on the one hand, on the basis of 
interest, experience, and responsibility and, on the other hand, on the location of their farms (Furede, 
2002). lt appears that in most places, farmers were selected from govemment lists and provided with a 
bag containing a certain amount ofseeds of different kinds. In other places (as in Yamene), only farmers 
who were members offarmers' associations were provided seeds. The farmers were given the seeds on 
the condi tion that after harvest they retum 200% of the amount of seeds they received. T he intention of 
this was to establish a seed bank that could províde farmers with seeds each planting season. ldeally, in 
this way the ODA cou\d reach more farmers in their seed di stributions at the time of the next planting 
sea son. 
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In Memba, fanners with the best soils were favored in the distributions. This was part o f a govemment 
stratcgy to get the farmers with the poorest soil to abandon their land and movc their production to other 
fi e lds with more favorable conditions (interview with District Director of Agriculture in Memba, Aiupa 
Abudo, 22 July 2003 ). There is litt le social stratification in the area, so no other criteria were applied to 
the selection of bene fic iaries. 
Evaluation of the operations and problem s faced 
Agricultura( development in thc Mcmba arca is constrained by an un favorable environment, particular! y 
poor soils and unprcdictable rainfall. The dry, sandy soils are extremely dependent on good rains to 
produce well, and a shortage of rain can scrious ly affect farm production and farm livelihoods. The 
distribution of cassava sticks and seeds by SCIUSA aimed at decreasing the fanners' vulnerability to 
stress situations, whcreas the concurrent ODA operation aimed at both decrcasing farmers' vulnerability 
and rclicving the situation of acutc food insccurity. 
At the time of thc study, nei thcr the SC/USA nor the ODA had yet madc any fonnal cvaluations or 
reports regarding the degree of success or fa ilure o f their seed distribution operations. Since thc 
distributed cassava had not bccn harvested at the time o fthe fie ldwork (July 2003), it was too earl y to 
assess success or failure. 
Still , it was possible to get an impression of the operations by talking with representativcs from both 
SC/USA and ODA and by talking to fanners in the different communities. Sorne importan! experienccs 
from the operations, both in tenns ofthe perspectives and parameters of the implementers andas seen by 
the targeted fanners, are presented below. 
Thc SC/ USA oper·ntion 
A major problem faced in the SC/USA DAP has been to find C BSD-resistant cassava material, which 
was fo rmulated as a goal in the DA P2 Proposal (SC/USA, 2002a). No resistant or immunc varieties have 
been found and, according to thc SC/ USA Assistant Agronomi st, it is not likely that any resistant 
varieties witl be found within the program period (2002- 2006). However, sorne varieties that are only 
slight ly affected by the disease are considered to be tolerant and have been selected for multiplication 
and distribution. lt is hoped that the currently identified tolerant varieties (nikwaha. m 'povatahva, 
chigoma mafia, and nachinyay a) wi ll be sufficient to overcome the crisis. 
Lack o.f diversity 
Prob lems encountcrcd during the search for tolerant varietics have includcd genetic crosion , whcrc 
many traditional vari eties ha ve been discarded and have di sappeared from the arca, leaving the cropping 
system with a narrow genetic base. lt was al so difficult to get fanners to sharc infonnation on disease to l-
erance. In the hope of being provided w ith assets from the project staff, fanners ha ve been reluctant to 
say that they still ha ve good or to lerant varicties of cassava. For fanncrs to share this infonnation with 
the SC/ USA. a relationship o f trust and close collaboration between extens ion workcrs and fanners is 
necessary. There may also be a problem ofknowledge: linking thc leaf symptoms to thc root rot may not 
be obvious to the fanners; thcy keep planting stems from infcsted plants, thereby multiply ing the 
problcm. 
E ven though only a few varietics o f cassava domínate the farming system in Memba, quite a few o fthe 
old varieties still cxist and are c ultivated by the fanners. In an SC/ USA survcy in 2002, 6900 cassava 
plants were investi gated on 345 fanns in the six program districts, and sorne of the less common 
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varieties, such as Garcia, vinte, nacamula, namahava and nassuruma, showed low levels of infection 
(SCIUSA, 2003 b). Al! ofthese have been included in on-fann trials with the farmer training groups. 
Stealing cassava 
There ha ve been reports from fanners of problems with theft of cassava from the PM Fs. At night, other 
fanners (or fanners from within the groups) visit the plots and steal cassava. lt is c laimed that this 
happens because fam1ers are desperate for food. However, other fam1ers disagreed wi th this view, 
claiming that there has been a change in people's mentali ty: 
In the old days people could trust each other. People were also hungry at that time, but they would never 
steal from the fields. 
(Eiderly farmer in Mecuta) 
Still , the scale of this problem is unclear, andas stated by SC/USA 's Agronomist, Steve McSween: "The 
tolerant distributed cassava material is still out there amongst the farmers." Nevertheless, due to 
problems with theft of the distributed sweet cassava, it is reasonable to question the feas ibility of 
distributing sweet vari eties of cassava. lt was the fanners who adopted and developed a preference for 
the bitter varieties, in the first place, possibly beca use theft of sweet cassava had been a problem in the 
past. A study by Chiwona-Karltun in Malawi showed that social factors were the main reasons for 
farmers preferring bitter cassava: the need for processing roots before consumption confers protection 
from theft and vennin (Chiwona-Karltun, 2003). 
lt is important for indigenous knowledge and preferences to be leamed and utilized in order to accelerate 
the process of transferring agricultura! production technologies. In the process of figh ting cassava 
mosaic virus in Uganda, in order to secure prolonged and sustainable cultivation, the farmers identified 
resistant genotypes before they were released (Otim-Nape et al., 1994). This has not happened in the 
present situatíon. Fanners in Memba have been invo lved to a very limited degree in the process of 
identifying and selecting preferred tolerant varieties of cassava. 
Logistics 
The di stribution process was constrained by a number of problems: sorne communities cannot be 
reached by road, it was not possible to reach all the benefíciaries by the best planting time, and 
unfavorable weather condi tions were also mentioned as a constra int. The rain carne as expected in 
January and February but stopped early in March. Furthermore, a cyclone made cultivation difficult for 
sorne fanners. 
In the whole program area, 6162 households were reached by the SC/USA cassava distributions 
(SC/USA, 2003b) . The ultimate goal of reaching 50,000 households by the end ofthe program period in 
2006 is still far away. The SCIUSA Assistant Agronomist is worried that at the program's current pace, it 
w ill be difficult to reach that goal. However, calculat ing the 2003 nurseries covering more than 25 
hectares with 10,000 plants per hectare and each plant producing lO cuttings, 2.5 mi Ilion cuttings can be 
produced. That would be enough for lOO cuttings to each of25,000 households. Adding the customary 
free exchange of cassava cuttings makes it likely that di stributed vari eties will diffuse through the region 
once the fanners have enough for their own needs. 
The DDA operation 
So far there has been no fonnal evaluation ofthe DDA distributions. The only ava ilable indicator oftheir 
degree of success is the amount of seeds paid back by the fam1ers (table 1 ). lt appears that the distributed 
sorghum has not perfonned well, probably due to late distributions and lack of rain late in the cropping 
season, whi le the di stributed maize and gro undnuts seem to have done better. Still , there are reasons to 
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belíeve that many fam1ers ha ve not yet paíd back the agreed amounts in spite of good production. As one 
farmer said, "1 ha ve not yet paid back the amounts of seeds demanded by the govemment beca use no one 
from the government has been here asking for them." Here, the government faces a logistical problem in 
that neither the government nor the farmers have the means to transport the seeds to the seed bank. 
The govemment distributed seeds on credit to avoid fanners getting used to receiving suppot1 for free. 
However, the farmers who benefitted from the govemment distributions generally (and not surprisingly) 
were not pleased by having to pay back twice the amount that they had received: 
It does not make sen se that we ha veto pay back the seeds. 1fl had kept the seeds, 1 would ha ve distributed 
the seeds to persons in other areas, but now this is impossible. 
(Farmer in Chupite) 
Timing ofthe distributions 
The local authorities relied on central funding for the seed distributions, which may ha ve contributed to 
late distributions in some of the communities. The seeds and the instructions were given by the 
provincial ministry in Nampula, and the framework given for the operations was perceived by the ODA 
in Memba as a limitation: 
The operation was emergency assistance, and that should not be a governrnent task . ... We [the DDA] 
did what was possible within the framework given by the Govemment ... . The main problem that we 
faced in the distributions was reaching all the people. In addition, seeds were not enough, and some of 
them arrived too late, and did therefore not perform well in the fíe ld s. 
(Aiupa A budo, District Director of Agriculture in Memba) 
Logistics 
Reaching people was another problem. In the end, the ODA was assisted with transportation of the seeds 
within the district by SC/USA. The problem of late distribution was most pronounced in the case of 
sorghum, which was hampered by a short (but heavy) rainy season. In addition, there were not enough 
seeds for all the cornmunities to receive the whole package: 
The govemment told us that 200 people should clear their land because we were about to receive seeds 
for planting. ln the end they only brought cowpeas in small amounts, only 50 kg (2.5 kg to each of 20 
people). T here are still 180 people here waiting for their seeds. 
(Farmer in Muipia) 
Discussion 
Se ed security 
Seed security can be defined as a situation where farmers ha ve or can access enough seeds of desired 
species and preferred varieties, of good quali ty, in time to fully exploit the potential of their farms. The 
cassava disease disrupted the en tire farming and seed supply system in Memba in a way that undermined 
seed securi ty, as defined by all of these criteria. 
The failure o f cassava affected not only the food supply. There is a shortage both at individual farms and 
generally in the cornmunity, and when there is Jack of food, people cannot save en ough seed. Seed 
security accompanied the food insecurity. 
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In Memba there were many farmers who had not saved enough seeds or, in the case of cassava, lacked 
disease-free cuttings. There were no other farmers to go to for seeds and they could not buy sufftcient 
quantities. Thus, there is strong evidence that in thi s situation externa! assistance was needed. 
The slow-onset slow-recovery nature of the crisis 
A plant disease that does not kili its host and is transmitted through vegetative planting materials would 
tend to increase from year to year, eventually resulting in total infection of susceptible varieties. Tf the 
disease causes serious yield loss and resistant varieties are not available, a crisis situation will gradually 
develop. lt may take time, maybe years, until farmers and authorities see the danger. This kind of 
situation could al so occur in other vegetatively propagated subsistence crops such as potatoes, bananas, 
sweet potatoes, and yams. We are therefore díscussing not only a specific incident of cassava on the 
coast of East A frica, but a general problem that could affect subsistence farmers in many parts of the 
world. 
The case of a disease in cassava also shows the difficulties and long-term nature of recovery. The 
problems include the search for resistant altematives and the practica! task of multiplication and 
distribution of disease-free planting materials. That cannot be done in a one-season operation. Recovery 
takes time, and severa! years must be allowed for the restoration of affected cropping systems. Relief 
operatíons wíth short-term budgets are therefore inadequate as a response to such crises. 
Vulnerability and lack of alternatives 
Agricultura! history provides many cases of catastrophic outbreaks of plant diseases. From history we 
know ofthe late blight in potatoes in Ireland in the 1840s and the demise ofthe Gros Michel banana in 
the 1960s. In most cases, the outbreak has been preceded by genetic uniformity. Vegetatively 
propagated species are particularly vulnerable because the growing of one or a few favored varieties 
results in an extreme degree of uniformity. In the case of bananas, the industry has continued with the 
same degree of uniformity, based on a single new clone (Cavendish). 
There are other examples of cassava diseases in Africa, cassava mosaic virus (CMV) being the most 
striking. The situation of CMV in Uganda is very similar to the one we find in Memba: widespread 
cultivation of a few popular but very susceptible varieties of cassava was identified as one exp lanation 
for the sudden upsurge of the disease in Uganda (Thresh et al. , 1994). The pandemic had its greatest 
impact in areas with limited genetic diversity, where the main varieties were vulnerable to infection. In 
contrast, areas of high diversity experienced a marked shift in the relative importance of different 
varieties (Otim-Nape and Thresh, 1998). 
As in these examples, in Memba the cassava disease could spread unhindered in areas with on ly or 
mostly susceptible plants in the fi elds. According to farmers' experiences, a switch from growing 
severa! varieties to only one variety took place at many fanns in the years preced ing the disaster. Most 
likely this happened because the virus was a lready there making new, "clean," introductions appear 
more vigorous than the old varieties. This points to a need to organize the supply and maintenance of 
virus-free planting materials. 
Examples from other parts ofthe world show that low cost in vitro propagation of cassava is possible. In 
northem Cauca, Colombia, an NGO (FIDAR) together with CIA T have carried through a collaborative 
plan, involving the establishment of a tissue-culture laboratory and training of farn1ers. By using 
low-cost altematives, the tissue-culture laboratory was set up for 20 times less than the cost of a 
conventional laboratory (Restrepo et al. , 2000). In order to speed up the propagation of disease-tolerant 
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cassava varieties, this example may also be relevant for development actors working with the problems 
of CBSD in Nampula. 
The soils of the most severely affected areas of coastal Mozambíque are un favorable for typical seed 
crops and make it hard for farmers to mitigate the problem by switching to other species. This added to 
their vulnerability befare the crisis and made a quick recovery after the crisis vcry difficult. 
Lack of knowledge about the virus 
Cassava brown streak disease has been litt le studied and only superfic ially describcd in the avai lable 
li terature. The disease is spread through infccted planting materials, but there must also be a mechanism 
whereby plants grown from e lean cuttings become infected in the field. A booklet about cassava diseases 
issued by liT A (Msikita et a l. , 2000) says that the virus is "believed to be spread from plant to plant by 
insects." But the lack of exact knowledge how the disease is spread, the la e k of systematic screening of 
germpl asm for disease tolerance, and the nonexistence ofbreeding programs with a focus on the disease 
was a poor starting point for agencies that too k up this challenge when the problem first beca me known. 
This situation is repeated every time a disease or pest appears for the first time in an area. Preparedness in 
the form of capacity to quíckly start research on new diseases or pests and to integrate the search for 
resistance in plant breeding programs is needed but generally inadequate or nonexistent for many 
importan! subsistence crops in tropical countries. 
In such situations, local authorities and development agencies need to link with profcssional experts for 
coll aboration. The experts are needed for technical support and they, in tum, need the local projects for 
surveys and testing of materia ls. 
In this case, SC/USA has established links to the national research center in Mozambique (IN lA), to the 
regional network (SARRNET), and the lntem ational lnstitute of Tropical Agriculture (liT A). In 
addition, they ha ve networked with organizatíons and projects that work w ith cassava in other affected 
coastal areas in East Aft·ica. Having to develop solutions in that way, however, explains why the 
recovery has been slow and must be accepted as a long-term undertaking. 
The shortcomings of local knowledge and traditional coping rnechanisms 
Seed crops that are managed through on-farm seed selection may maintain so me degree of resistance to 
old diseases and quickly build up resistance to new diseases. In cassava, however, each variety is a clone 
and not amenable to such selection. On the contrary, farmers' local management tends to erode the 
existing base for selection when serious diseases start appearing in their varieties. 
In the Memba case, reliance on one crop andfew varieties madefarmers vulnerable to CBSD. The.fact 
that the stap/e was a vegeta ti ve/y propagated crop with poorly developed informal systems (integration 
in markets, etc.) made the .system even more vulnerable. In this case, solutions require access to new 
germplasm, a capacity for testing and multiplication--or the technology to generate and maintain 
disease-free planting materials. Al! of this is outside the reac h and beyond the capacity oflocal farming 
communities. 
Avoiding d ependency and encouraging self-reliance 
As a matter of policy, both the government and SCIUSA have self-reliance as a main objective and 
therefore want to avoid free handouts. In the case of the government, this means no food distribution, 
and seed distribution on credit. For SC/USA, it means collaboration with farmer groups in multiplying 
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and making tolerant cassava varieties available in affected areas. Since the implementers ha ve identified 
only varieties of cassava that are toleran! to CBSD (not resistan!), some kind ofknowledge transmission 
(of disease and cultural practices to ensure clean planting material) has to go with the material as part 
ofthe distribution process. 
The local people are clearly going through extreme! y hard times but seem to be able to survive by their 
own means. In both the SCIUSA and DDA operations, the fanners' own capacities and preferences have 
been addressed toa limited degree. For example, the di stribution of the nikv.·aha variety was not based 
on farmers' preferences, but because ofits disease tolcrance and availability; it is still an open question 
whether the fanners in the end wi 11 adopt this new sweet variety. Fanners' preferences are more complex 
than just disease tolerance; other sociocultural factors, such as taste, cooking qualities, and protcction 
from theft, are important. Thus, there is no guarantee that fanners will adopt the nihvaha variety. 
The govemment gives out seeds on credit and demands repayment in kind in order to establish a seed 
bank for redistributíon in coming years. This requires organization and an infrastructure for 
administrat ion of such a credit scheme, for recovery of seed loans, and for storage and redistribution of 
the seeds. The ODA does not appear to have the capacity and resources to manage all of that. The 
wisdom of combining credit recovery and extension services may also be questioned, and the interest is 
rather high: retum of twice the amount ofborrowed seed after one cropping season. The requirement of 
repayment by weight does not encourage rhe retum of high-quality grain as seed. Thus, "seeds on 
credit " does not seem to be a viable scheme because o.fthe low quantity and (vet)' likely) low quality o.f 
the returned material. 
Traditionally , seed security ís ensured by mechanisms ofredi stribution ofseeds and cuttings within the 
communi ty. Those mechanisms are only marginally commercialized and based on free gifts, in the case 
of cassava, and seeds for work, in the case of seed crops. This mechanism broke down w ith the cassava 
crisis. Post-disaster recovery should ideally restore on-fam1 production and household food securi ty, 
genetic resources, and the seed supply system with the traditional mechanisms of distribution and 
exchange within the communi ty. But it is too early to assess whether the recovery w ill bring back the old 
mechanisms of seed exchange. A local seed trade is emerging and may, over the long term, replace the 
old ways of acquiring seeds for those who do not have enough. 
Operational issues: the question of cooperation and trust 
Because of the nature of this crisis, ad hoc operations cannot sol ve the problem. Only projects with a 
long-term presence and long-tem1 commitment can deal with the difficulties of finding and 
implementing so lutions. A long-term presence is also necessary to bui ld rc lat ions of tn1st in arder to 
mobilize communities for active involvement. The way SCIUSA operatcs in collaboration w ith local 
and regional scientifíc networks seems in thi s caseto be a relevant model. 
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Ahstract 
For more than 30 years, the intemational communi ty has been assisting Ethiopia in recovering from 
recurring disasters. A continua! need for emergency agricultura! assistance as a response 10 droughts, 
conflict, and famine has led many to queslion lhe effecliveness and sustainability of the current 
interventions and to search for altemative approaches. This paper describes the approaches used for 
agricultura! recovery in Ethiopia, including problem diagnosis, design and implementation of 
interventions, and evaluation. Furthermore, lessons from one specific case, based on fieldwork in East 
and West Hararghe, are presented to assess the need for and appropriateness of the approach u sed. The 
study reports results from a review of assessment and evaluation reports, literature reviews, interviews 
with key informants, and questionnaires given to farmers and govemment officials in East and West 
Hararghe. 
The crop production system in East and West Hararghe is very di verse with very limiled use of inputs. 
Fanners' seed security is based on domestic supply and availability of assets to access the market. 
Productivity is inherently low and the droughl of the last two years has reduced supplies of own saved 
seed. Access to seed in the market is limiled due lo lack of cash or olher asse1s. However, even in 
drought, the supply of seeds from the market has been adequate to meet the demands from both farmers 
and the relief seed system. 
In East and West Hararghe, between 75o/o-79% ofthe households surveyed had received seed assislance 
in the previous three years. Direct seed distribution is the standard agricultura! emergency o r recovery 
response to repeated crop failures in Ethiopia. The use of seed aid has been institutionalized wi th the 
formation of a "relief seed system" with clearly deftned ro les and procedures that define how seed needs 
are identified and how seed is distributed. Farmers have a need for assistance in a rder 10 recover from 
very complex, chronic emergencies but the continua( application ofthe standard response has not always 
met this need. lmproved approaches for diagnosing seed needs and taking lessons from past experiences 
are needed, and there is a need to explore new approaches that ensure that local strengths and 
opportunities are employed. A need to look beyond the short-term perspective of relief operations and 
focus resources on long-tenn developmenl is urgent. 
lntroduction 
For more than 30 years, the intemational community has been assisting Ethiopia in recovering from 
recurring disasters. A continua! need for emergency seed assistance as a response to droughts, conflict, 
and famine has led many to question the effectiveness and sustainability ofthe current inte rventions and 
to search for altemative approaches. 
l . Pauta Bramel is a consultan!; Sigrid Nagoda is with Caritas Norway; Jon Magnar Haugen and Leif Torc Trredal are consultants 
for CARE Norway, Dereje Adugna, Taye Dejene, and Tesfaye Bekele are with CARE Ethiopia. 
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The main objective of this case study is twofold . First, it aims to describe the approaches used for seed 
re lief in Ethiopia. This will include issues of diagnosing the problem and designing, implementing, and 
evaluating interventions. Changes in the seed re lief approach over time have also been reviewed. 
Second, lessons from one speci fic case, based on fieldwork in East and West Hararghe, are presented to 
assess the need for and appropriateness of the seed re lief approach used. 
Food security and disasters in Ethiopia 
Ethi opia has a long history of drought and famine (EM-DAT, no date). Droughts that resulted in maja r 
fam ines occurred in the years 1972-74, 1976- 1978 1983-84, 1987, 1989/91, 1993/94 , 1997, and 
1999/2003. In eight ofthe past 15 years, the number a ffected from drought ranged between 5- 14 million 
people. In two of those years, 2000 and 2003, the number ofpeople affected exceeded 1 O mi Ilion. Except 
for 1985/86, 1988, and 1995/96, the need for disaster response has been constant since the 1983/84 
drought. 
Poverty is both a cause and an effect ofthe Ethiopian disasters. In appeals for emergency assistance, the 
various famines that ha ve occurred since 1 996 are all blamed on a combination of a drought emergency 
and poverty. On the other hand, the chronic vulnerabili ty of the Ethiopian rural population is seen as the 
effect of repetitive crop failures that have gradually deprived farrners of their assets. Dercon (2002) 
found that communities affected by the 1983/84 drought had barely recovered to pre-drought levels by 
1994/95. Poor conunun ities have repeatedly had to adopt survival mechanisms that deplete their 
long-term strategies and assets. Droughts have caused the less poor to become poor, and the poor to 
beco me destitute. The lack of productive assets and savings, a long with small plots of land and a weak 
and poorly educated work force means that people are very vulnerable to shocks. 
A World Bank Country Study (World Bank, 1998) suggests that the share ofa household's income spent 
on food is a key indicator ofpoverty. In Ethiopia, this averages 75%. 8oth on-fann production, markets, 
and gifts/loans/wages from friends and relatives contribute to household diets . More than half(53 %) of 
the food consumption is obtained through purchases in local markets. A survey by Dercon (2002) found 
that most households rely on the market for food during certain times of the year, even for crops 
cul tivated on their own land. On average, households reported that they have no homegrown food in 
stock during about 1 O weeks per year. 
Agricultural policies 
Dercon (2002) analyzed the impact of the política! and economic reforms in Ethi opia from a feudal 
system, through a communist-in spired contro lled economy, toa market-based economy (supported by 
the lnternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank). He studied changes from 1989 to 1994/95 in 
households that were affected by the 1984/85 drought. The study concluded that the reforrns had not 
been universally pro-poor. The nearly 50% o f households that had good rains, good land, and access to 
infrastructure contributed to more than 80% of the overal l estimated reduction in the poverty gap. The 
poorest households stayed poor and had a lower growth rate. 
In the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian govemment adopted an initiati ve for agricultura! development ca lled 
"agricultura! development led industrialization." Through nationwide promotion and dissemination of 
agricultura! extension packages, this approach contributed to increased food production. Many fanners 
were able to produce a surplus that could be marketed. However, since markets are underdeveloped, the 
high supply resulted in very low cereal prices, especially for mai ze, sorghum, and wheat. Wholesale 
prices for mai ze in Nekempt plummeted by 75% from August 1999 to July 2002 as the number of plots 
that participated in the extension package program in East W ellega Zone increased from 600 in 1995 to 
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133,017 in 200 1 (Raymakers and Sewaonet, 2002). This has led, in tum, to an inabi lity of farmers to 
repay loans for the extension packages. The loan repayment has forced farmers to sell parts of their 
assets, household items, livestock, or oxen (Raymakers and Sewaonet, 2002). 
Guinand (2002) concluded that "many cash crop and surplus-producing farmers ... say they are better 
off not using the so-called govemment agricultura! ex tension package that is not helping them any 
more." The use offarm inputs has been s ignificantly reduced, and the productivity achievements ofthe 
late 1990s have been reversed (EC/ LFSU and WFP, 2002). Seed sales from the formal sector (including 
the ESE, the Pioneer Company, and farmer-based secondary seed multiplication units) fell from 35,000 
metric tons (Mt) in 200 l to 20,000 Mt in 2002. For 2002, an F AO/WFP assessment concluded that about 
97 % of the seed used was local. 
F ood and seed assistance 
Development economist Amartya Sen 's analysis of the 1972 Ethiopian fam ine led to his Nobel 
prize-winning theory of entitlement (Sen, 1981 ). The entitlement approach switches the focus from a 
problem of food availabili ty, addressed through food di stributions, to one offood entitlement, addressed 
through poverty reduction and market reform. 
Emergency reliefin Ethiopia has not proved able to adopt Sen's new paradigm. The Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Commission (DPPC, 2002a) indicated that, in terms ofrelieffood aid, the food intlow 
to regularly mitigate fam ine has expanded progressively by over 600,000 Mt per year in the period from 
1994 to 1999. Paradoxically, these imports have co incided with an increase in domestic cereal 
production but very low cereal prices to farmers. Programs for food aid are repeated every season 
(Raisin, 200 1 ), and due to constraints of time or other factors, evaluations of the long-tenn impact of 
assistance on food security are rarely undertaken. This hampers the possibi lity offinding a way offthe 
treadmi ll. However, seed assistance has been widely adopted, with the intent of reestablishing 
production, and thereby ensuring food security in the long run. 
The predominant approach for seed assistance, direct seed distribution, is generally based on the 
assumption that most households in a food insecure area are also seed insecure, i.e., that they do not have 
sufficient seed of their own or sufficient capacity to acqu ire seed locally ( Longley et al. , 2002). 
However, repeated provision of seeds in vulnerable areas might disrupt traditional household strategies 
for managing and accessing seed. Seed markets (both formal and informal) may also be disrupted. ln 
effect, local systems and capacities for coping wi th harvest fa ilures may be undermined, which may 
prolong the need for ''emergency" assistance. A pproaches that are employed to diagnose local seed 
stress and guide interventions are often s implistic. Assessments oflocal seed securi ty are seldom carried 
out before interventions are planned or implemented. Differences across households are seldom 
explored, and it is often assumed that all crops are equally affected . Remington et al. (2002) presents a 
framework for assessing seed security and diagnosing seed systems. This framework describes three 
parameters of seed securi ty: avai lability, access, and quali ty. Availability is re lated to seed supply. A 
sufficient quantity of the seed of desirable crops must be found within reasonable proximity to people 
and in time for critica! sowing periods. To benefit fro m available seed, people must have access to it, 
which means they must have adequate resources to secure seed through purchase or barter. And last, 
seed must be of appropriate quality, that is, it must be for desirable varieties and of acceptable standards 
(seed health, physiological characteristics, and varietal integrity). 
Seed di stributions generally contribute to seed avai lability by creating an artificial supply ofseed within 
a limited period oftime. However, questions may be raised at this approach, as seed is hardly ever totally 
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unavailable. Certain areas may provide surplus production, or seed ofaltemative crops may be available. 
For instance, recent food aid imports to Ethiopia have coincided with high cereal production in certain 
areas ofthe country (Guinand, 2002). The problem may be more one ofaccess or quality: seed may not 
be accessed because it is beyond the purchasing powcr of the impoverished, shock-susceptible 
population. A ltematively, farmers may be forced to use seed of inferior qua li ty. However, Remington et 
al. (2002) concluded that, "In summary, the preceden ce for the determination of food unavai labili ty, the 
complexity of diagnosing a lack of seed access, and the challenge of addressing access all contribute to 
the avoidance of the access determination." 
Methodology 
The case study consisted of three main sources of evidence. A review was made of all relevant reports 
that are available publicly on ReliefWeb, reports given during interviews, literature searches carried out 
in the UN Emergency Unit of Ethiopia (UN-EUE) library, and reports from F AO and NGOs. lnterviews 
were conducted in Addis Ababa in September 2002 with 20 key informants representing four 
government agencies (the Ethiopian Agriculture Research Organization [EARO], Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Commission [DPPC], National AgriculnJral Input Agency [NAJA], and Agricultura! 
Input Service Corporation), three of the largest donors (USAID, Government of Norway, and 
EURO -AlD), two UN agencies (UN-EUE and F AO), two disaster-assessment agencies (European 
Commission!Local Food Securi ty Unit [EU-LFSU] and Food Early Warning System-Network 
[FEWS-NET]), fíve NGOs (including the Christian ReliefDevelopment Agency [CRDA], the umbrella 
agency for most of the local NGOs in Ethiopia), one parastatal (Ethiopian Seed Enterprise [ESE], and 
one prívate trader involved in seed procurement (ODA Share Company). The focus of the interviews 
was knowledge of the farming systems in general, the formal and farmers' seed systems, the impact of 
the disaster on agriculture and seed systems, experiences with emergency and recovery responses, and 
experience with seed based interventions in emergencies or for development. 
Different types of data were collccted in fíeldwork in nine woredas (di stricts) in the specifíc target area, 
East and West Hararghe, in Aprii-June 2003. Surveys were done with fanners while interviews were 
conducted with grain traders and govemment offí cials. Thc farmer survey involvcd between 30 and 2 16 
households per agroecological zone in each woreda. Nineteen grain traders were interviewed. Woreda 
administrative offícials were interviewed in every woreda except Mieso. One woreda agricultura! 
development offícer (ADO) was interviewed in each of the nine woredas. Officials of peasant 
associations were also interviewed in each ofthe nine woredas, for a total of66 officials in 60 villages. 
Seed aid in Ethiopia 
A review ofrecent seed reliefprojects in Ethiopia reveals that disasters are al! blamed on a combination 
of a drought emergency and chronic vulnerability. Over the years, direct seed distribution has become a 
typical response to these seed stress situations. 
In 1999 an appeal was made for food and seed distributions because of" the poor 1998 meher [main and 
long rain y season] and 1999 belg [short rain y sea son) harvest as well as increasing vulnerability from 
previous years" (UNDP-EUE, 1999). The appeal was justifíed further because "many farmers have 
consumed or lost their grain seeds and have been forced to sell agricultura! tools and oxen to buy grain." 
In 2000, an appeal was made for food and nonfood assistance due to repeated poor rains and the fail ure 
of the 1999 belg and the poor meher (UNDP-EUE, 2000) . Another appeal in 200 1 stated that the 
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objective ofthe project was to "save lives and to support the recovery process by protecting and building 
productive assets." Furthermore, it was stated that "an essential component of the approach will be ... 
the provision of seeds and tools for the upcoming belg cropping season" (UN/OC HA, 200 1 ). A new 
appeal in 2002 requested more than $ 15 mi Ilion for the provision oflocal and improved seed for the belg 
season in response of a fai lure of the previous belg rains and the poor meher (DPPC, 2002b,c). The 
appeal gave the following description of the situation: "Seed stocks are required in many crop-growing 
areas for the coming planting season. Seed ava ilability in 2003 will be critica) dueto the poor production 
perfom1ance in 2002. The seeds ha ve hi ghly shrivcled and are of poor quality for pl anting. Therefore, 
time! y supply is cri tica ) to avoid intlated needs for the remainder of 2003 ." Additional appeals were 
made in March (DPPC, 2003a) and June (OPPC, 2003b) of2003. 
Most appeals reviewed since 1996 relate the farmers' vulnerabilities to the famine in 1983/84. In the 
Govemment of Ethiopia 's appeal for 2003. the disaster was described as the res idua l effect of 
con ecutive years of drought and poverty. The food insecurity is described as chronic in nature w ith the 
exception of particular crisis periods that may produce more acute and transitory food insecurity. The 
appeal concludes that poverty is the underlying cause of chronic food insecurity dueto a lack of assets 
and endowments, low or variable rainfa ll , high population density, and low natural resource 
endowments. This is despite overall good harvests in 1995/96, 1998, and the meher of 2001, and 
increased cereal production in the surplus growing areas of the country from 1996 to 200 l . 
In Ethiopia, repetitive seed aid in the form of direct seed distribution has been institutiona lized to such an 
extent as to see the formation of a relief seed system, which is driven with funds from intemational 
donors and focused on seed procurement and production. Apmt from the funders, thc system is 
composed of organizations or individuals who produce seed ( or grain), institutions that procure seed. 
institutions that distribute the seed, and fin ally the beneficiary househo lds that rece ive the seed as 
assistance. The system is regu lated by the OPPC nationally, and by the Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) regionall y, while the ationa l Seed lndustry Agency (NS IA) monitors 
seed quality and procurement. DPPC and OPPB are govemment agencies. The DPPC has three 
mandates: prevention/mitígation, preparedness, and immediate response. Food aid is classified as 
emergency response, whereas seed a id is considered a mechanism for preparedness or rehabilitation. 
Other national agencies in volved in the relief seed system are the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE), the 
Biodiversity lnstitute, Ministry of Agriculture, Ethiopian Agricultura! Research Organization (EARO), 
and the uni versities. 
The donors include intemational organizations, the European Union (EU), USA ID/OFDA, DFlD fro m 
the UK, and other official Northern agenc ies. Funds are provided directly or through F AÜ. Additional 
fundin g comes from prívate funds to NGOs. Donors may be involved at a number of di fferen t levels, 
funding assessments, serving as members of the assessment teams, or responding as key informants for 
the assessment. The food and non-food assessments are generally done with DPPC as the lead agency, 
while WFP and FAO, UN-EUE, the donors, the NGOs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the DPPB, 
regionallzonallworeda staff, and fam1ers participare as appropriate. Irrespecti ve of the assessment team, 
the assessments are generally based on the same sources ofinformation (see below). The institutions that 
solicit fu nds and procure the seed include the Govemment ofEthiopia, FAO, EU RONAJD, CRDA, and 
intem ational NGOs. The institutions that undertakc the distributions include intemational and local 
NGOs, thc Ministry of Agriculture, DPPB, and development agents in the affected peasant associations. 
Zonal and woreda committees participare in seed needs assessments, and work with affected farmers to 
identify the particular crops/varieties and quantities of seed needed. Often they mayal so participare in 
seed procurement through organizing local tender. In general , the woreda committee works with local 
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development agents or peasant associat ion lcaders or local peasant association committees to identify 
beneficiaries. The woreda committee is usual! y made up of representa ti ves from the local govemment, 
the implementing NGO, Ministry of Agricu lture, and the woreda DPPC. 
Needs assessmenls 
Prior to 1996, the DPPC did needs assessments based on the food ba lance sheet and used thi s as a basis 
for appeals. WFP assisted in the food assessments; FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture d id agricul tura! 
assessments. Thi s resulted in the donors receivi ng two sets ofnumbers or estimates of need, which were 
sometimcs not very similar. In 1995/96 the DPPC made the assessments more transparent. Currently, 
multi-agency emergency needs assessments are led by the DPPC but carried out by over 15 institutions, 
including govemment agencies, foreign donors, UN agencies, and NGOs. EU-LSFU and FEWS-NET 
are also involved in assessments and early warning for food- and non-food needs. 
Assessments are routinely done at least twice ayear, depending on the situation. One assessment is done 
in October/December for meher, followed by another in June/July. Indicators used in the assessments 
are crop production estimates, crop production area, li vestock status, market prices, human health status, 
general tood securi ty, and weather data. The number of affected households is determined together with 
local officials. The Ministry of Agriculture provides market data, and market trends are ana lyzed and 
assessed relative to other years and to quantitative assessments done by others. The col lected data is 
cross-checked against information from farmers, traders, NGOs, donar project staff, and remate sensing 
data from early-waming systems. Prior to 2003 , food assessments were used to justi fy seed needs. In 
2003, seed assessment indicators were identified by the DPPC, thus faci litating a separate assessment of 
seed securi ty. The indicators were the status of belg rains and the effect on seed stock, on the 
plantlreplant cycle, grain price, and the quality of grain in the market (DPPC, 2003b ). 
Local assessments are used as inputs into the larger scale food or non-food assessment (WFP/DPPC and 
FAO/Ministry of Agriculture). Local condi tions and needs are assessed by local government officials, 
such as the development agents or Ministry of Agriculture extension staff. These assessments collect 
data on the number of specifically affected comrnuni ties, number of affected households, and the 
specific needs for food, seed, or other non-food needs. They are surnmarized at the woreda leve! by the 
woreda officials, reported to the zonal DPPB, and finally reported to the DPPC in Addis Ababa. This 
local assessment also guides the Govemment of Ethiopia and local NGOs in implementing direct seed 
distribution. The Ministry of Agriculture extension staff, the development agents and the local NGO 
staff work with the affected communities to identi fy the exact quantities and types of seed needed. The 
cxact number of beneficiaries to be targeted in the communities is also determined with the local 
offici als. 
In addition, to these assessments, VN-EUE carries out descriptive annual regional assessments and 
special assessments throughout the year to provide a situation report that is initiated wi th the DPPC at the 
federal leve! but irnplernented with DPPB at the local level, along with NGOs and fanners. The 
assessments are cross-checked with the local government and others for validi ty. The indicators of stress 
include weather conditions, livestock conditions, grain/livestock prices, and human health status. The 
agricultura] situation is assessed along with the fanner' s seed status frorn farrner interviews. The 
assessrnent do es not consider the cause ofthe lack of seed- whether it is from lack of availability or lack 
of access. Seed requirements are formulated from a local request for an agriculturallseed response and 
local confirrnation with different farmers, NGOs and government representatives. They alert the UN 
country team to the seed shortage. [f it is a very local cris is, the local NGO wil l respond, but if it is of 
greater magnitude, FAO wi ll get involved and fo llow up with an addi tional assessment. 
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Seed procurement 
The seed is procured at the intemational, national , regional, or local leve!. The procurement process is 
usua lly by tender, which specifies the exact quantity of seed required for each crop/variety, the 
requirement for packaging and labeling, quality standards, and delivery s i te. Certified seed of improved 
varieties is supplied from the formal sector (ESE, priva te sector, research stations, and university farms ). 
In addition, there are producers and traders who are certified to produce and del iver seed of local 
varieties. Uncertified seed and gra in, generally from the in forma l system, is also supplied, either from 
central and regional markets or through local traders, seed grower cooperatives, and local farmers. 
Over the years, emergency seed from central sources, inc luding improved varieties, has been met with 
many complaints from farmers about late del ivery and the appropriateness of distributed seed. This has 
led to the development of a local procurement process, where F AO and various NGOs procure seed by 
tender to local traders, who generally purchase local seed from smaller traders or farmers and bulk the 
seed lots. They also purchase seed from local seed grower cooperatives. The Ministry of Agriculture as-
sesses the physical quality ofthe seed ( cleanliness, puri ty, degree of impurities, broken or di sea sed seed) 
but not germination percentage. Local procurement is usually done by local tender under the supervision 
of a local procurement committee made up of staff from the zonal!woreda DPPB and Ministry of Agri-
cul ture, woreda counc il members, and the local NGO. The tender is usua ll y given to one trader. 
The provis ion of seed from the formal sector is limited because of an underdeve\oped national seed 
industry. This includes federal and regional agricul tura! research establishments, universities, the NS IA, 
the ESE, and a few priva te companies (Gemeda et al., 2001 ). ESE domina tes the production, processing, 
and di stribution of seed of released varieties, selling its seed to commercial farmers and other interested 
organizations, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and NGOs. Each year, ESE sends a letter of 
availabili ty toNGOs. During 1995- 1998, ESE distributed about 15% of its seed to state farms , 55% to 
extension management training plots, and 30% to others (Gemeda et al., 200 1 ). It decides what varieties 
to produce over a two-year cyc le based on the supply ofbreeder seed, avail abi1ity of contract farms, and 
demand for the varieties. ln 1998, 67.5% of its distribution was wheat, 3 1% was maize, l% was bar ley, 
and 0.5% other crops. Woreda Ministry of Agriculture staff sell the seed that is given to them in retail 
packs. All the seed is packaged and sold in small amounts sufficient for one-fourth to one-halfhectare. 
The seed rate is predetermined based on an average for the crop across the country. The price for seed is 
set based on production cost, overhead, and a small margin to recover costs . 
These days, traders involved in seed relief, such as the ODA Share Company (which has participated in 
this type of seed trade for more than 1 O years ), purchase and deliver from the same area (personal 
interview with Belissa Gobosho, Genera l Office Manager, ODA Share Company, Addis Ababa, Oct 16, 
2002). lfthe seed is not Iocally avai lable, they will ask to procure from other areas or they will decl ine 
tender. They participate in tenders in Addis since this is where they are licensed and mainly deal with 
seed of haricot beans, barley, tef, chickpeas, niger, and wheat. All these traders are required to have a 
trade license, which can be got from NAIA, which issues an efficiency certificate to deli ver seeds anda 
license/technical certificate to deal with seeds. To get a certificare, the traders must meet specific 
standards, have experience with deli very, and paya fee. 
One additional approach has been used by SCF-UK. In this process, woreda local committees work 
together with woreda offic ials to set up a market place on a speci fi c date. The committee compiles a list 
of crops and varieties and the required amounts, and then selects the desired seed from farrners and local 
traders that meets quality standards. If the required seed is not available, the committee has to loo k at 
altemative crops and varieties. These local seed markets have been arranged in six to eight woredas. 
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In an EU-funded project, there was a major problcm with the EU procurement procedure that requi red a 
single central tender from one vendar for all the required seed. 
The "relief seed system" has a large number of participants and is better developed and util ized than the 
forma l seed sector, although the seed produced by the fonnal sector is used ex tensively by this system. 
The main feedback loop is berween those who procure seed and those who deliver seed . There is little 
feedback between the recipients ofthe seed (who are the affected households) and these seed producers. 
The development of this system has been driven by the constant need to provide secd in emergencies, 
and many feel that it has had a negative impact on the development ofthe formal seed sector to meet the 
seed needs of fanners in a more sustained fashion. 
Evaluation of seed assistance 
We reviewed five final reports and evaluations of past interventions to study how the seed problem was 
diagnosed, which actions were taken to a llcviate the problem, the evaluation criteria used to judge the 
impact ofthe intervention, the technical and ocia! adequacy ofthe intervention, cost effectiveness, and 
finall y, the impact over the longer tenn in relation to meeting project goals. The reports reviewed dealt 
with seed distributions by CRDA in 1994, CRS-Ethiopia in 1999, SCF-UK in 1999, CARE-Borana in 
200 1, and FAO in 200 1. 
CROA 
Sin ce L 984/85 CRDA has been coordinating the procurement of seeds, tools, and transport for members. 
The L 994 program was its tenth. Reports from 1994 show that 8 1% ofthe recipients receivcd the seed on 
credit, 9% got the seed on time for sowing, 92% thought it was appropriate, but only 11 % used the seed 
for 10% of the ir seed requirement (CRDA, 1995). Problems identified in the implementation included 
the high demand for seed in the target areas, delays in seed delivery, a shortage ofstaffin the member 
NGO and the Ministry of Agriculture, remoteness ofproject areas, and final ly, the poor yield ofpl anted 
crops dueto continued drought, too much rain, di scases, and other pest problem over the season. 
CRS-Etlúopia 
CRS-Ethiopia/HCS implemented seed distribution in 1999 in 12 peasant associat ions in Fedis Woreda 
in East Hararghe (CRS/HCS, 2000). The project was implemented through a local partner, the Hararghe 
Catholic Secretariat (HCS), and the DPPC at the zonal and woreda levels. lmpact was assessed on the 
basis of four criteria: the number of beneficiaries, the amount of seed procured and distributed, area 
planted, and production per area plantcd. The evaluation of the project concl uded that the seed was 
deli vered on time, the project distributed appropriate local seeds of high quality (germination of 95%), 
there was good production by farmers in both distributions, good participation by all partners, and the 
allocated budget was adequate. 
SCF- UK 
SCF-UK implemented seed distribution in seven woredas ofNorth Wollo and in three woredas ofWag 
Himra, along with the zonal departments of agriculture (SCF-UK, 2000). The implementation process, 
which included procurement, distribution, and coordination berween actors, was eva luated with the 
stakeholders and found to be satisfactory even though there were problems with the procurement ofthe 
seeds from ESE in a timely fash ion, and seed was distributed to only 55% ofthe beneficiaries targeted, 
who on ly received 35% ofthe seed required. lmpact was assessed on the basis ofthe fo llowing criteria: 
number of beneficiaries, quantity of seed distributed, area planted, production per area planted, the 
contribution of production to household food security and indebtedness, fam1er satisfaction with the 
timing of distribution and variety, credit repayment. and effectiveness of targeting. In general, the 
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project was well received although sorne of the fanners received the seed late and it was the wrong 
variety of wheat or the wrong crop. The use of improved varieties and credit were also found to be 
problematic for targeting beneficiaries in this intervention. 
CARE-801·ena 
CARE-Borena reported on a seed distribution done for the meher 2001 in the pastoral areas of thc 
Borena Zone of Oromiya Region (CARE-Borena, 2001 ). CARE and the Ministry of Agriculture 
procured local haricot beans and katumani maize from ESE. Woreda committees and peasant 
association Ieaders allocated seeds to beneficiaries. The criteria used to measure impact included the 
number of beneficiaries, quantity of seed distributed, percent of area in the woreda planted w ith 
distributed seed, timely distribution ofseed, crop production and deviation from normal, the gap filled in 
food security with the production, and seed repayment. The haricot beans performed well but the maize 
was planted late and did very poorly, so there was not much of an impact on food securi ty. 
FAO 
F AO implemented seed distribution as part of a larger project to facilitate the resumption ofagricultural 
activities in preparation for the meher cropping season of 2001 among displaced households in Tigray 
and Afar. The tender process was used. The improved seed was del ivered late or the next season, but all 
the local purchase was fully distributed in the meher 200 l cropping season. The criteria used to evaluate 
the project included the number of beneficiaries, quantities of seed distributed, land area cultivated, 
success of loca l purchase to meet variety preference (no data given), use of inputs (stated as "were put to 
good use" but no data), estimated production , and estimated months of food supply. The ratio of cost of 
production versus total value was 1 :3. In this calculation, costs included the cost ofthe seed purchase and 
the cost ofland preparation/planting, while value included both the food and the value ofthe straw. 8oth 
project implementation and impact were judged acceptabl e based on quality of inputs, timeliness, and 
suitabil ity of implementation . 
Summary of review 
In general, in the five projects reviewed, no specific problem diagnosis was used to design the 
intervention, so no a lternative interventions to address the emergency were considered. Thc process of 
implementation focused mainl y on the procurement and delivery of the inputs and was not reviewed. 
The impact of the intervention was considered in each of these cases almost exclusive! y in relation to 
teclmical adequacy. Thus, the diagnoses and evaluations are very focused on the supp ly-side dimension 
of the operations; while the farmers, representing a possible demand for assistance, were not involved. 
One eva luation was made ofthe social adequacy in relation to the targeting (SC-UK) and one evaluation 
addressed the cost-benefit ratio ofthe intervention (F AO). No project evaluated the longer-term impacts 
of the intervention on the households, the communities, the target agricu ltura! system, or the seed 
system. While all these evaluations concluded with a list of constraints and future needs or opportunities, 
it is not clear how all these were addressed in subsequent interventions. 
Farmers' seed systems in Hararghe regions 
The diagnosis of seed insecurity at the household level depends upon a baseline understanding of 
household seed security within the framework of locallivelihood systems. Fieldwork was conducted in 
nine woredas of West and East Hararghe to describe the community and household secd system in 
relation to seed security, identify indicators of household seed security, evaluate houschold experience 
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with seed assistance, and determine thc role of farmer/grain trader sales for local seed security. 
lnterviews were done with indi vidual farmers and farmers or grain traders who sell seed and grain. 
Household characteristics 
The fanncr survey included 1 80 1 respondents who were randomly sampled, using an opportunistic 
sampling scheme, at the village, woreda, and district level. The proportion ofthe respondents that were 
female (3%) or carne from female-headed househo lds (3%) was very small. The survey also sampled 
very few very poor households with small landholdings and very few animals or other livelihood assets. 
The sample mainly included male-headed households with four to eight members, of average wealth 
with modera te landholdings, a small number of animals, and some chal as a cash crop. 
In recent years, there have been indications that farm production has fallen (figure 1 ). Farmers perceive 
that crop production has fa llen dramatically since the fairly average year of2000-bad in 2001 to even 
worse in 2002. ln 2002, more than 60% ofthe lowland and midland households rated the harvest much 
lower than average. 
Cropping p ractices 
The households surveyed listed 15 crops grown overall in their plots. Of these, 1 O were grown in a ll 
three zones. Finger mil let and oats were only grown in the midland and highlands, groundnuts and 
paprika only in the lowlands, and garlic only in the midlands. Maize, sorghum, and chal were grown by 
the highest proportion of the households in all three zones. There were a total of 74 crop combinations 
planted by the surveyed households. The on ly crops that were mono-cropped were finger millets, 
groundnuts, and paprika. A moderate proportion ofthe respondents used fe1tili zer routinely (25% in the 
lowlands, 48% in the midlands, and 43% in the highl ands). Of those who used fertilizer, it was used 
mainly on maize and potatoes. lmproved seed of maize, sorghum, and wheat were used routinely by a 
number ofhouseholds in all zones (23% in the lowlands, 28% in the midlands and 5% in the highlands). 
The seed required was hígher in the lowlands but similar for maize, sorghum, t~(and haricot beans. 
The planting time for maize, sorghum, and haricot beans is March to June (March to May in the 
highlands). Tef is planted from April to July in the lowlands, from March to May in the midlands, and 
only in April in the highlands. Replanting is rarely done. For maize, 92%- 97% of the respondents did 
not replant ifthere was crop loss. Ifreplanting is done, it is mainly done with sorghum and potatoes in the 
lowlands and midlands, and sorghum and maize in the highlands. 
Household seed sources 
In normal years a household wi llutilize the most trusted sources that they can access. Any disruption in 
the normal farming practices can result in reduced availability ofthis preferred source andan increased 
demand for seed from altemative sources. 
While 97% of farmers in Ethiopia stil l use landraces (FAO, 2002), that does not necessari ly mean that 
they use 100% home-saved seed for those landraces, even under norma l conditions. A s ingle household 
can use two or more sources routinely, and different crops or varieties may be accessed from different 
sources . The survey households used seed from their own saved secd, seed obtained from soc ial 
networks (such as neighbors or relatives), seed purchased from the local market, and seed obtained from 
seed assistance given by GOs and the govemment. Figure 2 shows how households in the three 
different zones meet their seed needs. The figure compares data for 2003 and before 2003. 
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Figure l. Household assessm ent of hat·vesl status in 2 000, 2001 , and 2002 
Before 2003 , the majority ofhouseho lds in the lowlands used multiple channels for seed. In the mid lands 
and hi ghlands, the proportion ofhouseholds who uscd own saved seed only was equal to the proport ion 
ofhouseholds using multiple channels. Prior to 2003, about 10%-12% ofhouseholds used only the loca l 
market to access seed in all three zones. In 2003 , after the drought of 2002 , a higher proportion of 
househo lds planned to use the loca l market in all three zones. There was also an increase in the 
proportion ofhouseholds who planned to use only seed from seed assistance, especially in the lowlands 
and midlands. In allthree zones, thc proportion of househo lds who planned to obtain seed frorn rnultiple 
channels declined. The use of only own saved seed declined in the lowlands and midlands but increased 
in the highlands. Thus, the drought of 2002 resulted in households access ing fewer seed channels, 
especially in the lowlands and rn idlands, and reliance on sced frorn outside the home- from the local 
rnarket and seed assistance- increased. 
Table 1 shows thc contribution of di fferent seed sources to household seed needs. Figures are separated 
by crops and zones, and compare data frorn 2003 w ith that frorn before 2003. 
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The main seed channel used to meet household seed needs for maize was own savcd seed both before 
2003 and in 2003; however, the use of this channel dccl ined in 2003, espec ially in the lowlands and 
mid lands. This reduced use of own saved seed was compensated by an increased demand for seed from 
the local market and from seed assistance. The social nctwork only contributed a small proportion ofthe 
total seed needs for maize. 
Own saved sccd contributed 6 1%-76% of the total seed needs for sorghum, but in 2003 this was 
reduced, especially in the lowlands and midlands. For sorghum, the social network contributed more 
than seed assistance, especially in the lowlands and midlands. 
The importancc of own saved seed beforc 2003 was lcss for wheat compared to maize or sorghum, 
especially in the lowlands where households only used this source for 27% of their secd needs. In 2003, 
the contribution of this seed source increased or stayed very s imi lar. Both the local market and seed 
assistance accounted for one-fourth to one-thi rd of total seed needs. In 2003, there was a reduced 
demand for secd from the local market, espec ia lly in the highlands. In the lowlands there was an 
increased use of seed assistance for 2003. 
For te_¡; own saved seed was used for about one-third of the total seed needs befare 2003 in all three 
zones. The local market and seed assistance combined accounted for more of the total seed needs than 
own saved seed. In the lowlands and highl ands, there was a reduced use of own saved seed in 2003, 
while the contribution ofthe local market increased. In thc midlands, houscholds planned to use more of 
their own saved seed and secd from local networks in 2003. 
For haricot bcans, own saved seed and the local market were the main seed sources used before 2003. In 
2003, there was a reduced use of own savcd seed anda large increase in secd needs to be met from the 
local market. There was no change in the use o f seed assistance. 
Generally, the households surveyed met a high proportion oftheir seed needs with thcir own saved seed 
and the market. The impact ofthe drought of2002 increased the proportion ofhouseholds who used only 
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Tahle l. Proportion of Total Household Seed Needs Met from the Four Seed Channels 
for Sorghum, Maize, Wheat, Tef, and Haricot Beans in the Lowlands, 
Midlands, and Highlands, before 2003 and in 2003 
Proportion of Households Meeting Seed Needs from Channel: 
Maize Own saved Social Networks Local market Seed assistance 
Lowland Before 2003 49.4% 10.4% 27.8% 12.4% 
2003 11.5% 11.2% 34.7% 42.6% 
Midland Before 2003 66.2% 8.0% 16.3% 9.4% 
2003 31.5% 11.4% 23.2% 33.9% 
Highland Before 2003 58.8% 4.6% 20.0% 16.6% 
2003 52.9% 7.2% 18.1% 21.9% 
Sorghum 
Lowland Before 2003 61.4% 10.9% 21.5% 6.3% 
2003 27.2% 12.4% 43.7% 16.8% 
Midland Before 2003 76.4% 9.0% 12.8% 1.9% 
2003 41.4% 14.6% 39.6% 4.4% 
Highland Before 2003 71.6% 10.6% 16.3% 1.5% 
2003 60.9% 8.5% 27.9% 2.6% 
Wheat 
Lowland Before 2003 26.8% 7.9% 32.5% 32.9% 
2003 21 .4% 0.0 21.4% 57.1% 
Midland Before 2003 43.8% 4.5% 25.3% 26.5% 
2003 60.0% 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
Highland Before 2003 40.2% 7.1% 24.6% 28.2% 
2003 64.4% 4.1 % 6.6% 25.0% 
Tef 
Lowland Before 2003 28.5% 2.3% 27.7% 41 .5% 
2003 18.8% 2.5% 53.8% 25.0% 
Midland Before 2003 37.1% 11.4% 24.7% 26.7% 
2003 43.8% 25.0% 12.5% 18.8% 
Highland Before 2003 27.3% 9. 1% 27.3% 36.4% 
2003 0.0 0.0 75.0% 25.0% 
Haricot beans 
Lowland Before 2003 36.7% 7.5% 39.9% 15.9% 
2003 12.2% 14.4% 62.2% 11 .1% 
Midland Before 2003 50.1% 10.0% 35.9% 4.0% 
2003 37.1% 6.2% 51.9% 4.8% 
Highland Before 2003 52.7% 1.8% 43.2% 2.3% 
2003 20.0% 6.7% 73.3% 0.0 
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one seed source. The local market met an increased propottion of total seed needs in all three zones. In 
the lowlands, the contribution of seed assistance increased as well. The proportion ofthe total household 
seed needs to be met from own saved seed was reduced for all crops except wheat in all three zones, 
maize and sorghum in the highlands, and tef in the midlands. The household 's response to this reduced 
supply of own saved seed was to increase seed use from the local market for all crops except maize and 
sorghum in the lowlands where there was an increased use of seed assistance. Thus, households in the 
survey responded to the reduced suppl y of own saved seed with greater use of altemative seed sources, 
such as the local market, and they became more dependent on s ingle sources. 
The households were questioned about their experience with seed from outside their domestic supp1y 
over the previous 1 O years. In the mid1ands and high1ands, very few households had never used seed 
from outside. Unlike the Jowlands or midlands, a majority ofhouseholds in the highlands use seed from 
outside every year for all the crops. However, the majority of seed sti11 comes from own saved seed. The 
use of outside sources has increased in the past five years for most crops. 
The abi lity to produce one's own seed is critica! to househo1d seed security, but to benefit from thi s 
retained seed, the househo1d must a1so be ab1e to conserve the seed and use practices that maintain 
varieta1 integrity or qua1ity. Thus, househo1ds were asked about their seed selection and conservation 
practices now and in the past. Signi ficant changes in any of these components cou1d indicate increased 
risk to seed security. The househo1ds in the survey described a number ofmethods used to conserve seed 
but many (more than 80%) used a white tab1et they obtained from the Ministry of Agricu1ture for maize, 
sorghum, tej, bar1ey, wheat, and haricot beans. In all crops there were very few changes in seed se1ection 
procedures and storage systems from 1 O years befo re. In all three zones, maize seed is main1y se1ected in 
the fie1d at harvest or the cobs are selected befare storage. Sorghum is al so selected in the fie1d at harvest 
and panicles are selected befare storage, but in the highlands a higher proportion ofthe households select 
the seed at planting time. Separating seed from grain without any selection process is more common for 
wheat than for maize and sorghum. The majority of barley, tef. and haricot bean seed is se1ected at 
planting time. 
Seed markets 
The market is a major source of smallholder seed. Generally, in the 1ow1ands, households listed 40 
different markets where they found the qua1ity and quantity of seed desired. Tn the midlands, househo1ds 
1isted 35 markets, whi1e in the highlands, households 1isted on1y 15 markets. Thus in the surveyed 
woredas, households u sed a diversity of markets to access seed or p1anting material. Overall, about 70% 
of the households accessed sufficient quantities of seed to purchase. Among those who did not access 
sufficient quantities of desired seed, on1y 5% fe1t that this was due to a prohibitive1y high demand in the 
market. Another 13% felt that quali ty seed of the desired varieties was unavailab1e. About 90% of the 
households in the lowlands and midlands and 80% in the high1ands found the price of seed higher than 
for food grain in the market. 
Overall, in the three agroecologica1 zones, 75%- 85% of househo1ds used credit to purchase seed. The 
main sources of credit were loans from re1atives/neighbors (26%), the government (49%), cooperatives 
(4%), or NGO revolving funds (1 %). Households were also asked about other sources ofincome for seed 
purchase, which was main1y cash from the sale of shoats, calves, or food crops. F or many households, 
access to the seed market depended upon credit from the govemment or relatives/neighbors, with very 
few househo1ds (1ess than 20%) using cash or assets sold for cash. 
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Seed traders 
A survey was also done with 19 maJe grain traders in nine woredas. A trader was characterized as small, 
medium, or large, depending on access to storage facil ities, own transport, marketing facilities (own 
store to sell seed or selling only at weekly markets ), and volume of sales. A majority ofthe small traders 
had regular sales but were unlicensed . A nearly equal number ofthe medium traders had regular licensed 
trades and intermittent unlicensed trades. Surprisingly, the large traders were mainly unlicensed, with 
temporary to intermittent sales. There was no relationship between the characteristics ofthe traders and 
the number or types of markets attended. A trader attended up to four regional and local weekly markets. 
The traders were asked about the crops sold in the previous year (2002) and crops purchased for sell ing 
in 2003. Individual traders sold up to five crops in 2002 and six in 2003. There was no relationship 
between the number of crops sold, the types of crops sold, and the various trader characteristics. There 
was little relationship between the number of crops sold in 2002 and 2003. For example, three traders 
who sold no crops in 2002 had bought two to six crops to sell in 2003. All this demonstrates the very 
informal, dynamic nature of this market. 
Traders either buy the commodity directly from fanners or through local agents in various ways: 42% 
purchased the commodity at the main market, 16% purchased from agents, and 42% traveled by public 
transport and by donkey to farmers to make purchases. Nearly 47% of the traders did not need to 
transport the grain since it was bought near their house. Overall, 42% ofthe traders felt they could access 
as much as they wanted. Grain was so id as seed by 68% of the traders but only 42% of the traders had 
ever purchased grain to sell as seed. Seed was stored separately from grain by 59% of the traders. Seed 
was so id on credit to farmers by 22% of the traders. 
Local purchases accounted for 57%- 100% of grain purchases for 2003, depending on the crop. In 2002, 
a drought year, local purchases accounted for a lower proportion of the grain/seed supp ly of maize, 
wheat, and beans but a higher proportion for sorghum, te[, barley, and chickpeas. In 2003, all the 
local-purchase seed came from direct purchases from farmers for sorghum, beans, and chickpeas. E ven 
for the other corps, a majority of local purchases were directly from fanners. In 2002 and 2003, the 
govemment, other traders, and NGOs met the demand for relief seed assistance through local purchases. 
In 2002, 48% of these traders sold seed to farmers, 24% sold to the govemment, 19% to other traders, 
and 10% to NGOs. Obviously, local purchase ofreliefseed assistance uses the same market that farmers 
use directly, which could contribute to a shortage. However, neither the traders nor the farmers 
perceived these purchases from the reliefseed system as a constraint to access to seed in the local market. 
Apparently, seed supply is sufficient but access to seed from the market may be restricted due to low 
availabi li ty of cash or credit in the households. It is noticeable, however, that local traders were able to 
access the grain of most crops from farmers during years when production was low and seed assistance 
was needed. 
Farmers' experience with seed receivedfrom government 
and NGOs in 2000 to 2003 
Households were asked about their experience wi th seed received from NGOs or the govemment for 
assistance or development in the past three years. Overall, 8% ofthe households had received sorghum, 
23% had received maize, and 1% had received wheat. ln total, only 72 households in the survey received 
more than one crop from a di stribution. In many cases, the govemment distributes seed for the NGO or 
together with NGO staff. No household declared that they had received a distribution from both in the 
same season. Most ofthe di stributions were free, from both the NGOs and the government, although the 
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Figure 3. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the relief seed distrihution for 
respondents who had henefitted 
number of households that received the seed for credit or in-kind repayment has increased slightly, 
especially for seed from the government. 
The survey requested the fanners to judge the technical aspects of relief seed distribution for those who 
had benefitted (figure 3). Nearly all the households received improved varieties of wheat, maize, and 
sorghum. O ver all crops, 70o/o-83% ofthe households that recei ved seed fo r an emergency received it on 
time. Only 45%-52% of the benetíciaries felt that the amount of sorghum and wheat seed they were 
given was adequate. F or all three crops, the beneficiaries felt that the variety was appropriate for the crop 
season and the emergency. Very few beneficiaries thought the variety quality was poor, and for maize 
and wheat, over 60% thought it was excellent. This indicares that benefi ciaries felt that the d istributions 
were technically sound. 
In the lowlands, of the households that received assistance, 42% received seed because they did not ha ve 
seed to plant because ofthe drought, while 58% said they took the seed because they were told to take it 
by the peasant association leaders. In the midlands, on ly 16% of the respondents needed the seed 
because ofthe drought, while 85% said they were told to take the seed by the peasant association leaders. 
In the highlands 50% of the households accepted the seed for each of the two reasons. In the lowlands 
and midlands, 53% ofthe households felt they could have obtained the appropriate seed themselves if 
they had received cash instead of seed for assistance, but in the highlands, only 42% felt th is way. 
The households that had received seed assistance in the previous three years also used seed from their 
family or neighbors and the market. In all three zones, the majority of households used seed obtained 
from the market at the same time they obtained relief seed. Households were al so asked about the source 
of seeds used during the season/year when others received seed assistance. There was no difference in 
the responses across agroecological zones. Overall , 65% ofthe households that did not receive seed aid 
indicated they had still planted, 55% of the households that planted when others used seed assistance 
used their own saved seed, 19% accessed seed from fami ly or neighbors, and 26% obtained the seed 
from the market. 
In the previous three years, 75%- 79% of the households in the survey received seed assistance. The 
households were asked whether they were still growing the varieties they had received from the 
government or NGOs in the last three years. Two maíze varieties (katwnani, a variety reieased in 1974, 
and A Sil , a variety released in 1973 ), a sorghum variety (76Tr#23, released in 1 979), and one haricot 
bean variety (Mexican 142, re leased in 1 973) were still being grown. The households had also adopted a 
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wheat variety, inkoyi, and a tef variety that were farmer varieties from other areas of Ethiopia. The 
proportion of households that still planted the varieties varied across the three zones for all varieties 
except Maize A 51 l . Of those who had received a variety through seed assistance but no Ionger planted 
it, the main reasons given were related to poor performance (whether the variety was improved or local), 
high incidence ofpests, and the Iow storabi lity. 
A ltogether, 18% of the households that received these s ix crops/varieties as seed assistance still 
cultivated them. Another 26% ofthe households al so cultivated these varieties, but these households had 
been introduced to the varieties by other farmers. Thus, it would seem that farmers were more will ing to 
experiment and grow new varieties when they obtained them from other fanners rather than directly 
from the government oran NGO. Whilc this is a good adoption rate, it is not known how many times 
they received these crops/varieties or how many crops/varieties they had tested but not adopted. Thus 
the effectiveness of the use of seed assistance to introduce new varieties is still uncertain from this 
survey. 
Evaluation of past seed interventions by government and local officials 
A survey was done w ith woreda admi nistrative offícials: the agricultura) development officer (ADO) 
and the peasant association leader or the development agcnt in a l! nine woredas were interviewed. Seven 
of the nine woreda administrative officials had been involved in seed relief programs during the 
previous three years. In four woredas, the officials a lso had experience with ferti lizers as patt ofthe seed 
package. Al! the experiences were from the belg seasons in 2000-2002. 
The woreda officials listed three main responsibi lities for their office in seed assistance: ( 1) organizing 
woreda DPPC committees, (2) identifying drought-affected peasant associat ions, and (3) sctting up 
screening committees at the woreda leve! to target beneficiaries. For the three belg distribut ions, the 
problem was described as a drought, w ith the overall project goal to protect the affccted people and to 
provide them with seed. Seed needs assessments were performed in fou r woredas with staff from the 
woreda DPPC, Ministry of Agriculture, and NGOs. The targeting of beneficiaries was described as 
"those households highly affected by the drought with no seed and no purchasing power." When asked if 
the targeting was adequate to reach the most affected, four out of eight officials said no. 
All woreda agricultura! development offtcers had been involved in emergency seed interventions in the 
past, whi le five had also been involvcd in seed/ ferti lizer package distributions. Agricu ltura! 
development officers were involved in seed needs assessments in eight ofthe woredas (Meyu is a new 
office) and this was done w ith the development agents. NGOs were involved in the dístribution, and the 
coordination was good among a l! the agenc ies in four of the seven woredas. According to the 
agricu ltura! development officers, the criteria used to identify beneficiaries were drought impact, seed 
loss, availabi li ty ofassets to buy seed, availabili ty of land, abi li ty to prepare the land, and knowledge of 
how to use the seed properly. In four out nine ofthe woredas, the agricultura! development officers felt 
that the most affected beneficiaries were targeted. Two felt that sorne fam1ers sold orate thc seed given 
to them. Seed was distributed for free in two woredas and for credit in five woredas but no agricultura! 
development officer reported any payback of the credit, apparently dueto either a lack of follow-up by 
the govemment or GOs or crop fai lure for the beneficiaries. 
Ninety-three percent of the peasant association leaders and development agents ha ve been involved in 
seed programs in the past. The main role ofthese officials was to mobilize the peasant association to take 
the seed and/or ferti lizer package. In 24 of thc pcasant associations, a committee was established for 
target ing beneficiaries. Al! peasant association offícials described the problemas Ioss of seed dueto late 
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onset of belg rains and stated the project goal as "giving seed to affected households." Seed assessments 
were done in 37 peasant associations and in 32 of these, the peasant association official was involved in 
the assessment; however, only seven of the 68 peasant association officials knew how the assessments 
were done. Most (95%) identified the cri teria for targeting beneficiaries as, for example, "Those who 
entirely lost bis seed dueto caterpillars," while a few gave criteria like the fo llowing: "Those who could 
afford to pay back the Ministry of Agriculture." There was no reference to loss of crop from the drought. 
Overall , 63% of the peasant association officials knew that special efforts had been made in the past to 
target female-headed households. 
Local purchases had been made with the assistance of the peasant association leader or development 
agent in eight peasant associations. ln three ofthese, the farmers were also involvcd in the selection of 
the seed needed. The seed was distributed for free in 28% of the peasant associations and for credit in 
22%, but only two said the fanners repaid the credit for cash, while no peasant association officia l 
rcported that fanners had repaid the in-kind credit. Some ofthe peasant association officials (38%) were 
involved in the supervision and monitoring of the performance of the crops. When asked to g ive 
suggestions to improve seed interventions in the future, 96% suggested that it would be better to 
distribute varieties directly detennined by the farmers instead of"strange" varieties. 
The survey among local govemment officials indicates that the focus ofthe emergency interventions in 
the previous three years was on direct seed distributions for emergency and development seed 
assistance. The main role for al! these official s was identifying the affected areas and targeting the 
beneficiaries. Officials at the woreda leve! wcre mai nly involved in coordinating the response, assessing 
necds, and targeting beneficiaries. The peasant association leaders, the development agent, and the ADO 
were involved in assessing local needs, listing beneficiaries, and monitoring crop performance. The 
description ofthe disaster and the description ofthe criteria used for targeting beneficiaries di ffered at 
the various government levels. At the very local leve!, there was greater awareness o f thc poor impact of 
the distribution and the poor payback on any credit arrangement. The peasant association officials and 
development agents fe lt the farmers cou ld have taken a greater role in determining the specific 
crop/variety to be distributed. 
Discussion 
lt is clear from the 30-year history offood and non-food assistance given to Ethiopia that the approaches 
used by donors, relief agencies, and government agencies have not mitigated the need for assistance. 
Thi s is evident in the appeals for more than $ 15 million in seed assistance in the year 2003. The case 
study reveals that different opinions persist as to what is the root cause of the Ethiopian emergencies. 
Most Addis-based officials claim that the recent emergencies are the result of a combination of chronic 
poverty and extreme climatic events . Many of the officers at the leve! of the woreda and peasant 
association concluded that the cause was an acute climatic event. Given the history of seed assistance in 
Ethiopia, direct seed distribution is the standard approach to agricultura! relief and rehabilitation. This 
seems to be used as a follow-up to food distribution and, in general in Ethiopia, food needs are used to 
justify seed needs. lndicators used for assessing both food and seed needs are estimates of crop 
production, cropping season indicators, and grain prices in the market. While independent assessments 
ha ve been suggested for food and non-food needs in Ethiopia, we were only able to identify one example 
where the two had been addressed separately: the DPPC assessment of 2003, where new indicators of 
seed need had been suggested for future use. The records show no examples of emergency responses 
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other than direct seed di stribution, except in 2003, when two new approaches were used: CRS-Ethiopia 
used seed vouchers and fairs and CARE Ethiopia used seed vouchers. 
A number of changes ha ve been made in the implementation of direct seed distributions. Donors, NGOs, 
and the govemment of Ethiopia have responded to farmers' concems with more frequent delivery of 
appropriate local crops/varieties in a timely manner. They have made changes in the procurement 
procedures, such as the timing of request for funds, more efficient tendering processes with certified 
traders, and the use of local purchase to obtain local varieties with less stringent quality assurance. The 
formal sector has expanded and has made changes to better address the need for specific varieties in 
small packs. Local purchase itselfhas been improved to allow greater input from the local communities 
in the decisions on crops and varieties. All ofthis has resulted in the development of a relief seed system 
that relies on local production to provide seed to respond to agricultura! emergencies. Also, noting the 
adoption of new approaches piloted by CRS and CARE, the evidence from Ethiopia shows that 
institutions are able to leam from past lessons. 
Why does the needfor direct seed distributions p ersist in Ethiopia? 
There is a general lack of problem diagnosis to identify local constraints and design an appropriate 
intervention. Generally, the need for a shift from food distributions triggers the need for an agricultura) 
response. While macro-level assessments may trigger this shi ft from food aid to agricultura! recovery, 
no micro-leve) assessments have been done to design the most appropriate local response. In a ll the cases 
reviewed, it is assumed that there is a need for seed, so direct seed distribution is implemented. No one 
assesses seed securi ty, i.e., whether seed is available locally, whether seed can be accessed, whether seed 
is of acceptable quality, or even whether seed is the priority need of the affected households. The 
experiences from Hararghe found that at the same time as farmers received reliefseed, most ofthem also 
used other seed channels, such as the market. This suggests a problem of access rather than availability. 
Apparently, the complexities of diagnosing a lack of access to seed, and the challenge of addressing 
access, contribute to the avoidance of seed stress being identified and addressed as an access problem. 
This has contributed to the poor perfonnance of these programs. 
Farmers have responded to disasters with increased reliance on seed outside the home, mainly from the 
local market and seed assistance. The local commodity market is very informal, with supplies of grain 
and seed procured mainly from local farmers. lt is used as a source of seed for fatmers on a routine basis 
but the demand increases when local crop production is lower. This local market is also used for the 
procurement of local seed for emergency seed distributions. It has probably been strengthened with the 
relief seed purchases but the impact of this does not seem to have enhanced the seed security of 
individual households. 
Generally, the needs assessments are initiated at the local leve! by the Ministry of Agriculture or the 
woreda DPPB, which report the results to the zonal and then the Addis DPPC. They al so notify the local 
NGOs or UN-EUE. This can be reported to Addis ora local proposal can be developed for a response. 
The focus of the assessment is on the number ofbeneficiaries to be targeted and the quantity and type of 
crop/variety needed. Based on this, a project proposal is developed to solicit funds to implement the 
intervention. The project must be approved at different levels, delaying its implementation. As the 
timing for the response is paramount, there is generally no time for considering altemative approaches 
and interventions. 
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Evaluation and rejlection 
In general, no time! y comprehens ive evaluation of the short- and long-term impact of direct seed distri-
bution is done, nor is there any attempt to redesign further interventions. There is a tendency to continue 
to use the standard response with logistical changes made to increase its efficiency. Longer term evalua-
tion of the impact of direct seed distribution on system resil ience or productivity has not been done. 
Most of the informants in Addis had knowledge of the local seed system, but the local seed system and 
its seed securi ty were not cons idered in the design of altemative interventions, especially in relation to 
the issues ofavailabi lity ofseed versus access to seed. All ofthe informants interviewed concluded that 
the seed security constraint in these emergency responses was access to seed dueto a high market price, a 
lack ofhouseho ld assets to gain access, and the stress on social networks. No one believed that the seed 
insecurity was due only to lack o f household seed availabi lity, yet direct seed distribution was 
implemented, a response tailored to address failures in seed supply. 
The need to continually respond to emergency agricultura! recovery has resul ted in fewer resources 
being available for agricu ltura! rehabil itation or development. There werc a number of examples given 
in the key informant interviews with donors and NGOs where agricultura( development programs have 
been reduced or delayed beca use of the need to respond toan emergency. There was no shortage of ideas 
on altem ative rehabilitation or development programs but very few had been fully implemented because 
of the need by donors to shift funds from development programs to an emergency response due to the 
continua! crisis. Many of the NGOs articulated the perception that donors were not interested in longer 
term projects or in the application of alterna ti ve approaches. However, donor interest in alternatives to 
funding direct seed distribution was demonstrated by O FDA in 2003 with the alternative approaches 
implemented by CRS and CARE. 
One other problem is that the continua! need for emergency responses resu lts in a low level of invest-
ment by NGOs and others into good agricultura! technical expertise in Addis and in the local offices. 
Most of the responses invol ving direct seed distribution are logistical and, thus, agricultura( technical 
knowledge is not always appreciated. Altemative agricultura! recovery interventions and development 
will require good technical skills and research options. Even though research stations (EARO) and agri-
cultura! universi ties are involved in many of these emergency interventions as seed producers and sup-
pliers, their research support is not available to use for testing. The survey revealed that 26% of 
respondents had adopted a few varieties that had been developed and released in the early 1970s orear-
lier, which shows that fanners are interested in new approaches in their cropping systems. However, it is 
doubtful whether the continua! emergency response with its short-term goals can meet this need. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Households in Ethiopia have a need for assistance to recover from complex, chronic emergenc ies and to 
increase their agricul tura! producti vity. The continua! app lication of the standard response has not met 
this need. Altemative approaches to agricultura( recovery, rehabilitation, and development need to be 
designed for Ethiopia. Sorne specific options suggested by the case study were as follows: 
• A comprehensive diagnosis of the agricultura! system, notj ust the seed system, needs to be made. 
There is a need to study seed securi ty within the broader context ofl ivelihood and not to study seed 
needs in isolation. One option may be to consider the value of baseline studies, like the farmer 
survey conducted for this case study, to develop a too! to assist in seed security assessmen ts. 
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There is a need to design interventions that are appropriate to address the problem at the 
micro-Ievel. The intervention used needs to address both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
exi sting seed and agricultura) systems, which requires a good understanding of the local 
agricultura! system and good technical knowledge of agriculture. The application of altematives to 
direct seed distribution, such as seed vouchers and fairs or just seed vouchers, needs to be carefully 
evaluated, and used if appropriate. 
• More emphasis should be put on market-based interventions that address the issues of access by 
farmers to seed, such as seed vouchers and fa irs. These should be focused on stimulating the 
development of local seed markets for farmers who already use the local grain market and fínd it 
satisfactory, as evident in our farmer and trader survey. A clearer understanding of thi s local seed 
market needs to be established and used in the design of seed interventions. The whole issue of 
access to this market through credit also needs to be investigated. 
• There needs to be greater investment in research to develop and test new varieties/crops and new 
agronomic practices that are appropriate to resource-poor farmers. This has to be clearly linked to 
local market development and it needs to invo lve farmers in the testing and evaluation. All this 
requires a shift in investment from emergency interventions to development and is very long term, 
compared to direct seed distribution in a s ing le season. Farmers have constraints to production and 
marketing that need to be addressed by research. The articulation of these needs to the research 
community is always very difficult and wil l require a more active role for NGOs and farmer 
organizations in research planning and testing. Farmers clearly need a greater role in designing 
emergency intervention, but future gains in agricultura! productivity depend upon both the 
development of research products and their use by farmers to meet a demand in the market place. 
This will need to be considered for future development interventions. 
• NGOs, the Govemment of Ethi opia, and donors need to carefully consider monitoring and 
evaluation as a very critica) part of project implementation. There is a need for clear criteria and 
procedures for evaluation ofthe process and the impact ofthe intervention. This needs to be done in 
a timely fashion and must be considered at the time ofthe project design. lt must be user focused for 
the benefít ofthe implementing agency, its partners, and others. Jt needs to consider the perspecti ve 
ofthe donor, the implementing agency, local staff and partners, and the beneficiary farmer. lt needs 
to look at both short-tenn indicators and long-term impacts on the agricultura! or market system. 
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Acronyms 
ADO 
CRDA 
DPPC/B/c 
EARO 
EC/LFSU 
ESE 
FAO 
FEWS-NET 
HCS 
NGO 
N AlA 
NSTA 
UNDP 
UN -EUE 
WFP 
Agriculture Development Office 
Christian Relief Development Agency 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission/Bureau/committee 
Ethiopian Agriculture Research Organization 
European Commission!Local Food Security Unit 
Ethiopian Seed Enterprise 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
Food Early Warning System-Network 
Hararghe Catholic Secretariat 
Non-Govemmental Organization 
National Agricultura! Input Agency 
National Seed lndustry Agency 
United Nation Development Program 
Emergency Unit ofEthiopia 
World Food Program 
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Ahstract 
• m 
The liberalization of Malawi 's economy and the remo val of agricultura! and food subsidies ha ve hadan 
adverse impact on agricultura! production costs, productivity, household economy, and food security. 
This situation has been exacerbated by droughts and fl oods, which have altemated in most parts ofthe 
country, sometimes causing acute stress in isolated areas. In response to such crises and long-term 
poverty, the Govemment of Malawi, donors, and NGOs have distributed food aid, followed by 
agricultura! inputs to rebuild agricultura! productivity. 
A study was carried out in central Malawi to assess strategies designed to mitigare the impact of disasters 
or of poverty on seed security among smallho!der farmers. E ven during one ofthe worst disasters, local 
seed systems were shown to be resilient, and farm-saved seed remained the major source. In the absence 
of real assessments, relief seed implementers seemed to jump by default from Direct Seed Distribution 
(DSD) during the acute phase to Community-Based Multiplication Schemes (CBMS) thereafter- as the 
interventions are known and rela tively simple. Farmers' views suggest that relief seed interventions 
have enhanced the number of crops or variet ies at the household leve!, and farmers ha ve preferred NGO 
to govemment seed interventions mainly beca use the latter distributed only small seed packages and d id 
not involve farmers in the choice of crops or varieties. However it is not clear if the relief a id or if the 
agricultura! inputs packages more generally (focused on maize) have managed to lessen the need for 
repeated emergency assistance. Chronic a id itsel f maybe be undermining local system-but this remains 
to be clari fied further. 
Introduction 
Malawi is a small, landlocked Sub-Saharan Afri can country covering about 1 18,000 krn2 with a 
population of about 11 million people. The country's economic base sti ll largely depends on the 
agricultura) sector, which contributes about 35% to the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 
about 80% of the population. The agri cultura) sector is divided into smallholder and estate subsectors. 
Traditionally, the estate sector has mainly focused on the production of export crops, such as tobacco, 
tea, sugar, and coffee, while the smallholder sector has been the main producer of food crops (maize, 
1. M. Alexander R. Phiri is a Lecturer in Agricultura) Economics, Bunda College of Agriculture; Rowland Chirwa is a Bean 
Breeder and SADC-CIAT Regional Network Coordinator; Jon Magnar Haugen is a consultan! for Care-Nof\\-·ay. 
Addressirzg Seed Semrit_y in DisCL~ter Response: Linking Relú'f with Development 
. 1351 
A Revie1c of Seed Securily Stralegies in Malawi 
rice, cassava, sweet potatoes, grain legumes) and lower-value cash crops, such as cotton. This study 
focuses on the smallholder fanners. 
Afterenjoying food self-sufficiency for a long time between the 1970s and early 1990s, Malawi suffered 
a severe dro ught in 1992, leading to a disastrous food shortage. In response to this, the government, 
a long with donor agencies and NGOs, provided food re lief, followed by seed relief. Similar re lief was 
provided in response to the food crisis in 2001 /02, and again in 2002/03. 
Access to appropriate seed is an important precondition for food production. lt is often assumed that 
seed insecuri ty is directly linked to food insecurity. In Malawi, this kind of perception was fi rst proved 
invalid after the 1992 drought disaster. For all interventions in response to the disasters mentioned 
above, the hypotheses were that farmers had run out offood, and that therefore they had consumed their 
seed stocks. However, to the contrary, even in arcas that had been worst hi t by drought, fa nners were 
able to plant their maize crop with the first rains, well before the seed reliefwas delivered in sorne areas, 
where delivery was delayed (Musopole, personal comm unicati on, 2003). Similar resul ts in Sudan were 
rcported by Jones et al. , (2003). Fanners' seed systems continued to meet the crop and variety needs of 
farmers, even fo llowing the 1998 famine in that country. 
Seed securi ty is dependent not onl y on seed being physically avai lable, but also on the abil ity of 
individual households to access the seed. In addition, the seed must be of appropriate quali ty 
(physiological/physical and genetic ). Often, farmers' access to seed of improved varieties is considered 
to be crucial to food security. At the policy leve!, it is argued that farmers' access to improved varieties 
(that is, varieties developed through formal plant breeding) will lead to increased food production and 
improved food securi ty. However, very little attention has been given to whether these correspond toa 
farmer's own preferences . 
This case study was initiated to assess the various strategies that have been implemented during the past 
two to three years in an attempt to mitigatc the negative impacts of natural disasters and deprivation on 
sced securi ty among smallho lder fanners in Malawi . 
Backgrotmd of the project 
This case study feeds into a larger project studying seed systems under stress. lt will contribute to the 
ovcrall aim o f gathering knowledge about how fanners secure seed in ti mes o f stress, and providing 
institutions with infonnation on assisting fanning communities in ways that promete, rather than 
undennine, sced security. 
This report describes the seed systems that fanners in Ma lawi use and how they ha ve functioned under 
the stresses that have occurred during recent years. Jt also evaluates the impact of the seed interventions 
that have been undertaken in response to these stresses and how such interventions have affected 
farmers' seed systems in Malawi, assessing whether these operations were necessary and appropriate. 
Based on institutions' own perceptions regarding fanners' needs and the appropriateness of past 
interventions, the text analyzes the institutions' abili ty to apply lessons from past act ivities to their 
planning and programming process. 
The case study contributed to the project in a number ways. Through meetings and in fonnal exchanges, 
stakeholders have been infonned of and inc luded in the project with the hope that this will influence 
future practices and approaches concerning seed securi ty, to ensure that future interventions support 
and/or increase farmers' resilience. 
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Methodology 
Literature review and stakeholders' meetings 
The project started with a comprehensive literature search on recent "seed and tools" initiatives that ha ve 
been implemented through various organizations. This review was guided by a review outline developed 
by the study team. Checklists were also developed for consultations with key organizations and donors 
and for a selected number of comrnunities where sorne ofthe NGOs are operating. The focus was mainly 
on the most popular seed interventions, through the Starter Pack lnitiative (SPI) and the Targeted Input 
Program (TIP), the Agricultura! Productivity Investment Program (APIP), and NGO initiati ves. Severa! 
NGOs that operate emergency programs, including Care Malawi , Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
through the Catholic Development Commission of Malawi (CADECOM), Save the Children, Plan 
Malawi, Concem Universal, and World Vision Malawi were consulted. Subsequently, a stakeholders' 
meeting was organized to which these key organizations were invited. After the stakeholders' meeting, 
sorne comrnunities where the NGOs operated were selected for a field study with a focus on the impact 
of seed initiatives. 
Field study: Survey and focus-group discussions 
Although severa! NGOs were in volved in the pre-scoping phase of this case study , the field study was 
undertaken in six sites in five districts where five different NGOs were operating seed intervention 
initiatives. These were Concern Universal (Dedza), Action Aid (Salima), Care Malawi (Dowa and 
Lilongwe-Chilaza), CADECOM (Lilongwe-Mitundu), and World Vision Malawi (Mchinji ). All study 
si tes were in central Malawi, in areas within or close to Lilongwe for ease of logistics. AII six si tes had 
also been subject to govemment seed intervention programs, SPls, and TTPs. 
Field work was comprised of focus-group discussions that were conducted us ing checklists, and 
individual interviews that were conducted using structured questionnaires with approximately 40 
questions, which were re latively the same questions as those in the focus-group checklist. The aim of 
using a questionnaire was to quantify the qualitative infonnation collected from the focus groups and 
then to compare the two sets of infonnation. 
Only comrnunities that were involved in NGO-driven seed-related operations were included in this 
study. Most NGOs in Malawi operate within the framework of a traditiona l authority. Hence, thi s was 
the entry point into each of the communities. Within a traditional authority, a cluster of villages was 
selected with the help of one group village headman. Each si te had at least five focus-group discussions 
with over 30 people in attendance in each group. A total of 30 focus groups were conducted. 
The individual interviews were conducted in the same areas. Individual s were selected usmg a 
multi-stage purposive and random sampling technique. From a cluster of villages, four to five villages 
were sampled (generally the same as those used for the focus groups) and households were then 
randomly se\ected. A total of 35 villages were selected for such interviews, with a target of nine 
individual households in each village. However, only 3 1 1 individual household interviews were 
achieved. These were distributed as follows: Dedza (5 1), Dowa (49), Lilongwe-Chilaza (50), 
Li longwe-Mitundu (58), Mchinji (53), and Salima (50). 
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Results 
Population and farming overview 
Social and demograpbic characte ristics 
Interview results revealed more than 40% illiteracy in the households studied. This corresponds with the 
national illi teracy leve! (NSO, 2000). The highest illiteracy rate was reported in Salima, where 52% of 
the household heads had not been to school. Such levels of illiteracy ha ve negative implications for the 
uptake of new teclmologies and the overall understanding of development issues. 
Overall, the main occupation of the majori ty of the household members across study sites was 
agriculture. The highest proportion (63%) ofthose engaged in agricul ture was reported in Salima and the 
lowest (34%) in Mchinji. These results confirm that agriculture is the main occupation ofthe majority of 
people in the rural areas ofMalawi. 
Size of farm landholdings 
More fanners in Mchinji (94%) reported to have large landholdings, more than 1 ha, followed by 
Li longwe Chilaza (66.0%), Salima with 56%, and Dedza (33%). For households with an average size of 
six people (which is a conservative figure for Malawi), such small landholdings cannot produce enough 
to meet the food requi rements for a ll members of the household from one harvest to the next. 
Cropping systems 
The majority of the rural households are smallholder farmers who re ly on a single harvest in a year for 
their livelihoods. These farmers grow various crops such as maize, cassava, rice, sweet potatoes, millet, 
sorghum, white pota toes, groundnuts, beans, and soybeans (table 1 ). lntercropping is widespread. 
Results from this study indicated that such crops as soybeans, white potaroes, and cassava were limited 
to relatively few farmers across the study sites, compared to maize, groundnuts, tobacco, beans, and 
sweet pota toes, which are trad itiona l crops in most of the study si tes . 
Traditionall y the majority ofpeople in Malawi, as in many countries in southern Africa, rely on maize 
for food securi ty. ln all the survey sites, almost all respondents (92%), produced maize mostly for food, 
compared to only 8% who sold part of it to eam some cash income. It has been estimated at the national 
leve! that maize occupies about 70% of the culti vated land within the smallholder subsector in any 
growing season (Phiri et al. , 2003). As a result, food security in Malawi is defined in relation to maize, 
which was confirmed by this study. Although most households had limited landholdings, on average 
0.49 ha of that was planted to maize. The land all ocated to other crops, and their sowing dens ity, is 
difficult to quantify because they are generally intercropped with maize. Generally, their densities are 
much lower than they would be when mono-cropped. 
Cassava, white pota toes, and soybeans ha ve only recently been introduced to the area as a result of crop 
diversification efforts. Cassava, for example, has been promoted for food security in most parts of the 
country following persistent droughts. Nevertheless, interviews with farmcrs revealed that the inclus ion 
of cassava has been slow, partly due to lack of access to cassava pl anti ng materials. 
The farmers in the study si tes reported various constraints. Sorne of the cross-cutting ones, captured 
through the focus-group discussions, were ( 1) declining soil fertil ity, (2) lack of fertilizer, (3) lack of 
markets for agricultura! produce, (4) pests and diseases, and (5) seed-related problems. The last is 
explored further in the fo llowing section. 
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Tahle l. Summary of Demographic and Farm Overview 
Survey Survey 
Characteristic (N=311) Characteristic (N=311) 
Occupation Landholdings 
Agricultura 48% Less than 0.4ha 6% 
Formal employment 1% 0.4ha to 0.7ha 19% 
Petty trade <1% 0.7ha to 0.9ha 15% 
Hired labor (ganyu) <1% More than 0.9ha 59% 
Cropping systems 
Cassava 5% Groundnuts 68% 
(16) (210) 
White potatoes 10% Tobacco 33% 
(32) (104) 
Soybeans 21% Beans 30% 
(66) (93) 
Maize 90% Sweet potatoes 29% 
(281) (91) 
Seed stress in Malawian cropping systems 
Farmers ' perceptions of seed-related problems 
Within the survey and focus-group discussions, fanners described their seed-related problems for 
different crops in varied ways. In general these included the following: 
• lack of cash to bu y seed 
• lack of markets that sell seed 
• inability to store seed because of hunger 
• inadequate seed or no seed at all 
• poor germination of relief seed 
• seed eroded by tloods 
• delays in sourcing seed 
• low harvest leading to seed insecurity 
• poorly timed distribution of relief seed 
• use of poor seed 
• cost of seed 
The most frequently mentioned seed-related problems were lack of cash to buy seed and poor 
gennination. Fanners in the foc us groups mentioned poor gem1ination of fann-saved seed, mainly of 
maize, beans, and groundnuts. This contrasts with findings from studies carried out in the Great Lakes 
Region, where fanners had no major concems with gennination offann-saved bean seed (Sperling et al., 
1995). The question is whether poor gennination offann-saved seed is caused by poor genetic quality or 
poor physiological quality. However, there is reason to believe that poor storage facilities, combined 
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with possible weevil damage ovcr the long period that seed must be stored because crops are only 
cu ltivated in one season, contributes to the inferior qual ity. 
The problem of poor seed quality was not only related to farm-saved sccd. In Lilongwe Chilaza and 
many other study sites, farmers received hybrid maize seed for the winter season (when farmers grow 
crops under residual moisture or irrigation). This was part ofthe govemment's Targeted Input Program 
(TIP), aimed at farmers in certai n localíties who had lost their rainy season crop in floods. Fanners 
complaíned that the hybrid maize seed th ey received failed to set cobs, and they did not harvest anything. 
They claimed that the hybrid was not adapted to the winter growing conditions. 
Description of stress: Acute and chronic 
Seed stress can be categorized as two types: acute or chronic. According to Sperling (2003), acute seed 
insecurity is brought on by distinct, short-duration events that afien affect a broad range of the 
population. People can be short of seed beca use of a failure to planta single season, loss of a harvest, or 
loss of seed stocks in storage. On the other hand, chronic seed insecurity is generally associated with 
poverty or resource deprivation. People who are marginalized may have problems saving seed or 
accessing seed through purchase or barter. Such seed insecurity is independent of an acute stress or 
disaster, although it may be exacerbated by it. These two types of stress can both be rccognizcd in 
Malawi: 
• Droughts and floods that have altemated in various regions ofthe country have temporarily caused 
Jow supplies of seed. 
• Poverty, coupled with high seed prices resulting from removal of subsidies on agricultura! inputs, 
has negatively affected access to seed on a continua! basis. 
Disasters like droughts and tloods usually occur in isolated pockets, causing acute food and seed stress 
in a localized area. However, in recent years, floods and drought have been frequent and, at times, have 
covered wide geographical areas, resulting in prolonged food and seed stress and the loss of people's 
resources. In such circumstances, the problem changes from acute to chronic food and seed stress. The 
chronic nature of this stress is illustrated by the fact that most households are not self-sufficient in maize 
from onc harvest to the next. Usually, during the last three months befare the harvest (February-April), 
the majority (approximately 75%) of the househo lds are without their own maize supplies (Levy, 2003). 
Sorne of them are forced to buy from the market at relatively high prices, or exchange labor for food, but 
many cope with inadequate food supplies. E ven those who buy or work for food most likely do not get 
supplies adequate to meet FAO daily intake standards. In the past few years, such disasters and stresses 
to the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in Malawi have resulted in more than 60% of all rural 
households being food insecure every year (Levy, 2003) . Dueto high levels ofpoverty, the majority of 
them are unable to compensate through the market, \eaving many food and seed insecure. 
Seed systems and seed security 
Almekinders and Louwaars ( 1999) categorize seed systems as formal and farmer. In the formal seed 
system, specialized breeders, seed producers, certifiers, and marketing agents supply seed through an 
organized chain. On the other hand, farmer seed systems are defined as systems in which seed selection, 
production, and exchange are integrated into crop production and the socioeconomic processes of 
farming communities. 
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In the past few years, various authors have mentioned the value of seed in the fanning system. Out of all 
the inputs used in agriculture, Morris ( 1998) identified seed to be one that is most limiting to crop 
productivity. Tripp (2000) said that under normal circumstances, most farmers are able to save or use 
seed from a previous harvest. He identified four situations where there is an incentive or need to access 
seed from other sources. These are emergencies, poverty, need for quality seed, and need for new 
varieties. Each of these situations leads to different types of seed demands, which can be satisfied by 
different responses. 
The concept of seed security depends on three principie elements: availability, access, and quality 
(Sperling, 2003). Availabi/ity is related to seed supply: a sufficient quantity of seed of desirable crops 
must be found within reasonable proximity to people and in time for critica! sowing periods. To benefit 
from available seed, people must have access to it, which means they must have adequate resources to 
secure the seed through purchase or barter, or indeed, domestic storage. Last, seed must be of 
appropriate quality, that is, it must be of desirable varieties and of acceptable standards (health, 
physiological characteristics, and varietal integrity). 
The following text summarizes informatíon on seed systems among Malawian farmers and how they 
secure their seed. The information has been col lected through direct di scussions with participating 
NGOs, extracts from the literature, and fanners ' opinions expressed in the focus groups and individual 
interviews. 
Channels of seed acquisition: Overview 
This study showed that most of the smallholder farmers in Malawi depend largely on the farmer seed 
system for such crops as maize, groundnuts, beans, soybeans, sweet potatoes, and white potatoes. The 
farmer seed system includes such means of seed acquisition as fann-saved from previous production, 
purchases from local markets, exchange of labor for seed, and donations from friends or relatives. Phiri 
et al. (2003) reported similar results in a study on fanners ' use of improved maize seed in the SADC 
region. They found that up to 70% of the smallholders in Malawi stí ll used the farmer seed system for 
maize, where the main seed source was fann-saved, which was recycled each season. The remaining 
30% of the smallholder fanners acquired maize seed through the formal system, which is about 20% 
hybrid and 10% open-pol linated varieties. 
The formal system is limited beca use farmers' income or other resources are not adequate for purchasing 
seed from organízed retail outlets or agro-dealers. The inability offanners to access seed from the formal 
system has been exacerbated by the higher prices resulting from removal of state subsidies on 
agricultura! inputs. Adding to this, most seed dealers in the formal system are located in urban or 
semi-urban areas, making the di stances to the nearest distribution point prohibitively far. Thus, farmers 
tend to recycle their own local maize varieties or grain harvested from a hybrid maize crop. Although 
group discussions with farmers revealed that they doubted the quali ty of recycled maize seed, the farmer 
seed system continues to domínate the acqui sition ofmaize seed among smallho lder fanners in the study 
si tes. The situation for other crops is different in the sense that the formal seed system is less developed 
for such crops. Very limited quantities of certified seed for groundnuts, beans, soybeans, etc. , is made 
available through seed multiplication groups or farmers' associations. The few farmers who access such 
seed usually do so through loan schemes or NGO activities. Otherwise, the majority of farmers rely on 
the farmer seed system for these crops. 
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Channels of seed acquisition: Good versus bad years 
The major source of seed for maize and other crops is farm-saved from previous crops. Other means 
include cash purchases, loans, exchanges of seed for work, relief seed, and gifts from relatives. During 
the last few years, relief seed has beco me one ofthe important means of acquiring seed, particularly after 
the food crisis in 200 1/02. 
Figures 1-4 highlight the trends in seed acquisition in the study area. The focus in these graphs is 
primarily on the differences in trends between a normal year (2000/0 1, representing the general situation 
with chronic seed stress) and a year of disaster (200 1/02, representing acute seed stress). These graphs 
capture two crops: maize (figures 1 and 2) and beans (figures 3 and 4). The pattems shown for beans are 
reasonably representa ti ve of similar crops like soybeans and groundnuts. Since many fam1ers acquired 
seed in a variety of ways, the percentages add to more than 100%. 
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For both maize and beans, farm-saved seed from own production remains the major means of acquiring 
seed for normal seasons (figures 1 and 3) as well as seasons ofseed stress (figures 2 and 4). Although the 
interviews with farmers did not clearly separate purchased seed by source (formal or loca) markets), it is 
only maize seed that could be obtained from both types of markets. Beans and other grain crops are 
almost nonex istent in the formal market and can only be obtained as grain in the local market, planted as 
seed for the next crop. Seed acquired in exchange for labor has also become an important means for the 
needy to obtain seed on a routine bas is. These are people who are prepared to work and prefer to get paid 
in kind (with seed) rather than with cash. There is also some indication that there was an increase in the 
proportion of farmers who acquired maize and bean seed through relief programs during the seed stress 
season. Thi s means that although farmers savcd sorne seed (and also used local channels to acqu ire seed 
off-farm), during disaster years such as 200 1/02, secd rclief interventions might ha ve supplemented or 
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duplicated their own stocks. It should be noted, however, that the area planted to beans is a lot smaller 
than that pla nted to maize and that not al! study sites were in bean-growing areas, which explains the 
differences in proportions of farmers accessing maize and bean seed. 
Seed security iu Malawi 
In terms of seed security in Malawi, the survey information is far from clear-cut. lt was evident in the 
study that for aJI the crops that were reported during the period 1999 to 2003, the main source of seed 
was farm-saved. Even during 2001 /02 , a food crisis year, farm-saved seed was reported to be the main 
type of seed that fatmers grew. Thus, even under the worst conditions, many farmers were able to save 
sorne seed from their majar crops. However, farmers routinely ha ve to go outside their own home stocks, 
their own farm-saved seed, to get enough to plant. In sorne cases, such as with beans, they are used to 
accessing seed off-fann through purchases in local markets and by working for seed. Obviously, seeds 
ha ve always been local ly available, but whether they are accessible to al! farmers and whether they are of 
appropriate quality remains in question . 
Seed-related interventions 
It ís often assumed that seed insecuri ty is directly linked to food insecurity. Because ofthe importance of 
maize to food security in Malawi, seed interventions have tended to focus on maíze. However, in an 
attempt to diversi fy cropping systems, recent interventions (mainly SPI and TIP) ha ve included other 
crops, such cassava and sweet potatoes for drought tolerance and legumes or pulses for enhancing soil 
ferti lity, protein supply, and cash income. By trying to diversify cropping systems, these interventions 
are different from the routine direct seed distributions that aim only to restare the pre-disaster cropping 
system. 
The following section di scusses policies and interventions that have been enacted or undertaken to 
improve fanners' seed security. They include general agricultura! policies to strengthen access to seed, 
seed distribution for development purposes, and seed as emergency assistance. The premise of these 
programs is that access to appropriate seed, which for most program managers means seed of improved 
varieties, is the key to restoring or enhancing agricultura! productivity. 
General agricultural policies 
Although the single most common means of seed acqulSlttOn is fann-saved for most food and 
dual-purpose (food/cash) crops, farrners do supplement or replenish their seed stocks through other 
sources. Two contrast ing eras of central agricultura! poli cies have, in different ways, influenced 
farmers' seed systems and the means that farmers have used to restock or replenish their seed stocks. Up 
to the early 1990s, there were subsidies on agricultura! inputs and products administered by the 
Agricultura! Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). Among the agricultura! inputs, 
ADMARC used to stock subsidized certified seed of officially recommended varieties for maize 
(hybrids and open-pollinated varieties), groundnuts, beans, and severa! other crops that the govemment 
promoted at that particular time. Seed ofspecific crops was made available in ADMARC markets, which 
were located in the rural areas where such crops or varieties were adapted. 
As a parastatal organízation, ADMARC enjoyed a monopoly in marketing smallholder agricultura! 
inputs and products. Through íts Smallholder Agricultura! Credit Administration (SACA), the 
organization offered credit and inputs at subsidized prices. This prov ided an avenue for most farmers 
who needed to restock or add on new seed to their own stocks, thus helping them to overcome problems 
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with access to seed or seed quali ty (for the new varieties). But this type of support to the smallholder 
farmers was considered to be financially unsustainable. As a condition of strucrural adjustment 
programs, ADMARC was restructured to improve efficiency in the marketing ofsmallho lder inputs and 
produce (Ng'ong'ola et al. , 2003). In the mid-l990s, subs idies on agricu ltura! inputs were removed and 
from then onwards, the market for agricultura! inputs and products was liberalized. 
With the removal of input subsidies, lack of access to credit (following the coll apse of SACA), and 
reduced income (following liberalization), farmers lost their access to certified seed o f improved maize 
hybrids, old and new. Seed of open-pol linated maize varieties and other crops was no longer avai lable, 
because after liberalization, the private sector was only interested in hybrid maize seed, on which they 
could make profits. However, many fanners could hardly afford the seed of improved maize hybrids at 
market value. Smale and Phiri ( 1998) reported di sconti nuities in the use of improved maize hybrid seed 
by the majority ofsmallholder farmers in Malawi. Obviously, ADMARC had stimulated the demand for 
improved seeds. The question remains whether the demand for cert ifi ed seed of improved hybrids 
indicares that farmers appreciate such seed, or whether it followed from certain biases (especially 
subsidies) towards improved seed in the ADMARC system. 
owadays, farmers m ay find it difficult to replenish or restock seeds of new or improved varieties if such 
seeds have been lost, which may cause hardships in disaster situations. Different government and NGO 
seed ini tiatives have assisted communities in overcoming seed stresses, but there are variations in 
approaches, and their impact on local seed systems may differ. 
Seed as a spur to development: APIP and SPI/TIP 
The market liberalization, combined with other factors, has led to reduced productivity and food security 
at both the household and nationallevel. In this context, both government and donors have accepted the 
urgent need to scale up safety-net programs as well as to find appropriate strategies to promote 
smallholder productivity. 
In recent years, the govemment has enacted two majar initiatives to respond to seed insecurity among 
smallholder farmers. The Starter Pack Tnitiative (SPI), which has been modi fied to the Targeted Input 
Programme (TIP), and the Agricultura! Productivity lnvestment Programme (APTP). 8oth of these are 
based on govemment perceptions of food insecuri ty among smallholder farmers. As many 
resource-poor farmers run out of maize befare the onset of the rains, there is a w idely he ld notion that 
they are not able to save seed for the next crop. Through ensuring access to qua lity seed, the 
interventi ons have been aimed at enhancing crop productivity and thereby helping to overcome food 
insecuri ty and all eviate poverty at both the household and nationallevel. 
Justification 
APIP is a countrywide loan scheme designed to help smallholder farmers obtain agricultura! inputs; it is 
not a free input-distribution initiative. The project, implemented with fi nancia! and technical assistance 
from the European Union, gives "resource-poor" smallholder farmers interest-free loans on agricultura! 
inputs. In tended to strengthen access to improved technologies, such as improved seed (Phiri, 2000), the 
loans are given free of interest to overcome the barriers that risk aversion put on investment decisions 
among resource-poor farmers. A lthough the main target group for APIP is the resource-poor farmer with 
Iess than 0.5 hectares ofl and, the target group has expanded to include farmers with up to one hectare of 
land. The credit package provides not only maize seed, but it al so includes soybeans, groundnuts, cotton, 
and other legumes to promote diversification ofthe crop base and improve soil fertil ity. 
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SPVTIP on the other hand, was established after an assessment in 1998 (Biackie et al. , 1998) that 
revealed that fanners had poor access to improved technologies such as seed of improved varieties, 
leading to declining productivity. The main assumption was that the majority of smallholder fanners 
were unable to access seed of"improved varieties" because they were cash constrained, but it was also 
widely believed that fanners were not aware of the benefits of using seed of improved varieties. It was 
believed that through the use of seed of improved varieties and proper application of fertilizer, 
agricultura) productivity would improve and so would food security. In the section that follows, we 
discuss this in more detail, considering the design, implementation, and lessons leamed from SPIJTIP. 
Design and implementation 
SPI started in the 1998/99 cropping season with a universal free seed distribution to all smallholder farm 
families throughout the country, where 2.86 mi Ilion packs containing 2 kg of improved maize seed, 1 kg 
oflegume seed, and 15 kg offertilizer (1 O kg ofbasal and 5 kg oftop-dressing), sufficient for 0. 1 ha were 
distributed. This blanket SPJ was repeated in the 1999/2000 cropping season. The intention was that 
after production had been "jump-started," fanners would ultimately be weaned off distributions. 
However, from 2000/01, the program was modified and became a Targeted Input Program, through 
which only a targeted number ofhouseholds received free inputs (enough for 0. 1 ha). Initially, the target 
was 50% (about 1.5 million households) ofthe total number of smallholder households in the country, 
and during this season, the fertilizer was reduced to 1 O kg instead of 15 kg. The number ofbeneficiaries 
was gradually reduccd in subsequent TJPs, and only about a third of smallholder households werc 
targeted during the 2002/03 cropping season (Levy, 2003). 
Lessons learnt from SPI/TIP 
Evalualion reports for the first two cropping seasons SPI was implemented revealed that maize 
production increased (Levy, 2003). It was estimated that this increased production would be sufficient to 
feed a family for about 1.5 months. However, since inputs were distributed free, there was a danger that 
local markets would be undennined . 
Lessons from TIP were somewhat different. According to Levy and Barahona (200 1 ), the contribution 
ofTIP to household and national maize production in general, was poorer than that ofthe universal SPI. 
Targeting beneficiaries for TlP was generally based on criteria such as poverty, number of orphans in a 
household, and the age ofthe household head. This targeting was not very successful. It turned out that 
the strategy ofrelying on the community to identify the poor, was not appropriate. There were two major 
problems: 
• The reliance on village-level political authorities to be capablc ofand willing to select beneficiaries 
in a fair and transparent manner was not realistic. 
• In addition, the assumption that communities would accept the notion that when resources were 
scarce, the small amount available should be targeted to the poorest, turned out to be in error. 
The evaluations revealed that there was resistance within communities to si ngling out the poorest 
families because differentiation among the poor was culturally unacceptable. Furthennore, the village 
task forces favored themselves. relatives, and friends. These problems in securing proper targeting of 
provisioned seed could have significantly reduced the impact ofthe program. 
Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with DPvelupment 
. 146 1 
M.A.R. Phiri, R. Chim:a, and }. M. Haugen 
Lessons from APIP 
The main lesson from APIP is that maize, grown under sma llholder management conditions, is not a 
high-retum crop capable of repaying the loan (Dr. Elizabeth Sibale, European Union/ APIP, personal 
communication 2004). Although APIP is a subs idízed credit scheme, the majority offarmers have been 
unable to repay the loan solely on the basis ofmaize. Hence, grain legumes were subsequently included 
in the loan package to play a dual role of fetching a higher income to repay the loan as we ll as fixing 
nitrogen in the soil for the subsequent crop. There is general consensus among key players (govemment, 
donors, and NGOs) that dueto low maize y ields under the management conditions of smallholders (and 
the low prices of maize relative to prices of inputs), it is not worth creating an extra burden by 
introducing maize hybrids. Instead, open-pollinated varieties have been preferred to hybrids; they can be 
recycled and farrners do not need to purchase new seed each year. 
Emergency seed initiatives 
On 27 February 2002, the president ofMalawi declared a "State ofDisaster" in relation to food security 
in the country. The donar community, spearheaded by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UK 
Department for Intemational Development (DFID), responded . Through the Department of Disaster 
Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation (DDPRR) and the Ministry of Agriculture and lrrigation 
(MoA!), donors, the UN, and the NGO consortium, the govemment launched the Joint Emergency Food 
A id Programme (JEF AP) as a coordinated humanitarian response to the food crisis. This included 
provision of both food and seed. Seed was di stributed in most of the communities in Malawi to ensure 
that farmers had sorne seed to plant. 
Severa! NGOs played a role in these seed provisions. This study has gone into detail with the operations 
of selected ones, including Action A id, Save the Children (UK), Plan Malawi, World Yision Malawi, 
Care Malawi, Concem Universal, Catholic Relief Services through CADECOM, and the Evangelical 
Lutheran Development Program (ELDP). Severa! of these NGOs had previous experience with 
seed-based activities. They had distributed seed and planting materials of di tferent crops to foster crop 
di versification and thereby strengthen food security and increase cash income. These distributions 
included seed of open-pollinated varieties of maize, self-pollinated legumes (groundnuts, beans, 
soybeans), and the vegetatively propagated crops like white potatoes, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Sorne 
of the NGOs were also involved in promoting community-based seed multiplication groups to ensure 
the availabi lity of good-quality seed at reasonable prices within the communities. 
J ustificution 
Almost all NGOs in this study used the govemment 's call for disaster assistance to justify their 
responses. Nevertheless, they al so did rapid assessment studies of the food, social, and economic 
situation in the areas in which they operated and, thus, quantified the magnitude ofthe disaster. Concern 
Universal observed loss offamily members dueto famine and the u se of erosive coping strategies, such 
as disposal of capital assets at extremely reduced prices, and used these observations as indicators of 
stress. Likewise, Care Malawi used such indicators as levels ofhunger-related diseases and consumption 
of famjne foods like wild tubers and banana roots. Similarly, CRS used observations of fanners' 
premature harvests to feed their fam ilies as an indicator of looming disaster, and therefore called for 
interventions (CRS, 2003). According to Mr. Edson Musopole of ActionAid (personal communication, 
2004), ActionAidjustified their interventions on vulnerabili ty assessment reports from the FAO, WFP, 
and Govemment of Malawi . 
All NGOs assessed seed insecurity, and the need for intervention , on the basis of food insecurity . CRS 
(2003) clearly states this in their proposal document: "Jt is assumed that as a result of unfavorable 
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weather conditions, many households do not only run out offood. but seed or planting materialsfor the 
next crop season as we/l. " 
Diagnosis 
None of the NGOs undertook a specific diagnostic study on the magnitude of the seed problem. 
Sylvester Kalonge, sector coordinator for C-SAFE (personal communication, 2003) explained that this 
was due to the time pressure in responding to disaster situations. Project proposals for food relief, 
intended to save lives, and those for seed relief, for agricultura! recovery, have to be developed almost 
simultaneously because the hunger period coincides with the on-set of the next cropping season. 
Because of this, many NGOs use a food cris is to justify a seed crisis . However, at the implementation 
phase, many NGOs do further analyses of the seed situation through participatory assessments with 
farmers in the areas in which they operate. These analyses have revealed that food insecurity is often 
accompanied by seed insecurity at the household leve! , again leading to food insecuri ty in the long run 
(CRS, 2003). 
For example, Concern Universal had been working in various areas in Dedza and Ntcheu Districts. After 
the 2002 food crisis, Concern Universal responded to the government's call for assistance. Since they 
already had operations in the area, they conducted a quick assessment of the social and economic 
situation. They used such food security indicators as people losing a family member to starvation, 
desperate sales ofl ivestock and other capital items like bicyc les at incredibly low prices (usually at less 
than 30% of the normal value) to determine the seriousness of the food crisis. Based on these findings, 
they targeted the communities that needed food relief support, and with assistance from WFP, 
distributed food in the disaster-affected areas. Following the food distribution, Concern Uni versal 
proposed a small grant targeting one traditional authority, Tambala, in Ntcheu District. The area was 
chosen because ofthe poverty leve! and because no other NGO had activities there. The project aimed to 
provide poor households with relief seed and tools. Through participatory rural appraisals at the 
beginning of project implementation, farn1ers in the communities chose two crops (maize and beans), 
seed banks, and small irrigation equipment. The maize seed was for open-pollinated varieties because it 
is their policy to distribute seed of open-pollinated varieties. This project was one-off, only for one year, 
a typical relief response to crisis . Clearly, the project u sed the food crisis and extreme poverty in the area 
to justify their re lief seed and tools interventíon. 
Design and únplem entation 
Recent relief seed ini tiatives in Malawi have mainly taken three forms. One is direct seed distribution 
(DSD) for quick agricultura! recovery following acute seed stress. Most NGOs have delivered seed 
directly to beneficiaries. CRS-CADECOM tried seed vouchers and fairs (SV &F) beca use, unlike DSD, 
seed fairs promote a decentralized choice of crop seed based on smallholder farmers' preferences in 
terms oftype and amount. lt also promotes diversification since the smallholder farmer has a wide range 
of choices. 
In the case of CRS-CADECOM, the seed vouchers and fairs approach was used to give vulnerable 
households access to seed. Severa! act ivities preceded the actual seed fairs. One important activity was 
to conducta quick survey to establish seed availability in the communities before conducting the fair. 
Thi s was important to make sure that farmers would have seeds to sell. (lt is worth noting that just the 
possibility of holding a seed fair is an indication that seed is locally available.) 
A third type of seed initiative is encouraging communi ty seed multiplication (CSM) schemes, which aim 
at establishin g seed security in the long run. In CSM schemes, farmers who receive seed are general\y 
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required to repay the seed, plus interest, at harvest. The recovered seed is stored and may subsequently 
provide insurance in case of future harvest failures. CSM schemes are o ften ins titutionalized into 
community seed-producer groups, where a group of farmers are trained in producing quality seed. 
All ofthe GO initiatives emphasized community participation in decision making. Farmers, through 
group discussions at the corrununity leve!, were involved in reviewing the causes offood insecuri ty and 
were encouraged to identi f)r possible solutions. Then they suggested possibl e crops and varieties of their 
choice. The communities also participated in choosing the primary beneficiaries . As a result, NGOs 
adapted their approaches to farmers ' preferences and thus tried to ensure that they met the actual needs 
of the vulnerable households. Study findings through focus-group discussions in the communities and 
discussions with NGOs indicated that these initiatives not only served to re tore seed security w ithin the 
community, but also became ways of generating income for members ofthe communities. Although not 
explicitly stated, the choice that the NGOs made between DSD and CSM indicates that they are 
somehow aware ofthe distinctions between chronic and acute seed stress and that the ch.ronic stress can 
only be resolved through building local capacity. 
Concem Universal and CARE Malawi combi ned DSD and CSM. They argued that even though the 
irru11ediate need was to respond to the rehabilitation o fthe seed situation aft:er the crisis, their focus was 
beyond rehabilitation, towards self-reliance in seed supply. The example of Concem Uni versal, 
described above, is a case in point, where they combined the two roles by providing farmers wi th (maize 
and bean) seed to replenish lost stocks soon after the di saster, but also built eed banks, where farmers 
could store their seed, coupled with provision of irrigation equipment to make sure that farmers would 
be able to generate more seed in the future should drought strike again. 
The types ofcrops that NGOs used in their rehabilitation activities (OSO/S V &F) were no di fferent from 
those they used in CSM. For example CADECOM-CRS held SV &F that encouraged the exchange of 
various crops (open-pollinated maize, cassava, pearl millet, sorghum, beans, groundnuts, white 
potatoes, cowpeas, rice, soybeans, and pigeon peas), depending on which crops we.re grown in the area 
(CRS, 2003). Whi le Concem Universal di stributed onl y two crops (maize and beans), CARE Malawi 
had cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, and groundnuts. 
From the project proposals, one gets the sense that for the SV &F, the focus of CADECOM-CRS was 
primarily on the rehabilitation of agricultura( systems in drought-affected areas. By facilitating the 
appearance of a broad spectrum of crops and varieties at the fairs, they gave farmers access to varieties 
they would otherwise have lost. For CARE Malawi and Concem Universal , on the other hand, the aim 
was not only rehabilitation, but also to improve the self-re liance and food ecurity of disaster-affected 
households by introducing new crops and varieties. 8oth organizations promoted the use of improved 
crop varieties. The proposal highlighted the need to offer fanners some high-protein and cash-income 
crops in addition to drought-tolerant crops, so that fa rmers would be better able to cushion subsequent 
drought effects. 
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lmpacts of initiatives: 
Development, versus emergency, versus chronic stress 
Farmers ' perceptions 
In the focus groups and individual interviews, farmers were asked about their perceptions of different 
seed ini tiatives. These discussions focused mainly on DSD and CSM (NGO seed programs) and SPI/TJP 
(govemment seed programs), since SY &F and APIP hada limited reach. 
Communities largely preferred the NGO initiativcs over those from the government. The targeting of 
NGO in itiatives was considered more transparent, seed was provided in a timely manncr, farmers were 
able to choose the crops they received, and thc quality ofthe seed was superior. In add ition, the NGOs 
providcd extension services with their CSM program. Overall, the NGO seed programs were said to be 
more sustainable because the CSM approach provided an exit strategy, in strengthening the local 
capacity to multiply and share seeds. 
Seed intervention ini tiatives in general have had a positi ve impact on croppi ng system by promoting 
diversity in the number of crops as well as varieties grown. Farmers in all six areas in this study were 
unanimous in reporting that the seed interventions expanded the diversity of crops and varieties in their 
communities. Thi s was consistent across the six sites and from both the focus groups and indi vidual 
interviews, with 82% of the households interviewed reporting an increase in diversity. Most of the 
farmers were happy that they now had more crops and varieties than befare. 
However, the new varieties have been introduced at the expense ofsome old ones. Among thc individual 
interviews, 7 1% of the respondents reported that some old local varieties were disappearing. Most 
notable were local maize and groundnut varieties. In all six study sites, the late-maturing local maize 
varieties were being replaced with new early-maturing varieties for food security purposes. Likewise, 
farmers were replacing local groundnut varieties with new ones, like CG7, because new varieties 
performed better than local ones under speciftc production constraints. 
Regarding seed security, 47% ofthe individual fam1ers interviewed reported that the seed initiatives had 
contributed to seed security; hence, farmers were less worried about seed problems. However, thc seed 
initiatives had varied impacts on fam1ers' ways of sourci ng seed. The majori ty (69%) of respondents 
among the interviewees reported that they had changed their ways of sourcing seed beca use of the seed 
initi atives that had been implemented in their areas. For cxampl e, among individual interviewees, 44% 
of the respondents reported that they had reduced buying seed of the crops included in the program: 
open-pollinated maize, groundnuts (CG7), cassava (Manyokola and Mbunduma/i), swect potatoes 
(Kanchiputu, Kenya, Y oyera), and new bean varieties (Napi/ira , Khaki, Nanyati, and Nkha/atsonga). It 
was reported that white potatoes had also been introduced recently through seed initíatives; however, 
farmers were not aware of the varieties. Likewise, thc focus groups revealed that in all communities 
under study, farmers who had benefitted from the programs had either stopped or reduced buying or 
working for the type of seed that they had received (note that this kind of information is not re flected in 
figures 1 through 4 because they present a single cropping season and not a trend). 
The discussions w ith farmers índicated that the seed initiatives had eased access to seed. lf we take a 
social perspective, particularly in Malawi, where farm-saved seed is the predominant system and, more 
important, where poverty levels are very high, the reduced need to buy seed either through local or 
formal markets is a plus because it implies that farmers need to use fewer resources for seed. However, it 
is difftcult to identify the long-tenn impact of the interventions. 
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Advocates of the formal seed system perceived these NGO or govemment seed interventions as a threal 
to the formal seed industry. OSO programs were said to have a negative effect on retail and household 
demands for seed. Tripp and Rohrbach (200 1) reported that seed distribution programs had al so 
discouraged the development of wholesale and retail trade channels because pri va te seed companies 
preferred to sell large consignments of seed to a s ingle buyer, like an NGO. Thus, any interest in the 
prívate sector in developing local channels for seed distribution would be reduced by the possibi lity that 
either govemment oran NGO would suddenly initi ate a free seed distribution program. 
In reality, however, the perceived threat is probably exaggerated. Not a ll farmers get seed from the 
forma l seed markets anyway, and for those who do, it is mostly hybrid maize seed . Thus, both the formal 
and farmer seed systems ha ve had and will continue to ha ve a role in Malawi 's smallholder agriculture. 
Resilience offarmers ' seed systems: Farmers ' view 
Through the focus groups, farmers were given an opportuni ty to express their opinion on how they 
would manage their seed problems in the absence ofNGO or SPI/TIP seed interventions. Most of them, 
in five out of the six sites, suggested that they could still cope with the situation by us ing their 
farm-saved seed, supplemented by seed acquired through cash purchases from local markets or 
neighbors or exchanging seed for work. These responses revealed that farmers' seed systems would still 
maintain some resilience. However, it should be noted that farmers who rcly on seed for work often plant 
late, as they have to wait until the seed owners have satis fied their own requirements. 
The ability of institutions to respond to assumed or assesse d impacts 
Most institutions covered by this study ha ve evaluated some oftheir previous interventions to look at the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ir programs. Based on the findings of such e valuations, they have 
responded by making adjustments. 
Plan Malawi made a fo llow-up study on the possible impact of the ir previous seed interventions (Joseph 
Ndengu, personal communication, 2003). However, apart from identifying that certain new crops and 
varieties were adopted after being introduced by the interventions, speci tic socia l and economic impacts 
were difficult to establish. For example, because primary beneficiaries ofthe OSO were required to pass 
on a proportion of their harvest as seed to other farmers, there is reason to believe that there were a 
number of secondary beneficiaries. However, there was no proper record of this. 
Another lesson for Plan Malawi has been to ensure that the seed of open-pollinated and self-poll inated 
crops is of good quality. In the past, they bought open-pollinated maize and self-pollinated legume seed 
from any registered seed grower or supplier (Joseph Ndengu, personal communication, 2003). The 
quality became difficult to verify when small traders, farmer groups, and associations supplied the seed, 
and it appeared that some suppliers sold grain as seed. To get around this problem, Plan Malawi started 
to make contracts with reputable organizations, such as ICRISAT, to provide quality bas ic seed of 
groundnuts and pigeon peas, which they used in their CSM programs. Thi s has worked well and the 
quality of basic seed has been assured. Based on this, similar contracts to produce good-quality basic 
seed are now being extended to other organizations that can supply basic seeds of other crops, such as 
beans from CIAT and cassava and sweet potatoes from IITA-SARRNET. 
Concem Uni versal has also evaluated its previous in itiatives (Isaac Munro, personal communication, 
2003). These have focuscd on seed sources and the petformance ofseed banks, among other things, and 
have had an influence on current seed programs. For cxample, there were negative experiences with 
centralized storage faciliti es, which made it difficult to ensure the qual ity ofseed that farmers put into the 
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storage. To encourage the production and storage of quality seed, they recommend decentralizing seed 
banks to the communities, so that each community is responsible for its own seed. 
Concem Universal also did a study on seed sources, which revealed that while fam1ers acquired seed 
from various sources, seed banks were ranked as one ofthe preferred sources (Senard Mwale, personal 
communication, 2003). Therefore, subsequent programs have built in more emphasis on seed banks to 
make them efficient, reliable, and sustainable. 
Care Malawi relied heavi ly on the national agricultura! research system for their supply ofbasic seed, 
which they used in their OSO/CSM programs. This worked well before the year 2002, when they faced 
serious seed shortages because, during the disaster year, the national research stations had committed 
most ofthe seed to govemment seed initiatives. As a result, the NGO had to access seed from unreliable 
sources, where quality (varietal purity) could not be guaranteed. After this experience, they decided to 
contract out the seed supply to re liable institutions or medium- to large-scale farmers. 
ActionAid recorded experiences similar to those ofConcem Universal with seed banks. However, their 
approach to improving the supply of quality seed at the community leve!, involved establishing 
community seed producer groups where selected farmers and farmer groups within communities were 
trained to produce quality seed of open-pollinated crops that should be reliable within the area. 
However, these suppliers were not equipped to market their seed, and in their subsequent programs 
ActionAid had to focus on training the seed suppliers in marketing skill s. 
CAOECOM-CRS said their experience with OSO and SPI/TIP showed that the number of crops offered 
to farmers was too limited to cover the crops that farmers normally grow. To respond to this, they 
developed the SV &F approach, which provided access to a wider range of crops. 
F AO had gone into seed multiplication by default rather than by design. This basically started after the 
2002 food crisis and the call for crop di versification. Cassava multiplication was one area they got 
involved in. Their experience was that marketing was seen a problem; however, over time, structures 
were put in place to market the certified discase-free cuttings. In addition, farmers had to be trained in 
disease and pest identification so that they could identify diseases and pests in good time, to maintain 
quality production . 
Discussion 
In Malawi, extreme weather events like droughts and floods have caused acute stress to farmers' access 
to seed. Over the longer perspecti ve, such vagaries of weather have added stress on livelihoods, 
depriving farmers of their resources. Thus, more households are experiencing chronic stress, which is 
manifested as poor access to seed, even in normal years. 
Seed security 
While a significant proportion of farmers employ formal markets for parts oftheir maize seed, the large 
majori ty of those interviewed in our study rely on the farmer seed system (farm-saved, local markets, 
relatives, and seed for work) for most of their crops. Thi s was the situation even after the stress of the 
2001 /02 season. lt is apparent that seed has always been available in the are as studied, even in times of 
stress. This is also illustrated by the observation that CADECOM-CRS were able to conduct seed 
vouchers and fairs that attracted a wide spectrum of seeds of different crops and varieties. This indicates 
that programs that import seed for relief aid, on the assumption that seed is not avail able, have been 
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mistaken. However, households under stress may not have the capacity to access seed in adequate 
quantities or of appropriate quality beca use the tenns on which to access them can be prohibitively high. 
Fanners' complaints of the poor gennination of their fann- saved seed require attention. These claims 
may be related to poor genetic quality of the local varieties, thus suggesting that new genetic material 
(new varieties) should be introduced. However, the complaints may also be related to poor physiological 
quality ofthe seed, caused by inappropriate storage facilities. With only one cropping season per year, 
there is a long storage period befare the next planting. Establishing proper seed storage facilities may 
contribute to solving this problem. Complaints about the maize hybrid deli vered for winter TIP, which 
was said not to have been adapted, indicate that even improved seed may sometimes be un satisfactory. 
Seed-relate d interventions 
Through the ADMARC system, farmers had been subsidized with cheap inputs, marketi ng support, and 
credit. The collapse of ADMARC and other subsidized insti tutions that provided credit for agricultura) 
inputs, created a new operat ing environment for smallholder fanners seeking externa) sources of seed. 
Seeds from the formal sector became prohibitively expens ive for smallholder fanners, with the result 
that most of them cou ld only access local seed. 
The authorities responded by establishing ad hoc fonns of subsidies that provided interest-free loans 
(APIP) or free agricultura! inputs (SPI/TIP). By disseminating certified seed, the SPI/TJP aimed at 
boosting agricultura) productivity, and thereby promoting food security. However, in the face of 
recurrent emergencies, it is evident that households are vulnerable, which has led to yet another type of 
intervention, namely, seed rel ief, with the aim of protecting food sccurity in the short run. 
Responses from farmers who had benefitted from DSD or CSM interventions were generally positive. 
The general notion was that the programs had helped to reduce seed insecurity and, therefore, improved 
food security. Fanners had positive perceptions of the seed they received through DSD, and they 
commended the programs because they were open to local involvement. Furthe r, the fanners 
commended the CSM initiatives because they were directed at strengthening local capacity to secure 
quality seed. However, these favorable responses are subject to serious questions. First, there is a human 
element to such responses where the beneficiaries respond favorabl y with the hope of continued support 
from the program. The second is related to the sustainability ofthe CSM activities. What becomcs ofthe 
CSM scheme when everyone in the community has acquired the seed oftheir choice? 
Generally, NGOs in Malawi have become involved in seed interventions as a response to the 
govemment's call for assistance following the 2002 disaster. While the call was primarily for food, there 
was also an urge to provide seed for agricultura! recovery. NGOs did not undertake in-depth diagnoses 
of the impacts of the disasters on seed systems, but made quick assessments to justify funding from 
donors. Because of time pressure, these were based on indicators of food insecurity; . the situation in 
regard to seed insecuri ty was not assessed per se. 
Based on the findings reported here, it can be said that the justification and design of NGO seed 
interventions in Malawi have been based on somewhat ad hoc approaches. The in fonnation that is 
collected to guide the interventions has been based on assumptions and in fonnal inferences rather than 
structured assessments. NGOs don 't employ a wide repertoire of alterna ti ve interventions; rather, they 
seem to follow certain approaches as a blueprint and employ them by default. Jn general, DSD was 
undertaken whenever a seed shortage was diagnosed, while CSM and the establishment ofseed storage 
facil ities were employed to faci litate seed security in the long run. The exception was CADECOM-CRS, 
who tried seed vouchers and fa irs. 
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Ideally, different seed problems should call for different seed interventions. Among the specter of acute 
or chronic stress conditions and problems of access to or quality of seed, there are various options for 
responses (Sperling 2002). While OSO would be appropriate whenever there is a fai lure in the seed 
supply- where seed is unavailable- it may not be the most appropriate response when there are access 
problems. Even though most NGOs have a sense that OSO and CSM may fu lfill different objectives and 
play a role in different circumstances, they generally have a narrow sense of the differences between 
stresses. This limited knowledge may con tribute to the low repertoire of approaches that organizations 
employ. However, NGOs seem keen to leam from experience, as indicated by the adjustments that have 
been made to the standard approaches over time. 
In the cases ofTIP and S PI , seed distributions were used as a development tool to jump-start agricultura! 
production, a nd not to resolve an emergency situation. In these programs, the implicit goal seems to be 
one ofsubstituting the farmer seed system and traditional varieties with the formal system and improved 
varieties. There is reason to question the sustainability of such approaches. SPI was meant to be one- off, 
to jump-start agricul tura! growth by showing farmers that good seed and fertili zer could make a 
difference in food security at the household leve!. However, the program has been recycled severa! times 
(also in the form of TlP), without any convincing long-term impact. Agricultura! productivity did 
increase in the short tem1, but no sustained increase in production can be detected. Farmers complaincd 
about the approach, and the blanket distributions made it difficult for the approaches to target specitic 
seed problems. 
It is worth noting that the various seed interventions described in this study ha ve different impacts on the 
resilience of the farmer seed system. The govemment seed interventions (SPVTIP) have al l included 
hybrid maize, which cannot be recycled. However, farmers seem to acknowledge the yield advantage of 
hybrids compared to local cultivars or open-pollinated varieties. The NGO seed initiatives (OSO and 
CSM), on the other hand, have focused on improved seeds of open-pollinated maize, self-pollinated 
legumes (groundnuts, beans, and soybeans), and vegetatively propagated crops (white potatoes, sweet 
potatoes, and cassava), wh ich potentially add crop diversity at the household leve!. 
By creating artificial access to inputs, there is a danger that seed interventions may actually undermine 
the local systems and tradit ions for securing seed-systems that households may be dependent upon in 
the absence of externa! assistance. On the other hand, subsidies and interventions may already have 
significantly altered the local seed and livelihood systems in Malawi, creating a situation of dependency 
on such assistance. Having said thi s, the study showed that even during disaster years, farm-saved is the 
largest component o f all means of sced acquisi tion. And clearly, farmers ha ve coping mechanisms, even 
under what policymakers might perceive as the worst scenario. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The following factors are critica! for the success of seed re lief interventions, such as OSO: 
• timeliness 
• amount 
• appropriateness 
• targeting 
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A diagnosis of the impacts of disasters on seed systems is important to cnsure that interventions are 
justitied and to guide their design and implementation so that they meet the actual needs of fanners. 
Diagnoses must be sensitive to difference acros crops and across, as well as between, households and 
communities. 
Local involvement is importan! for both diagnosing the problem and implemcnting any intervention. 
Whil e disasters may cause severe stress to loca l communities, local systems for securing sced often 
show remarkable resilience. Rather than intcrvening in the fie ld of sccd, it may often be more 
worthwhile spending efforts to relieve other strcsses. 
When the need for seed interventions is established, GOs seem to jump to DSD and CSM by default 
because they are logistically simple. Depending on the type of seed problem, othcr options, such as 
SY&F, might be more appropriate to meeting fanners' needs. 
Seed insecurity and, especial ly, chronic seed insecurity should not be viewed merely a seed problems 
but, rather, within a livelihood context. Appropriate seeds are often available even in emergencies, but 
fanners cannot access them because their resources are insufficient. Rathcr than looking at seed as an 
isolated issue and thereby coming up with seed-based interventions, non-seed approaches may be more 
appropriate to alleviate such general strcsses. lt may be rel evan! to view thc use ofboth DSD and CSM in 
this light. Rather than seed, as in the case o f DSD, farmcrs should be provided with general resources 
with which they can access local seed or meet othcr priorities. Rather than cstablishing new networks, as 
in the case of CSM, maybe efficient networks for seed production and cxchange already cx ist, the 
problem being that livelihood stress lcavcs no potential for accessing thcm. 
In Malawi, two sets ofhighl y subsidized systems (ADMARC and SPI , both targeted on the supply s ide) 
may have distorted both commercial systems and farmers' own management of the seed supply. This 
may have undennined local systems and resulted in a high dependency on extemal subsid ies, which, 
agai n, may be one reason it is difficu lt to find an ex it strategy from recurrent seed intcrventions. 
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Acronyms 
AOMARC 
APIP 
CA O ECO M 
CIAT 
CRS 
CSM 
OOPRR 
OFID 
oso 
ELOP 
FAO 
GOP 
ICRISAT 
JITA 
NGO 
SAOC 
SACA 
SARRNET 
SV&F 
SPI 
TIP 
UK 
WFP 
Agricultura! Oevelopment and Marketing Corporation 
Agricultura! Productivity Investment Programme 
Catholic Oevelopment Commission of Malawi 
Centro lntemational de Agricultura Tropical 
Catholic Relief Services 
community seed multiplication 
Oepartment of Oisaster Preparedness, Relief and Rchabilitation 
Oepartment for lntemational Oevelopment, UK 
direct seed del ivery 
Evangelical Lutheran Development Programme 
Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations 
gross domestic product 
lntemational Center for Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics 
Intemational lnstitute for Tropical Agriculture 
nongovemmental organization 
Southcm African Oevelopment Community 
Smallholder Agriculture Credit Administration 
Southem African Roots and Tubcrs Research Network 
seed vouchers and fairs 
Starter Pack lnitiative 
Targeted Input Program 
United Kingdom 
World Food Program 
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Ahstract 
Zimbabwe has been a recipient of food or seed a id since the 1990/91 drought, consídered one of the 
worst in 100 years. At present, as in the past, interventions aimed at agricultura! rehabilitation and 
recovery have focused on di rect seed distribution ( "seeds and tools"). While these interventions are 
being modified to better address the needs of farmers recovering from disaster, they are still based upon 
the premise that the emergency has resulted in a loss of seed and other assets, and there is a need to supply 
them. This study of relief seed interventions in Zimbabwe addresses a number of issues: (1) the 
effectiveness of the past agricultura! recovery response to disasters, (2) knowledge of farmers' seed 
systems, (3) changes in seed systems as influenced by relief seed distributions, and ( 4) the cause of thc 
continua! need for seed ass istance. 
The survey reported here found that thc seed requirements for households were less than those generally 
recommended by the technical guidelines used in macro-leve! seed assessments, especially for legume 
crops. Households obtain most of their seed from own saved seed and the local market for all crops but 
maize. For maize, seed obtained from the formal sector is most importan!. Seed security for households 
in the survey was dependen! on availabili ty of own saved sced and access to seed channels outside the 
home. Maize appears to be the exception for the use of various seed channels, especially in relation to the 
formal sector seed. Thus, seed needs assessments that focus on maize ha ve a bias towards seed demands 
from the formal sector. 
The Zimbabwe seed industry is one of the largest in A frica and is a major supplier of relief seed in the 
region. Much ofthis seed is produced by smallholder farmers and also distributed to smallholder farmers 
for emergency rel ief programs, often by the same GOs in the same areas. While this increase in seed 
supply and the enhanced links to the fonnal sector has increased the supply of seed to the relief market 
and increased the value ofthe relief seed market to Zimbabwe seed companies. it has not increased the 
supply of local seed or enhanced access to local seed for rural smallholder farmers. There is a cri tica! 
need for alternative responses that will strengthen the local seed system and its links to the fonnal sector, 
with increased emphasis on seed enterprise development at the local level. 
lntroduction 
Z imbabwe has a history of recurrent droughts. In the last 20 yea rs, significan! d roughts occurred in 
1982/83 (700,000 people affected), 199 1/92 ( 4.6 mi Ilion people affected), 1994/95 (5 mil! ion people 
affected), and 200 1/02 ( 6. 1 m i Ilion people affected). This frequent loss of food production, and the 
subsequent need for recovery, has reduced househo ld assets , increased vulne rabil ity and stressed coping 
mechanisms. Recurren! droughts ha ve a lso contributed to a rapid decl ine in the economic status of the 
l . Pauta Brame) is a consul tant; Tom Remington is with Catho lic Relief Services. 
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country. A study done by the World Bank (Aiwang, Milis, and Taruvinga, 2002) on the changes in 
poverty in Zimbabwe in the 1990s and its causes found that the percentage of people living in extreme 
poverty increased from 26% in 1990 to 35% in 1995. This increased poverty was closely tied to 
economic restructuring and the poor performance ofthe economy. There is evidence that ownership of 
physical assets has been slow to recover from the impact of the drought of 1991192. In addition, the 
country faced a political crisis in the late 1990s which severely affected the competitiveness of the 
economy (lntemational Crisis Group. 2002). The política! crisis also severely affected the policy 
environment that is necessary for the alleviation of poverty and the facilitation of rapid recovery from 
drought. Al l ofthese have contributed to the cutTent chronic complex emergency in Zimbabwe. 
Since the end of 2001 , FEWS NET, FAO/WFP, IFRC, UN-RRU, and other organizations have 
conducted numerous assessments ofthe current emergency food situation in the Southem A frica region. 
These assessments have confirmed an increas ing food crisis in the region due to a combination of 
factors, including ( 1) drought and un usual rainfall pattems, (2) poor harvests from previous years, (3) 
reliance on a single staple crop (maize), (4) a continuous decline in economic conditions, and (5) 
detrimental government policies. Government policies and regulations, such as food price controls, a 
monopoly on maize marketing by the Grain Marketing Board, and the high duty on small grains, inhibit 
access to food in general. The government's fast-track land reform policy has severely curtailed 
commercial cereal production, contributing toa decline in grain reserves. The emergency food situation 
is exacerbated by the fact that considerable portions of the population in the country are particular! y 
vulnerable beca use of high levels of chronic malnutrition and HIV 1 AIDS. (Zimbabwe has one of the 
highest HIV/AIDS rates in the region, at 25.1% of the population). 
Zimbabwe has been a recipient of food and seed a id sin ce the 1990/91 drought-considered one of the 
worst in 100 years. Donors, GOs, and the govemment ha ve used many approaches to assist farmers in 
recovering from the immediate emergency and to rehabilitare the agricultura! sector. While these 
individual effot1s may ha ve alleviated the short-tetm needs, non e of them ha ve resulted in longer term 
improvements that would ha ve mitigated the impact of the current drought and economic crisis, which 
once again threatens the lives and li velihoods of Zimbabwe. At present, as in the past, agricultura! 
rehabilitation and recovery interventions have focused on the distribution of "seeds and tools." This 
response has become the standard progranuned response after initiation of food a id (also see discussion 
in IFPRI , 2002). 
D escription of case study 
Direct secd d istributions (seeds & tool s) are being modified to better address the needs of farmers 
recovering from di saster. However, they are still based upon the premise that the emergency has resulted 
in a loss of key assets and, s in ce these are not avai lable, there is a need to s imply supply them. 
This study of the relief seed approach in Zimbabwe will address a number of research questions: 
• How do donors, relief agencies, govemment agencies, and farmers respond to the need for 
agricultura! recovery from disasters? 
• What are the attitudes towards and knowledge of farmers' seed systems? 
• How has the formal seed system changed, influenced by the development of a relief seed approach? 
• If a direct seed distribution is an intervention to assist agricultura! systems in recovering from a 
drought or other disaster, then why is there always another request for seed assistance? 
4cúlu-.uing Seed S N'LLrit.l in Disa.sif'r H.esponse: Linking Relú'f tt"ith Development 
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The evidence collected included a review of key documents, especially those by Mheen-Siuijer ( 1996) 
and Gwarazimba (2002a,b ), and key informant interviews with the SADC Regional Seed Security 
Network, SADC/GTZ, F AO Emergency Unit for Zimbabwe, LEAD, ZACH, Agricultura! Seed and 
Services/Nhimbe Seed Ltd., Mayfly Trading, ZFU-Binga, Hwange District AREX office in Binga, 
KMTC in Binga, UN-RRU, EURONAID, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, FEWS NET, SCF-UK, CRS, World 
Vision, and Plan Intemational. Questionnaires were administered to farmers, market traders, and 
govemment officials in the Binga and Nyaminyami Districts with SCF-UK and in six districts with 
CRS-Zimbabwe and CTDT. 
Seed aid in Zimhahwe 
Seed assistance has been a response to disasters since independence in 1982. The Govemment of 
Zimbabwe and other donors have routinely assisted fanners in recovering from the civil war, droughts, 
floods, and other disasters that ha ve hadan impact on crop production. These distributions ha ve included 
seed, tools, implements, livestock, and fertilizers. Direct assistance has become an annual response in 
many areas of Zimbabwe. The approach has been refined over the years with more and more emphasis 
on improved assessment and targeting. The current relief seed approach for Zimbabwe is shown in box 
l . A description ofthe regional relief approach can be found in a review available from the SADC Seed 
Security Network (Gwarazimba, 2002a). 
Seed aid donors include intemational organizations, such as UNDP-RRU and F AO and bilateral donors, 
including USAID/OFDA, DFID, CIDA, EU, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, and others. Additional 
support comes from NGOs and Zimbabwe govemment funds through the Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB). Assessments are currently done by four groups in Zimbabwe, who use many of the same 
sources of information. Seed distribution projects are developed by F AO, NGOs, and the Government of 
Zimbabwe and implemented by intemational, national, and local NGOs, AREX, and the GMB. Seed is 
procured from the formal sector (national and regional seed houses, seed companies, and agro-dealers) 
and from grain traders. This year, for the first time, seed was sourced directly from farmers. Seed 
procured for relief seed distributions has been produced by commercial farmers, both large scale and 
small, by seed multiplication projects, and by contract fanners. 
Seed needs assessments 
A number of analyses ha ve been carried out on the emergency situation in Zimbabwe, its root causes, 
and the complex nature of the crisis (Christian Aid, 2002; IFPRJ , 2002; IFRC, 2002; OXFAM, 2002; 
WFP, 2002). A quantitative analysis of the food crisis has been done by FEWS NET (2002), which 
included an assessment of the crop and livestock situation at a district leve!. Separate analyses were 
presented on the status of production and access to food by four groups: communal areas, resettlement 
areas, farm workers, and urban areas. This analysis looked in depth at the status of reserves and at food 
availabili ty for the 2002/03 consumption year. It took into account a wide variety of foodstuffs and 
looked at access from income-generating options, such as cash crops and livestock. It did not look at 
input needs, such as seed or ferti lizers, for the 2002/03 production year. 
The F AO/WFP (2002) crop assessment mission u sed key informant interviews, field vtstts, 
remote-sensing data on rainfall and vegetati ve índices, and interim assessment reports produced by other 
organizations. They also used secondary data to confirm a ll their field results and come up with 
estimates of the population affected and seed needs. T hese are mainly based on estimates of crop and 
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Seed Relief Approach in Zimbabwe 
Donors: Government of Zimbabwe, FAO, 
EU, RRU, DFID, USAID/OFDA, Norway, 
CIDA, other Bilateral donors 
lnternational NGO, Government of Zimbabwe 
lmplemented by international, national 
and local NGOs, AREX and GMB 
Seed procured from seed houses, 
private seed companies, agro-dealers, 
procurement agencies, grain traders 
and farmers 
Seed produced by commercial farmers, small scale 
farmers in communal areas, seed multiplication 
programs of NGOs and IARCs, contracted small 
scale farmers, vegetable seed imports from South 
Africa and Europe. Foundation seed Produced by 
Government and IARCs 
livestock production, vulnerabi li ty, food availabili ty, and market prices, compared to previous years and 
1991 /92, as the worst drought year. No specific assessment of seed needs has been done, but the seed 
requirement is predícted based on crop status and food availability. This same methodo logy was used in 
2002/03 and 2003/04 (F AO/WFP, 2003). 
The Zimbabwe Natíonal Yulnerabílity Assessment Committee (ZimVAC, 2002a,b, 2003) also does 
seed needs assessments, based on the status of maize seed available and sales from the formal sector. 
They also use estímates of area to be planted to mínor crops such as mí llet, cotton, groundnuts, and 
maize. They estímate the percentage offarmers who planto plant the crop and assume a constant value 
for total area planted by each farmer to get a percentage of the area to be planted to each crop, which is 
then used to estímate seed requírements for each crop. The total seed needs are then based on the 
percentage of households with no seed to plant from retaíned seed. They then looks at input supply 
versus seed needs in the formal sector. 
The 2003/ 04 ZímYAC household survey asked a number of questions on availabil ity and access to 
agricultura! inputs (box 2). There are three questions on seed availability and access for main cereal 
crops and cash crops. While the questions were asked, the analysis presented in their report does not 
refer to the responses to these questions. 
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Box 2. ZimVAC questions on seed 
125. Did you have enough seeds for your main cereal crop in the last 12 months? No, yes , N/A 
126. lf not, what was the reason? 
could not afford to purchase 
was not available in the market 
both of the above 
other 
127. What was the main source for the seed that you used? (one answer only) 
from last harvest/retained seed/carry over 
purchased 
provided by NGO 
provided by government 
gifts/remittances 
other 
128. Did you have enough seed for your main cash crop? No, yes, N/A 
129. lf not what as the reason? 
could not afford to purchase 
was not available in the market 
both of the above 
other 
In add ition, FOSENET, a national GO comprising a food security network of 25 organizations that 
cover all the districts of Zimbabwe, con sol ida tes the monthly monitoring reports from individual NGOs 
and reports these results three to four times ayear. They report on the status of seed distributions, crop 
status, and seed needs for the next season ba ed upon observat ions in the ft eld. 
Mpofu (2002) described a macro-leve! approach to assessi ng seed needs in southern African countries 
affected by the floods in 1999/2000. The procedure estimates the total affected area and population in 
need of assistance. The crop need and crop calendar are al so considered in the estima tes of need . In this 
assessment, a questionnaire was sent to country focal points, seed companies, and seed projects. A 
mi ssion was also sent to each of the affected countries to tal k to government officials, NGOs, donors, 
and secd companies. Finally, there was a revicw of relevant background inforrnation. Thc crop seed 
needs were calculated as the total area to be planted times the governn1ent recommended seeding rate for 
each crop. The total cost ofthe seed needed was thc seed needs times the number ofhouseholds affected 
times the transport cost. The seed availabil ity was deterrn ined from the supply avai lable from the prívate 
or public sector in each country. Thus, the assessment was able to recommend where seed was available 
for distribution. This is a macro-leve! analysis that looked at theoretical need versus actual suppl y. It did 
not look at actual demand. 
One assessment, done by CRS/CTDT for their planned seed voucher and fa ir distribution in 2002/03, did 
focus on seed needs in both the farmer and formal seed sectors (Takavarasha, Vudzijena, and Madondo, 
2002). They used focus-group discussions and key informant interviews with AREX, CTDT. RDC, DA, 
and farmers. To determine the need for seed, they asked about cropping pattem s, most importan! crops 
grown, preferred varieties, and quantities required by crop/variety. To detem1ine the local seed supply, 
Addressing Seed Securily in Disas/er f<esponse: Linking Relief with D evdup llt(' lll 
Relie[Seed Assistance in Zimbabwe 
farmers were asked about seed quantities available locally. There was a reluctance among households to 
report on home-saved seed or the availability of seed from other local farmers. Thus, in all districts 
assessed, farmers claimed that the local seed supply had been severely affected by the drought. This 
highlighted one of the major constraints to determining seed supply at the household or local level. 
The focus of macro-level assessments of the country's seed needs is on calculated seed needs versus 
actual local demand for seed. Thus, the assessment that seed is needed is based on a perceived shortfall in 
supply rather than on demand, since local farmers' demand for seed is not entirely from fonna l-sector 
suppliers. All the assessment mcthods reviewed assumed that all households in an area (national, 
district, or ward) are equally affected by the drought or flood. In general, it is assumed that all 
households ha ve a similar demand for seed of different crops/varieties, ha ve the same seed requirements 
per hectare with no difference in cropping system or land type, and need the same quanti ty of seed 
assistance, since all have lost seed. The demand is also assumed to be constant, with li ttle recognition of 
a farmer's use of alterna ti ve crops during recovery. Fluctuations in area to be planted are assumed to be 
influenced only by the seed shortage. For crops other than maize, it is assumed that part of the demand 
will be met with home-saved seed and that poor crop production has an adverse impact on the supply of 
home-saved seed. Since it is assumed that the seed loss has resulted in non-availability of seed in the 
local area, no assessment of the impact of the disaster on access or quality is made. Access to seed is 
based only on an assessment of the price of formal seed, which is assumed to be the only seed supply 
available to meet the seed needs of the affected farmers. 
Farnters' seed system 
Agricultura! rehabilitation interventions with direct seed distributions are based on an assumption that 
all food -insecure households are also seed insecure, i.e., that seed is not available, they lack the capacity 
to acquire seed, and all crops are equally affected (Longley et al. , 2002). Current approaches to 
agricultura( rehabilitation tend to ignore or discourage altemative responses, which may be more 
appropriate. This is done on the grounds that altematives are more suited to a "development" context. 
The result is the repeated fabrication of an artificial supply of inputs over a finite period of time, which 
changes traditional household strategies for seed management and existing seed markets (both formal 
and informal). In tum, this may prolong the need for "emergency" assistance and further divert donar 
support for longer term interventions. 
Relief agencies in Zimbabwe do not carry out assessments of local seed systems. Rather, the decision to 
respond with a direct seed distribution is based on numbers of affected or vulnerable households and 
potential area to be planted. In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere in Africa (Remington et al. , 2002), lack of 
availability is the most common misdiagnosis and is based on the assumption that lack ofavailability of 
food is equated with lack of availability of seed. A lack of access is neither diagnosed as the primary 
constraint nor considered in the design of interventions. Utilization (referring to the qua li ty of both 
seed/planting material and varieties) is also rarely diagnosed as the primary constra int. 
Remington et al. (2002) concluded that, " ln summary, the precedence for the determination of food 
unavailability, the complexity of diagnosing a lack of seed access, and the challenge of addressing 
access all con tribute to the avoidance of the access detem1ination." This does seem to be the case for 
Zimbabwe. The only exception was the SADC Seed Securi ty Network report (2002) that described the 
seed situation in Zimbabwe for 2002 as "adequate to surplus" for cereals and pulses, except for minar 
problems with groundnuts, millet, and beans. Since retained seed is important for these crops, it is 
probable that the seed supply was adequate. SADC assumes that when there are no harvestable 
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surpluses, households willlack the cash to purchase seed, resulting in an access problem. This is very 
different from the assumption of other assessments that the lack ofharvestable surplus indicates a lack of 
seed at the household level, resulting in a diagnosis of lack of availability. 
Household seed security 
Survey 
The diagnosis of seed insecuri ty at the household level depends on an understanding of household seed 
systems and security. Therefore, a survey was conducted ( 1) to describe the community and household 
seed system in the context of seed security, (2) to evaluate household experiences with seed assistance, 
and (3) to determine the role offarmers and grain traders in the local seed system. Tnterviews were done 
with individual farmers and with farmers and grain traders who sell seed and grain. These interviews 
were conducted in Chiredzi, Lupane, Tsholotsho, UMP, Makoni, and Murewa districts (all ofwhich had 
been targeted in 2003/04 for a seed vouchers and fai rs intervention by CRS-Zimbabwe and CTDT) and 
two districts (Binga and Nyaminyami) where a direct seed distribution had been implemented by 
SCF-UK in 2002/03. A total of 380 farmers and 92 grain or seed traders were interviewed . 
The fanner surveys consisted of a set of questions to quantify individual farmer and cornmunity seed 
securi ty. Questions were asked about the components of the system in relation to asset base, seed 
requirements for planting, value of crops to household, seed source channels used, seed conservation, 
and experience with seed from outside the household (from the market and relief or development seed 
programs). Longley et al. (2002) describe the development of a seed system pro file that utilizes a similar 
approach to seed system security. These surveys and questionnaires were developed further with 
questions on household vulnerabi li ty and wealth from surveys carried out by SCF-UK for monitoring 
household food security (SCF-UK, 2003). A report is avai lable for the seed securi ty assessment in Binga 
and Nyaminyami (Bramel, 2003a). Information on possible indicators of househo ld vulnerability from 
the impact of HIV/ATDs was added with input from a study done for four countries (SADC FANR 
Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003). In addition, studies of seed system security comrnissioned by 
SADC/GTZ were used to frame the questions (Mheen-Si uijer, 1996). 
Mheen-Siuijer ( 1996) reported on a study of household seed security in the semiarid districts of 
Tsholotsho and Chiredzi. Seed security was defined as the ability of households within specified 
geographical boundaries to meet seed needs from their own enterprise production or through purchases 
from domestic markets . A household was seed secure if it had an adequate supply from its own 
production or had cash to purchase supplementary seed. Since seed security was related primarily to 
household production levels, Mheen-Siuijer concludes that household seed security is related to 
crop-protection practices, farmers seed selection practices, seed storage practices, and the value of seed 
to the household versus its food value. She also concludes that the most important factors for seed 
security are timely planting, appropriate farming practices, pest and disease control, and appropriate 
varieties that contribute to maximum crop production and adequate seed availability at the household 
leve!. 
Crop production 
Most ofthe crop production in Zimbabwe fa lls into three agroecological zones, which are referred toas 
natural regions (NR). Two of the surveyed districts, Makoni and Murewa, are classified as mainly 
Natural Region TTT (NR3), which is characterized by a long growing season, favorable rainfall and 
temperatures, and low probability of crop failure. This is the most productive natural area of Z imbabwe 
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for agriculture. The other six districts are mainly classified NR4 and NRS: the semiarid to arid arcas of 
Zimbabwe, where the growing season is shorter, the temperatures are high, and rainfall is low, with a 
high probability of crop failure. In many of these areas, farmers practice animal production more often 
than crops. The households surveyed were asked to rate the crop production for the last three cropping 
seasons (figure 1 ). In 2001, crop production was average in high-potential areas but below average in the 
semiarid areas. In 2002, both ecologies were affected to ncarly the same degree and were much below 
average. Then in 2003, crop production in the high-potential area was rated as average, but the semiarid 
areas were again much below average. If household seed security is related to crop production, seed 
securi ty in the 2003/04 season should be recovering in the high-potential areas but should still be 
problematic in the semiarid areas because of the three consecutive years of below- or greatly 
below-average crop production. 
Household seed security 
Farmers in the survey were asked about land holdings, areas planted to various crops, and the quantity of 
seed required to plant a specific area, based on the normal ( 1999) season. The mean plot size and 
quantity of seed required (in kilos) for the household was summarized for each agroecological area 
separately (table 1). There were different crops grown by the farmers in the two ecologies, different 
areas planted, and different seed requirements, except for groundnuts and bambara nuts. 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
O% .¡.tliill!!~ 
NR3-2001 NR3-2002 NR3-2003 NR415-2001 NR415-2002 NR415-2003 
D Better than average • Average OBelow average O Much below average 
Figure l. Farmer ralings of crop production in NR3 (high potential) and NR4/5 
(senúarid) for the 2000/01, 2001/02 , and 2002/03 seasons 
Table l. Mean Plot Size and Seed Required for Maize, Sorghum, Pearl Millet, Finget· 
Millet, Cowpeas, Groundnuts, Beans, and Bambara Nuts in High-Potential 
(NR3) and Semiarid (NR4/5) Areas 
Seed Seed Seed Seed 
Agro- Plot size Requirement Plot size Requirement Plot size Requirement Plot size Requirement 
ecology (ha) (kg) (ha) (kg) (ha) (kg) (ha) (kg) 
Maize Sorghum Pearl millet Finger millet 
NR3 1 49 26.5 1.35 5.8 1.08 7.5 1.09 4.1 
NR4/5 265 33.0 1.77 11.3 1.88 10.3 
Cowpeas Groundnuts Beans Bambara nuts 
NR3 1.19 2.0 0.96 16.0 1.37 13.5 0.9 8.0 
NR4/5 o 76 4.0 0.97 12.9 0.73 9.5 1.1 7.8 
Addressing Seed Secu rit\· in Disa.1ter Response: Unking Rt·li<f u·ilh Det;e/opment 
. 1661 
P.}. Brame! and T. Remington 
In both regions, maize was planted on the largest plots, and required the greatest quantity of seed. 
Groundnuts also required a larger quantity of seed. Except for maize, the cereal crops have a high 
seed-multiplication rate, while legume crops have a very low seed-multiplication rate (ODI Seeds and 
Biodiversity Programme, 1996). Crops that have a higher seed requirement and/or a lower 
seed-multiplication rate may be more seed insecure beca use of the need to save a higher proportion of 
the previous harvest and the difficulty in storing larger quantities of seed. Crops that requi re less seed 
and have high seed-multiplication rates, such as sorghum, pearl millet, and ftnger millet, are more seed 
secure and recover more quickly from crop losses. 
Seed requirements are dependent on the agroecological zone, speciftc crop, cropping system, and area 
planted. The recommended seed requirements for maize (33kg/ha), sorghum (8kg/ha-12kg/ha), and 
pearl millet (8kg!ha) for the fanners in NR3 were nearly equivalent to those used by the farmers in the 
survey. The seed rates used by farmers in the semiarid areas were lower than the recommended rates, 
except for ftnger millet ( 4kg/ha- 6kg/ha). The seed requirements given by households for cowpeas, 
groundnuts, beans, and bambara nuts are very low compared to the reconunended seed requirements 
(90kg/ha-l20kg/ha). This is probably dueto the corrunon use of intercropping for these crops. lt appears 
that the estimates of seed needs used for the macro-level assessments commonly used in Zimbabwe 
overestimate the seed required by households for crop production in the drier production areas and for 
the legume crops. 
Sources of seed 
Mheen-Siuijer (1996) reports that in addition to own saved seed, secd of traditional varieties could be 
gifted, purchased, and exchanged or bartered from one's neighbor or others loca lly. Households can 
purchase commercial seed from prívate retailers or receive it from the governrnent (the Grain Marketing 
Board) or NGOs. Households can use one seed so urce ora combination of seed sources. The importance 
of each source is determined by household experience; in nonnal years households use the most trusted 
sources. The impact of any disruption in nonnal farming practices can resul t in reduced availability or 
reduced access to a preferred source and an increased demand for seed from altemative sources. These 
seed sources are referred toas seed "channels." The nonnal demand for seed from specific channel s is 
determined by each household for each crop grown. In addition, the demand for seed from the various 
channels for the 2003/4 season was also deterrnined by each household. 
Maize was the most frequentl y grown crop in the survey. In the high-potential areas, 99% ofthe farmers 
surveyed grew maize, while in the semiarid areas, 97% did. The second most important crop in the 
high-potential areas was groundnuts (grown by 74%) and the second most important crop in the semiarid 
areas was sorghum (71% ). 
Few households use own saved seed exclus ively (figure 2). Most- in both the high-potential and the 
semiarid areas- use multiple channels to access maize seed, acquiring it from commercial sources for 
part of their seed needs. In normal years, a quarter of all farmers in the high-potential areas so urce all 
their maize seed at the local market, and a quarter of fanners in the semiarid areas acquire commerc ial 
seed from GMB and retailers. Maize seed sourcing in 2003 remained virtually unchanged in the 
high-potential areas; however, in the semiarid areas, more fanners used multiple sources and acquired 
commercial seed from NGOs. This was matched by a sharp reduction in seed sourced exclusively from 
GMB and retailers and from the local market. 
For all other crops, fanners in the high-potential and in the semiarid areas u sed different sources for seed 
in normal years and following drought (table 2). Own saved seed is an important seed source for small 
farmers in both ecological regions. For example, in the high-potential areas, fanners rel y a lmost 
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Figure 2. Proportion of households utilizing one seed source or multiple seed 
sources for maize under normal seasons and in 2003/04, for NR3 
(high-potential) and NR4/5 (semiarid) areas 
exclusively on own saved seed for finger millet and source the majority oftheir seed for groundnuts 
(63%), beans (58%), bambara nuts (68%), and pumpkins (84%) from their own stock. In the semiarid 
areas, a1most half of all farmers rely exclusively on own saved seed for groundnuts ( 49%), sorghum 
(42%), and pearl millet (49%). 
The drought disaster resulted in reduced availabilíty and reliance on own seed. This reduction was 
compensated by greater reliance on multiple sources, including NGOs and the local market. For 
example, in the high-potential areas, seed sourced from NGOs and the govemment increased from 0% to 
9% for finger millet and from 0% to 13% for bambara nuts. In the semiarid areas, it increased from 8% to 
13% for sorghum and from 5% to 12% for pearl millet. Groundnut seed sourced from the local market 
increased from 10% to 14% in the high-potential areas and from 10% to 17% in the semiarid areas. 
In cowpeas, the use of own saved seed increased with the drought, and the use of seed from NGOs and 
the govemment decreased. This is because cowpeas were given as seed assistance in 2002/03 by 
SCF-UK, which may have contributed toan increased household seed supply and reduced demand for 
outside seed. 
One other strategy used by households to respond to the loss of own saved seed or reduced access to seed 
outside the home is to switch toa different crop. Generally, there were very few households who planned 
to change their crop mix from normal after the two years of drought. Thus, the shift to alternative seed 
channels was a strategy used more frequently to respond to the drought than changing crops. 
Seed couservation 
The ability to produce one's own seed is critica! to household seed security. However, to benefit from 
this retained seed, the producer must also be able to use seed-saving practices that maintain varietal 
integrity and seed quality. Households were asked about their seed selection and conservation practices 
at present and in the past. Significant changes could indicate increased seed insecurity. Surveyed 
households described a number oftraditional methods used to conserve seed.ln the high-potential areas, 
88% of househo1ds used chemical seed treatments, a practice that had not changed in the previous five 
years. Although only 22% of farmers in the semiaríd areas used chemícal seed treatment, 16% used 
traditíonal treatments like tobacco, goat dung, ash, and shrub leaves. 
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Table 2. Use of Seed Sources by Households in NR3 (High-Potentíal) and NR4 /5 
(Semiarid) for Finger Millet , Sorghwn, P earl Millet , Groundnuts, Beans, 
Cowpeas, Bamhara Nuts, and Pumpkins, Normally and in 2003 
NR3 NR4/5 
Seed Channels Normal 2003104 Normal 2003104 
Finger millet Sorghum 
Only own 96.9% 88.2% 41 .7% 31 .1% 
Only gift 0.0% 0.0% 9.4% 6.8% 
Only local market 3.1% 2.9% 5.0% 6.8% 
Only NGOfgovernment 0.0% 8.8% 7.9% 12.8% 
Multiple sources 0.0% 0.0% 36.0% 42.6% 
Groundnuts Pearl millet 
Onlyown 63.4% 62.0% 48.6% 19.8% 
Only gift 2.8% 2.8% 9.5% 2.5% 
Only local market 9.9% 14.1% 0.0% 3.7% 
Only NGOfgovernment 7.0% 7.0% 5.4% 12.3% 
Multiple sources 16.9% 14.1 % 36.5% 61.7% 
Beans Groundnuts 
Only own 57.7% 46.2% 49.0% 38.9% 
Only gift 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 5.6% 
Only local market 19.2% 11.5% 10.2% 16.7% 
Only NGOfgovernment 15.4% 15.4% 8.2% 9.3% 
Multiple sources 7.7% 26.9% 28.6% 29.6% 
Bambara Cowpeas 
Only own 67.7% 60.0% 37.9% 44.4% 
Only gift 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 3.7% 
Only local market 22.6% 16.7% 10.3% 11.1 % 
Only NGOfgovernment 0.0% 13.3% 31 .0% 18.5% 
Multiple sources 9.7% 10.0% 17.2% 22.2% 
Pumpkins 
Onlyown 84.2% 64.7% 
Only gift 10.5% 11 .8% 
Only local market 0.0% 17.6% 
Only NGO/government 0.0% 0.0% 
Multiple sources 5.3% 5.9% 
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Mheen-Siuijer ( 1996) found that many of thc respondents in her surveys felt that their varieties had 
degenerated over the years. This loss in varietal quality was attributed to poor seed selection. In response 
to the question, " How has varieta l quali ty changed?" 38% ofthe households responded that it had. Many 
indicated that they were currently using earlier maturing maize hybrids than in the past. Few respondents 
referred to changes in their own saved seed varieties or crops. The conclusion is that although varieties 
have changed, there has been no significan! dctcrioration. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the seed requirements for the surveyed households was less than the quanti ties indicated in 
the technical guidelines used for macro-leve! seed assessments. This was especia lly true for legume 
crops that are routinely intercroppcd. While a high proportion ofhouseholds use only own saved seed, 
except for maize, the use of multiple seed channels is very common, especially when crop production 
has been poor. Current seed selection and conservation practices did not seem to indicate any negative 
impact on seed or varietal quality. Thus, seed securi ty for households in the survey was dependent on the 
availabi lity of own saved seed and acccss to seed channels outside the home. Because households do not 
use own saved maize seed, seed needs assessments that focus on maize distort the assessment with a bias 
towards the formal sector. 
Relief seed assistance 
Mheen-Sujier ( 1996) observed that farmers preferred free seed distribution over using their own saved 
seecl. Farmers actually waited for the seed distribution, with the result tha t they planred late. Thi s 
reduced yields, resulting in less seed saved for the ncxt season. She suggested that the dependence on 
free seed distributions created a temptation for farmers to consume their own seed. The conclusion is that 
seed packs ha ve decreased household seed security and farmer reliance on own seed sel f. Though this 
study was conducted in 1996. it is li kely that the situation has not changed, cspecial ly for maize, which is 
routinely g iven by the government and NGOs. 
Local govcmment officials and farmers were interviewed about their knowledge and appreciation of 
relief seed assistance. Although the local officials knew of past emergency and developmcnt sced 
distributions, these dístríbutíons were done with limited local assessment- or involvcment and 
coordination with local offí cials. The exception was AREX for assessment and moni toring and the 
involvement of vill age heads in targeting beneficiaries. Little or no fo llow-up or monitoring was done. 
Seed distributions were mainly done on a credit basis, but there was little payback by the fa rmers. The 
result was ( 1) la te delivery of seed, (2) deli very of inappropriate varie ties or crops, (3) late planting, ( 4) 
poor targeting, (5) disappointing harvests for those w ho received the seed. and (6) increased dependence 
on seed handouts. 
Local seed markets 
Sheen-Sujier ( 1996) found that most seed insecure households were poor, with little means to purchase 
supplementary seed. These farmers bought traditional varieties locally, and any quantity could be 
bought if cash or barter items were availablc. The usual sources o f seed were the better farmers. In some 
cases, farmers identifíed seed sources during harvest with visits to the field. Good fanners would even 
advertise the availabil ity ofseed through their neighbors. Sometimes the seed was avai lable locally and 
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sometimes they had to source from adjacent wards or districts. The acceptability of purchases from this 
informal market depended upon the location. 
In our farmer survey, farmers described a local seed market where local varieties of maize and other 
crops, such as sorghum, pearl millet, and groundnuts, were sourced from local shops, shops in the 
nearest town, or from other farmers in the same or neighboring villages in the same ward . A number of 
farmers or villages were named as sources ofseeds. Sourcing seed locally was descríbed as follows: 
• Seed is bought either in the same village or in the ward; however, there is no known prominent 
trader. 
• Everyone can sell ifthey have excess grain. 
• Selling is also at a very low leve!. 
• Seed can be found locally or in other villages. The sellers are not exactly traders but fanners who 
sell their excess grain as seed. Any farmers can sell , depending on their harvest in a particular 
season. 
• Seed can be obtained from local farmers in the same village. No specific fanner is known. Anyone 
with excess grain can sell 
• People come from far away to sell grain that local people can bu y and la ter use for seed. The names 
ofthe sellers are not known. 
It should be noted that a number offanners did comment that they preferred to obtain seed from relatives 
rather than use this market option, although the local market is used more frequently. 
The households surveyed for the case study indicated that normally the local market is relied on for all 
crops. When farmers were asked about the quantities of seed available for purchase in the past, 59% in 
the high-potential areas and 30% in the semiarid areas felt that there were suffi cient quant ities available 
for purchase. However, in the current season, that proportion had fallen to only 17% in the high-potential 
areas and 4% in the semiarid areas. More than 60% of the respondents in both regions said they did not 
know ifthe present quantities would be adequate. Sheen-Sluijer ( 1996) reported that farmers did not find 
infonn al purchase from the local market a very re liable source of seed, although the fanners in their 
study did conclude that if you had enough cash, seed could always be found in suffic ient quantities. It is 
notan easy channel to use and farmers in their study did not find easy access to the seed until the season 
had sta rted and the sellers were confident of their own seed needs. 
The households were asked about assets used to access seed nonnally and for the previous season. 
Normally, households in both regions use poultry, small ruminants, fami ly labor, crop sales, cash or 
remittances, crafts, and vegeta bies to exchange for seed. The number of assets used and their use by the 
households to access seed had not changed in the 2003/04 season. However, the actual value ofthe assets 
in re lation to the quantity of seed that could be acquired was not determined in the survey. So while the 
same asset was u sed, the "cost" of seed per asset m ay ha ve been affected and thus access could ha ve been 
limited beca use of the drought. 
Local seed vendors 
In total, 92 farmers and traders who sold grain or seed were interviewed, of whom 67% were farmer 
vendors. These vendors so ld 14 crops for grain. mainly their own production, except for maize, beans, 
cowpeas, suntlowers, and vegetables where they also so ld grain purchased from other farmers and 
traders. Virtually all the seed sellers were farmers selling their own production. Ofthese seed sellers, 16 
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farmers and six traders offered credit. lt is clear that there is an important informal seed market in 
Zimbabwe and that there are opportunities to strengthen the role of these farmer traders to improve the 
quality oftheir seed and the profitability oftheir seed business. 
Table 3. Crops Sold As Grain or Seed by Vendors in 2002/03 and 2003/0 4 
Crops 
Maize 
Groundnut 
Beans 
Sorghum 
Cowpeas 
Bambara 
Sweet potato 
Pear1 míllet 
Finger millet 
Soybeans 
Wheat 
Rice 
Sunflowers 
Vegetables 
No of 
sellers 
38 
28 
22 
17 
14 
10 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
Grain 
Purchase 
Own from local 
production farmers 
28 4 
28 
18 3 
17 
13 
10 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
Seed 
Purchase 
from other No. of Own 
traders sellers production 
6 8 8 
25 25 
26 24 
12 10 
10 10 
3 3 
3 2 
2 
4 4 
2 3 
3 
2 2 
Purchase 
from local 
farmers 
2 
2 
2 
The premium for seed varied for different crops, but sellers listed a 40% to 60% premium for maize seed, 
50% to 300% for groundnut seed, and up to 200% more for bean seed. Two sellers did not sell for cash 
but gave seed as a gift or exchanged for labor. One seller asserted that local crops were frequently sold 
only among farmers in villages and wards. Overall, 71% of the sellers surveyed sold grain as seed, but 
only 17% had specifically bought grain to sell as seed. The farmer sellers used special methods to store 
seed. These were mainly chemical and traditional methods. Farmers stored the seed in bags in the 
granary and in their home, hung from the roofin the kitchen and put in clay pots. Thus, the survey found 
that local seed sellers exist and are able to produce or bu y grain that was sold as seed. They are very local 
in both their purchase and sales. One agro-dealer did selllocal sorghum grain sometimes when he bought 
it specifically for that purpose. Sales ofseed were made to local farmers (69%), govemment (6%), seed 
houses (4%), grain traders (10%), and NGOs (13%). When asked ifthey could access as much seed as 
they wanted from the local farmers, only about halfthe sellers said yes. When asked ifthey could sell as 
much seed as they wanted, more than 70% said yes. 
In the evaluation ofthe seed vouchers and fairs program implemented by CRS-Zimbabwe and CTDT in 
six of the districts surveyed for the case study, a series of questions were asked of the seed sellers after 
each seed fair (Brame!, 2003b). The survey included 1347 seed sellers from the seed vouchers and fairs 
who sold 31 different crops. The majority of the sellers were farmers (88%) and full-time seed sellers. 
Overall , 72% of the seed sellers were women. Full-time seed sellers were very experienced sellers: 
nearly 70% had sold seed for more than four years, while nearly 30% of the farmers had sold seed for 
more than eight years. All the maize seed was sold by seed companies, stockists, and agro-dealers, but 
the majority of seed sellers for the other crops were farrners. The majori ty of farrners sold their own seed 
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for all crops while part-time seed sellers on ly sold their own seed. Part-time seed sellers were fanners 
who were proficient seed producers, selling seed in their communities if they had a surplus. Full-time 
seed sellers obtained the majori ty of seed they sold from sources other than their own production, 
usually from other local fanners. Thus they were full-time because they consolidated excess grain or 
seed in the community and sold it regularly. They did se ll their own production for sorne crops, for 
example, groundnuts. Other market traders and the fonnal sector were al so sources of seed for farmers 
and full-time seed sellers. 
This assessment ofthe seed sellers at the seed fairs indicates that a very local seed market operates on a 
routine bas is for crops other than maize. The source of seed sold is local but there does seem to be a 
routine demand and specialized suppliers. From the evaluation, it was clear that the CRS seed vouchers 
and fairs program utilized an a lready existing market structure to meet the need of the beneficiaries for 
the seed of a wide range of crops and varieties. 
Summary 
The local seed market in Zimbabwe is very informal. Most of the seed sold is a fanner' s or trader's own 
production. A large number of crops are sold routinely for both cash and credit. The market seems to 
ha ve adequate quality with special seed storage facilities used by most ofthe sellers. The majority ofthe 
potential customers view the supply as unknown, while the seed sellers view the demandas adequate but 
the supply inadequate. 
This information concurs with the observations o f Mheen-Sluijer ( 1996), who described this market as 
dependent on fanner-to-fanner interactions, which resulted in fmmers having to seek out a supplier for 
seed of both local and new varieties. S he describes the local nature of thi s market as being "within the 
area" where "fanners see the crops in the fíe ld and then determine which variety they wish to pl ant the 
next season. Sometimes fanners buy heads when they are ripe, they know it is a good variety and it is 
good quality. Fanners who sell seed are good farmers who grow a variety of crops and usually have a 
good harvest and one can often buy a range of varieties. lf a fanner has a lot of seed to sell , he will 
advertise that there is plenty ofseed for sale. As long as one has money, anyone can be approached to sell 
seed." 
Formal seed sector 
The seed industry in Zimbabwe is one of the largest in A frica. The public sector monitors and controls 
variety releases, multiplication, and di stribution of seed withín the country and for export. The public 
sector also conducts research and deve lopment on a wide range offield and horticultura! crops. For some 
crops, this research is done in coll aboration with intemational agricultura! research centers. The public 
sector is al so involved in seed distribution through relief programs. The priva te sector is responsible for 
seed production and marketing. 1 n addition, a number of priva te companies are involved in research and 
development, mainly for maize. After 1970, all publicly registered varieties were released and marketed 
through one company, Seed Co. The agreement with Seed Co specified producti on and pricing levels, as 
we ll as the retention of carry o ver stocks for seed security of maize, sorghum, wheat, barley, soybeans, 
and groundnuts. This agreement was cancelled in 1997 to make all publicly developed varieties 
available to any company ifthey also agreed to pay royalties on sales and reta in carryover s tocks for seed 
securi ty. No company has come forward to sign any new agreement, with the result that very few new 
public varieties have been available to farmers (Gwarazimba, 2002b). 
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The priva te seed sector consi sts of a number of companies which are focused on crops, vegetables and 
flower seeds. Seed Co, Monsanto, Pannar, and Pioneer do research and development in Zimbabwe while 
National Tested Seeds, Agricultura! Seeds and Services, and Quton Seed Company only do 
multiplication and distribution of seeds. A number of small companies import and market vegetable 
seeds. Based on seed production estima tes in 2002, Seed Co has about 50 percent of the fonnal sector 
market share for cowpeas, 52% for pearl millet, 56% for beans, 59% for open-pollinated maize, 66% for 
hybrid sorghum, 79% for hybrid maize, 91 % for sorghum, 94% for soybeans, and 100% for wheat. 
Agricultura! Seeds and Services has 60% ofthe market for groundnuts. There are 4 companies involved 
in hybrid maize and beans, 3 in open-pollinated maize, pearl mil let, and cowpeas, 2 in soybeans, 
groundnuts, and sorghum, and only 1 company in wheat and cotton (Gwarazimba, 2002b ). 
Informal seed sector 
The infonnal seed sector has attributes of both the formal and the local seed sectors and occupies a 
middle ground between the two. Companies such as National Tested Seeds and Agricultura) Seeds and 
Services purchase seed directly from smallholder or communal farmers. This seed can be of local 
varieties or from production with foundation seed obtained from these companies. These companies and 
others, such as Seed Co and Pannar, collaborate with NGOs to provide foundation seed and to purchase 
seed produced by smallholder fam1ers' groups. In 2002, there were seven NGOs involved in the seed 
sector with the collaboration of ICRISA T and CIMMYT. The crops produced were sorghum, pearl 
millet, open-pollinated maize, and cowpeas. This increasing link between the formal and infonnal 
sectors with the assistance ofthe NGOs has contributed toan increased supply of seeds for these crops. 
Many of these seed projects have focused on increased production by smallholder farmers, training 
farmers on seed production/conservation, and developing marketing links between producer groups and 
the prívate seed companies (Gwarazimba, 2002b). 
Maredia and Howard ( 1998) reviewed the literature on changes in the seed sector in A frica. They 
concluded that the focus by govemments and donors on formal seed sector development had been 
unsuccessful in building demand from the smallholder sector. Such a shift will require increased demand 
for improved varieties of a wider range of crops among smallholder fanners, decreased cost of seed 
production and marketing, improvement in transport and information infrastructure, and reduced 
leaming and transaction costs for new seed enterprises. While their focus is on the seed suppliers, they 
do consider the need to better understand and develop the market demand and to consider the seed 
quality issues of a decentralized seed system. 
Maredia and Howard ( 1998) concluded that seed projects carried out with the assistance ofNGOs and 
the public extension service in Zimbabwe could result in reduced costs in seed production and 
distribution, with trained seed producers in the informal sector and increased market links between the 
informal and formal sectors. They noted that there was a danger that these activities would be dependen! 
on subsidies from the NGO or donar community. Thus the withdrawal ofthese subsidies or the NGOs 
could result in the failure ofthc seed production and market links. This has been the case for a number of 
seed-multiplication projects in Zimbabwe and it continues to be an issue for the future of the informal 
seed sector. This will clearly be the case if the focus of this production is on crops or varieties that are 
distributed for seed relief but not marketed in rural areas to smallholder farmers. 
While seed projects that emphasize increased seed production can result in increased availability ofseed 
of minar crops in remate areas, without a focus on market development among smallholder 
farmer-producers, here might not be a similar increase in access to these crops in these areas dueto poor 
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local markets. Unfortunately, this curren ti y seems to be the case in Zimbabwe. The focus on the informal 
seed supply system without a concurrent focus on the informal seed market system may reduce the cost 
of seed production but will not increase the demand for improved varieties or strengthen distribution 
systems to these same farmers. 
Impact of the relief seed market 
The Zimbabwe seed industry is a major supplier of relief seed in the region (Gwarazimba, 2002a). Most 
sales ofseed have been to Mozambique, Malawi, Angola, Zambia, and South Africa. Much ofthis seed 
is both suppl ied by smallholder farmers and distributed to them through emergency relief programs, 
often by the same NGOs in the same areas. A large proportion of smallholder farmers (85%) in the more 
remote, drier areas of Zimbabwe are willing to pay for high-qual ity seed of minor crops. However, 
despite increased supply, many of these varieties are still not available Locally ata reasonable price. 
Quite s imply, the repeated and persistent distribution of relief seed has stifled the development of a 
viable seed market. 
Smallholders in Zimbabwe have limited access to this fonnaVinformal sector seed since most of the 
research, development, and marketing is done by agribusi ness companies specializing in hybrid maize. 
Most of the distribution is done through a central location by traders who lack knowledge of the 
varieties. In addition, the formal seed companies do not offer credit to the traders or farmers. Thus, only 
small quantities of seed are available in remote areas, or the availabi lity in shops is limited to planting 
time. There is also a limited distributíon network, which results in farmers in remote areas traveling long 
distances to more central points to source seed. Much of the seed that is sold from rural retail and 
wholesale centers is ofpoor qua lity dueto poor handling and storage conditions, and there is inadequate 
production of specific crops and varieties to meet an undeveloped market. Thus, the cost of seed is very 
high, well over 20% of the costs of production. Fanners have very limited access to finances at 
reasonable credit terms at planting time. At the same time, there is limited labor in the rural areas, very 
low land holdings, and limited access to markets with low prices for commodities. Thus, grain is only 
valued at 5% to l 0% of the seed price. 
The local seed system for maize is very different from the other cereals. There has been a shift away from 
own saved seed and greater use of fonnal-sector seed sources. Maize is also a crop that has been 
routinely made available through relief programs; thus, households have come to depend upon this 
source. The impact ofthe frequent distributions ofseed was evident from a discussion held with ZFU in 
Binga (Personal interview, June 2003). First, purchases by the govemment and NGOs in Harare make 
the very limited stocks unavailable in remote markets like Binga or Kariba. Also, the diversity ofhybrids 
available locally is limited since many ofthe seed companies make the less desirable hybrids available 
for sale there. One other consequence is that the agro-dealers and shops in the area are unable to get 
credit from the companies because the seed market is so uncertain with so much free seed being 
distributed. Thus, local sources of formal maize seed ha ve access to very limited supplies, which affects 
possible sales and then influences future access to seed for sales. The other problem is the limited access 
to transport, since these local markets outside of Harare are also not lucrative. In 2003/04, ZFU had 
managed to get Pannar to make seed avai lable for cash sales to farmers in Binga, but a very limited 
supply of a less desirable hybrid. Such a situation further limits fanners' willingness to access 
formal-sector maize from local shops and influences the development of forma l-sector outlets in the 
districts. In the past, both fanners and traders confinned that maize seed was available at local shops, but 
at the time ofthe survey, no local trader indicated they sold maize seed. 
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In Zimbabwe, the majority of smallholder farmers use their own saved seed for crops that are critica! to 
food security. Thus, a seed system must be encouraged that will sustain farmers' saved seed, a local seed 
market, and a viable seed industry. A ll play important roles in agricultura! rehabilitation and 
development. The past focus on seed supply needs to be complemented in the long term with enhanced 
development of market links and a dístríbutíon infrastructure at the local leve/. 8oth of these are 
currently sharply curtai led by the distribution of large quantities of free seed, which biases the 
development of commercial seed markets for alternative crops and sharply reduces incentives to develop 
retail trading networks in rural areas. Thus, addressing the short-term emergency need to enhance 
farmers' access to seed with sorne forrn of direct seed distribution reduces agricultura! rehabilitation 
over the long term. 
Conclusions 
Generally, donors, relief agencies, and government agencies have responded with direct seed 
distributions to a fairly constant need for agricultura! recovery from droughts and floods. These 
distributions have used seed obtained frorn the formal sector and traders in Z irnbabwe, and the need for 
seed has mainly been based on assessments from this sector of seed availability . Farmers ha ve cometo 
rely on this artificial seed channel for hybrid maize and have responded to this routine seed distribution 
with delays in planting, as they wait for the distribution of relief seed .. For other crops, they continue to 
utilize local markets. 
The donors, NGOs, and govemment have sorne knowledge and appreciation of farrner seed systems but 
do not focus emergency responses on enhancing farmers' access to nonnal seed channels, such as the 
local market, when they fail to save enough oftheir own seed or have a need to go outside their home for 
seed of new varieties. Instead, they assume seed is unavailable and make it avai lable locally via direct 
seed distributions. The local seed system is constrained by a poor information infrastructure about 
alternative sources of seed, which include both the informal and formal sectors. 8oth the farmer and the 
formal seed sector are hampered by the poor transportation system and the remo te nature of most of the 
crop production in Zimbabwe. 
Farmers ha ve limited access to formal-sector seed and the cost is high. They ha ve greater access to local 
seed through a very infonnal market, but it is limited by supply, quality, variety choices, and access. This 
informal market is more accessible in rural Zimbabwe than is the forma l seed sector. Farmers are 
interested in new varieties and crops but ha ve limited access except through direct distribution of re lief 
seed. 
The relief seed approach in Zimbabwe has included smallholder farmers as seed suppliers. In sorne 
cases, that has been with the assistance of NGOs and intemational agricultura) research centers in 
producing seed for the formal sector through seed multiplication projects. This increase in seed supply 
and the enbanced links to the forma l sector has increased the supply of seed to the rel ief market, as well 
as increasing the value of the relief seed market to seed companies in Zimbabwe. lt has not necessarily 
increased the supply oflocal seed or enhanced access to local seed for smallholder farmers in rural areas. 
In addition , the impact ofthe direct distribution of relief seed on the formal sector has been to reduce the 
supply of seed to the rural retail level and to increase the supply at central points like Harare. 
Finally, if direct seed distribution is an intervention meant to assist agricultura! systems in recovering 
from a drought or other disaster, then why is there always another request for seed assistance? The 
answer to this question is that the direct distribution approach does not strengthen seed system 
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productivity and resilience, nor does it effectively integrate the different systems farmers use. Past 
distributions have been ineffective in terms of timeliness, crop and variety appropriateness, and 
community/farmer participation and empowerment. Rather, they have dísrupted the development of 
local seed enterprises. There is a critica! need for altemative responses that will strengthen the local seed 
system and its links to the formal sector, with increased emphasis on developing seed enterprises at the 
local leve!. One altemative approach is the use of seed vouchers, which utilize the exist ing local seed 
market to meet the need offarmers affected by a disaster. This alterna ti ve was introduced into Zimbabwe 
in 2003 and was widely implemented in 2004. 
Acronyms 
AREX 
CRS 
CTDT 
FANR 
FAO 
FEWSNET 
FOSENET 
GMB 
NGO 
NR 
SADC 
SCF-UK 
UMP 
UNDP-RRU 
WFP 
ZACH 
ZFU 
ZimVAC 
agriculture research and extension 
Catholic Relief Services 
Conununity Technology Development Trust 
Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources 
Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations 
Food Early Warning System Network 
National NGO Food Security Network 
Grain Marketing Board 
nongovernmental organization 
natural region 
Southem African Development Community 
Save the Children Fund (UK) 
Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe 
United Nations Development Program-Relief and Rehabilitation Unit 
World Food Program 
Zimbabwe Association of Community Hospitals 
Z imbabwe Farmers Union 
Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Conunittee 
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